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CHINA’S RISE: HOW IT TOOK ON THE U.S. 
AT THE WTO 
Gregory Shaffer* 
Henry Gao** 
This Article builds from original fieldwork to show what lies behind 
China’s remarkably successful use of international trade law to take on 
the United States and Europe. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
is unique in China’s international relations as it is the only forum where 
China, with its anti-legalist traditions, has resolved its disputes through 
law and the use of third-party dispute settlement. After China acceded to 
the WTO in 2001, it invested massively in building trade law capacity to 
transform itself and defend itself externally. Through these investments 
and its increased market power, China became a serious rival to the 
United States and Europe in the development and enforcement of interna-
tional trade law. This Article provides the most complete account of this 
important development, which has had significant political impacts within 
the United States and Europe. The Article first explains China’s signifi-
cant trade law capacity-building efforts in government, academia, law 
firms, and business. It then assesses the broader implications for the in-
ternational trade legal order. It shows that global economic order, itself, 
is at stake, affecting citizens around the globe. The Article builds from re-
search involving over a decade of original fieldwork in China, Washing-
ton D.C., Brussels, and Geneva. 
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“We are in the history. We are making the history.”1 
- Peng Jun, Jincheng Tongda & Neal (“JT&N”) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much ink has been spilled on the trade threat of China, but there is little 
knowledge and appreciation of the remarkable institution building in China 
that led it to adapt to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and its rules, an 
international legal order created largely by the United States (“U.S.”) and the 
European Union (“E.U.”). China’s investment in WTO law and policy helped 
to dramatically move China toward a trade-liberal direction, integrate it into 
the global economy, and embed it in existing global economic-governance re-
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Peng Jun, Wo yu WTO de Jige Shunjian [Glimpses of WTO and I], in WO YU WTO: FALVREN DE 
SHIJIAO [ME AND WTO: LAWYER’S PERSPECTIVES] 221 (Yang Guohua & Shi Xiaoli eds., 2016).  
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gimes.2 Many commentators and scholars now challenge China for not abiding 
by international trade law norms.3 Yet, these commentators often underplay or 
fail to acknowledge the baseline from which China started when it was a 
closed economy disengaged from international economic law and institutions.4 
They also fail to acknowledge the United States’ own contribution to its trade 
challenges with China.5 
Many commentators, in parallel, describe a turn away from the rule of 
law in China.6 In trade law, however, China massively invested in developing 
legal capacity to adjust to the WTO requirements that the U.S. pressed upon 
it.7 In the process, China learned how to defend its interests through the WTO 
                                                                                                                                      
 2. EDWARD S. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME: WHY CHINA’S RISE DOESN’T THREATEN THE WEST 
18, 24 (2010) (“The bottom line is that China today is growing not by writing its own rules but instead by in-
ternalizing the rules of the advanced industrial West. . . . This is not a story about China playing its own game. 
Instead, it is a story about China playing our game, a game created and defined by the world’s advanced indus-
trial economies, most notably the United States.”). 
 3. Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261, 261 
(2016) [hereinafter Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge]; cf. THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, THE CHINA CHALLENGE: 
SHAPING THE CHOICES OF A RISING POWER 151 (2015) (“In the United States, many observers use an unhelpful 
measure when they accuse China of economic irresponsibility: the unprecedented bilateral trade deficit be-
tween the United States and China. . . . But economists generally lend little importance to bilateral trade defi-
cits . . . .”); STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME, supra note 2, at 41 (“[There exists] a category of scholars who 
interpret China’s politics-economics disconnect . . . as a departure from globally prevailing rules of fair 
play.”); Bryce Baschuk, China Hasn’t Met WTO Obligations, U.S., EU Say, BLOOMBERG INT’L TRADE REP., 
July 28, 2016 (“U.S. and European Union Trade officials criticized China for what they said was its failure to 
fulfill and adhere to the terms of its 2001 agreement to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). . . . Deputy 
Chief of the U.S. Mission Christopher Wilson criticized a slew of Chinese policies that he said ‘skew the play-
ing field’ in favor of domestic enterprises. He said China hasn’t lived up to its WTO transparency commit-
ments, has a poor record of notifying its subsidies, has failed to provide adequate notification of new economic 
policies and hasn’t provided translations of its laws and regulations.”). See generally TED C. FISHMAN, CHINA 
INC.: HOW THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER CHALLENGES AMERICA AND THE WORLD (2006). 
 4. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME, supra note 2, at 1 (“[T]he China of twenty years ago is so far re-
moved from the present as to feel like a distant dream . . . .”).  
 5. U.S. consumption and borrowing are primarily responsible for the huge U.S. trade deficit with Chi-
na. The resulting global imbalances have created political upheaval in the U.S., where blame has been cast on 
China, but China is not primarily responsible. As Irwin explained: “The trade deficit is impervious to import 
restrictions . . . because it is determined not by trade policies but by net capital flows into the United States. . . . 
[U]nless domestic savings rise (a good thing) or national investment falls (a bad thing), the United States will 
be a recipient of capital from abroad. . . . This, in turn, means that the United States will continue to buy more 
from other countries than they do from it.” Douglas A. Irwin, The False Promise of Protectionism: Why 
Trump’s Trade Policy Could Backfire, 96 FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2017, at 45, 52–53. In the case of China, 
the U.S. sells U.S. Treasury bonds to China at virtually no interest to help finance U.S. consumption and debt. 
The resulting U.S. capital account surplus balances the U.S. current account deficit (i.e., the U.S. trade deficit). 
See Paul Krugman, Tariffs and the Trade Balance (Wonkish) (Updated), N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A 
LIBERAL (Dec. 27, 2016, 11:08 AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/tariffs-and-the-trade-
balance-wonkish/ (“The starting point for a simple analysis of trade balances is the accounting identity, Cur-
rent account + Capital account = 0”). As a matter of basic economics and accounting, the current account defi-
cit (involving trade in goods and services) is offset by the capital account surplus (involving capital inflows), 
reflecting the balance of U.S. national consumption and savings in relation to global consumption and savings. 
See Scott Wolla, Making Sense of the Trade Deficit, PAGE ONE ECON. (Nov. 2016), https://research.stlouisfed. 
org/publications/page1-econ/2016/11/01/international-trade/ (“[T]he net outflow of funds on the goods and 
services side of the ledger (the current account) is offset by the net inflow of funds on the assets side of the 
ledger (the financial and capital account). Because the two accounts must offset each other (as a matter of ac-
counting), if Americans saved more, the trade deficit would be smaller. As such, the U.S. trade deficit says 
more about U.S. national and global saving than trade policy.”).  
 6. See, e.g., Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 935 (2011). 
 7. Id. at 943. 
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against the United States. Built on over a decade of fieldwork, this Article tells 
the original story of how China developed legal capacity to go head-to-head, 
lawyer-to-lawyer, in trade conflicts with the U.S. and Europe and became en-
meshed in transnational legal processes. China, in short, took on the economic 
powers through investing in law, transforming its trade-related laws, institu-
tions, and policies in the process. The U.S. and Europe had long called for 
China to invest in the rule of law.8 China answered that call regarding trade 
law. Our research provides the most thorough and empirically grounded as-
sessment of such developments in China and their implications for the United 
States, Europe, and the international trade legal order. 
These developments are remarkable. Economists explain China’s rise in 
terms of efficiency based on the combination of Western know-how and Chi-
nese wages that triggered the Chinese “manufacturing miracle,” where China 
became a giant in manufacturing in a couple of decades.9 Political scientists, in 
turn, write of China’s rise in terms of its increased economic power.10 But what 
about law? After all, it is not just power and money that rule the world, but  
also law and legal institutions. The three are complementary, and the story of 
China’s rise and its implications for global trade governance needs a comple-
mentary assessment of law. 
International relations scholars stress the importance of who designs and 
drafts international rules to place institutional constraints on others.11 In the 
WTO context, the U.S. and E.U. dominated the design and drafting of the 
WTO and its rules.12 China was not accepted into the WTO until seven years 
later, and, when it was, it appeared to get a terrible deal.13 China had to agree 
to China-specific rules that granted other WTO members greater rights against 
China, and China fewer rights against them, compared to the standard provi-
sions of the WTO treaties.14 And yet, through China’s investment in legal ca-
pacity, it was able to become a legal rival to the U.S. and Europe, who now 
                                                                                                                                      
 8. See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB91121, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES, at CRS-
12 (2003) (“The Clinton Administration further maintained that China’s accession to the WTO would promote 
U.S. economic and strategic interests, namely by inducing China to deepen market reforms [and] promote the 
rule of law . . . .”); Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 603, 
604 (2003) (“As early as 1994, President Clinton had expressed ‘support for efforts underway in China to 
promote the rule of law’ . . . .”). 
 9. RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW 
GLOBALIZATION 135 (2016). 
 10. Gregory Chin, Two-Way Socialization: China, the World Bank, and Hegemonic Weakening, 19 
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 211, 212 (2012).  
 11. Cf. LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 10 (2000); G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND 
THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 1 (2000); G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Fu-
ture of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?, FOREIGN AFF. (2008), https://www.foreignaffairs. 
com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west. 
 12. IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY, supra note 11, at 244–45. 
 13. See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB91121, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES, at CRS-9 
(2001). 
 14. See infra note 99. 
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suggest that the rules favor China.15 China successfully moved from being a 
“rule taker” to a “rule shaker” to a “rule maker.”16 How did this come to be? 
The Article shows how trade law is a two-level game involving the inter-
action of domestic and international law and policy.17 The WTO and its rules 
create an institutional context that plays into law and policy developments 
within China, with actors using international legal norms as leverage to ad-
vance internal positions.18 China’s response, in turn, helps shape the interna-
tional trade legal order. These developments affect U.S. and European domes-
tic perceptions of the legal order and their responses to it, which in turn further 
shape, or erode, that legal order. Whether one views China’s investment in 
trade law cynically as a threat to U.S. and European interests or as welfare-
enhancing for China and the world, these developments need to be understood. 
This Article first assesses the transformations China made in government, 
academia, law firms, and business to build capacity in trade law. It finds that 
such investment embedded key parts of the Chinese government and Chinese 
stakeholders in transnational legal processes of international economic integra-
tion and cooperation. It rooted China in an international dispute settlement 
process through law and a third-party institution. In no other area of interna-
tional relations has China agreed to resolve its foreign conflicts through deci-
sions of an international court.19 In fact, China’s traditional response to binding 
third-party dispute settlements is illustrated by its rejection of the rulings of the 
Permanent Court of International Arbitration in the South China Sea dispute as 
“waste paper.”20 
                                                                                                                                      
 15. Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker, and 
Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT 153, 162, 167–172 
(Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck ed., 2011) [hereinafter Gao, China’s Ascent]. 
 16. Id. at 167–72. 
 17. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L 
ORG. 427, 459–60 (1988). 
 18. Cf. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: 
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 34 (2002) (referring to 
such contests as “palace wars” among competing elites); Margaret M. Pearson, The Case of China’s Accession 
to GATT/WTO, in THE MAKING OF CHINESE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE ERA OF REFORM, 1978–
2000, 337, 364 (David M. Lampton ed., 2001) (Premier Zhu Rongji finding that “the only way to break the 
hold of the ‘old’ economy and its champions was to force change on it via the stringent requirements imposed 
by WTO rules”). 
 19. Compare Gao, China’s Ascent, supra note 15, 167–72, with Owen Bowcott et al., Beijing Rejects 
Tribunal’s Ruling in South China Sea Case, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016, 1:21 PM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china. 
 20. See Simon Denyer & Emily Rauhala, Beijing’s Claims to South China Sea Rejected By International 
Tribunal, WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/beijing-remains-angry-defiant 
-and-defensive-as-key-south-china-sea-tribunal-ruling-looms/2016/07/12/11100f48-4771-11e6-8dac-0c6e4acc 
c5b1_story.html?utm_term=.25cad7c3679c (“Foreign Minister Wang Yi was quoted as telling Secretary of 
State John F. Kerry last week that the case was a ‘farce.’ His ministry said it was delusional to think China 
would bow to diplomatic pressure to accept the ruling.”); Bowcott et al., supra note 19 (“Xinhua, [China]’s 
official news agency, hit out at what it described as an ‘ill-founded’ ruling that was ‘naturally null and 
void.’”); Jane Perlez, Panel Rejects China’s Claims in Sea Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.html (“In a tough 
speech in Washington last week, a former senior Chinese official, Dai Bingguo, said that the findings would 
amount to no more than ‘waste paper’ and that China would not back down from its activities in the South 
China Sea . . . .”). 
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Second, the Article assesses the implications of China’s ability to use in-
ternational trade law against the U.S. and Europe for the multilateral trade sys-
tem itself. The Article shows how domestic and international law and policy 
interact and cannot be understood in isolation from each other. Such interac-
tion involves processes of transnational legal ordering and disordering. The Ar-
ticle shows how China invested in developing legal capacity to defend its in-
terests, transform itself, and, in the process, become the rival of the U.S. and 
the E.U. before the WTO dispute settlement system. China’s investment, in 
turn, spurred reactions in the U.S. and Europe that could call into question the 
future of the international economic legal order.21 Much is at stake. Less than a 
century ago, during the inter-war period in the 1930s, the world experienced 
the dangers of unilateralism, protectionism, extremism, and great power rivalry 
unconstrained by international law and institutions.22 A return to great power 
economic rivalry and protectionist practices could bring dire consequences. 
The remainder of this Article is in eight parts. Part II introduces the Arti-
cle’s theoretical frame of transnational legal ordering and the Article’s meth-
odology. Part III sets the background by reviewing the considerable challenges 
that China faced in adapting its laws, institutions, and practices upon joining 
the WTO. Part IV explains China’s initiatives within government to build 
trade-related legal capacity to comply with WTO law and represent China ex-
ternally in negotiations, legal monitoring, and dispute settlement. Part V de-
scribes Chinese initiatives in academia, Part VI in law firms, and Part VII in 
companies and industry associations. Part VIII first analyzes the broader impli-
cations and limits of the WTO’s impact within China. It then assesses the im-
plications of China’s rise, and the ensuing U.S. and European reaction, for the 
international trade legal order itself. 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. To start, President Donald Trump won the 2016 U.S. election due to his victory in the “rust belt” 
states of Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; he won those states because he successfully lambasted 
trade from China for its “cheating” on “disastrous” trade deals. See Donald J. Trump, Jobs Plan Campaign 
Speech at Monessen, Pennsylvania (June 28, 2016) (“China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization has 
enabled the greatest jobs theft in history. . . . China cheated on its currency, added another trillion dollars to 
our trade deficits, and stole hundreds of billions of dollars in our intellectual property.”); DAVID AUTOR ET AL., 
IMPORTING POLITICAL POLARIZATION? THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF RISING TRADE EXPOSURE 34 n.50 
(2016) (“We calculate that a 50 percent ceteris paribus reduction in the China trade shock between 2000-14 
would have tipped the (narrow) voter majority in the states of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, leading 
to an Electoral College victory for candidate Hillary Clinton.”); Michael Schuman, Is China Stealing Jobs? It 
May Be Losing Them, Instead, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/23/ 
business/international/china-jobs-donald-trump.html (“Throughout his presidential campaign, Donald J. 
Trump has claimed that China is stealing American manufacturing jobs.”); see also David H. Autor et al., The 
China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 205, 
214–15 (2016). Now the future of the World Trade Organization as a guardian of global economic order is in 
question. 
 22. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PEDDLING PROTECTIONISM: SMOOT-HAWLEY AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1–9 
(2011). 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMING AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Frame of Transnational Legal Ordering 
This Article assesses the linkages between international and national 
trade law from the perspective of transnational legal ordering. By transnational 
legal ordering, we refer to the recursive interaction and impacts of international 
law, national law, and local practice on each other.23 These impacts involve 
law, institutions, professions, and professional practices conducted within par-
ticular normative frames.24 The processes involve both strategic action and so-
cial interaction because any strategic action takes place within existing institu-
tional contexts, and socialization occurs within institutional frames shaped by, 
and reflecting the positions of, powerful actors.25 
This approach permits us to go beyond the study of the formal relation of 
treaties and national law in China26 and the study of Chinese compliance with 
                                                                                                                                      
 23. See TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 1–2 (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013) (defin-
ing transnational legal ordering in terms of the processes through which legal norms are constructed and con-
veyed vertically and horizontally); Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 1, 1–11 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015) (defining trans-
national legal orders as a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that 
authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions). For earlier important 
work in this vein, see generally RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 745–46 (2006). On recursivity, see Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, 
The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate 
Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135, 1135 (2007). For work in political science regarding the two-way 
flow of norms between China and international economic institutions, see Chin, supra note 10, at 211–13. 
 24. See Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 
(2015) [hereinafter Shaffer, WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance]. 
 25. Our approach has parallels with two-level game theory in addressing the interaction of domestic and 
international law and politics. See Putnam, supra note 17, at 434. Overall, our approach most closely resem-
bles historical institutional theory in international relations, as a complement to rationalist and social construc-
tivist theories. For the realist approach to international law, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE 
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005), and for its application to China, see Mark Wu, The End of an Era 
for Global Trade: Resetting U.S. Trade Policy in the Wake of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Demise (draft on 
file with authors) [hereinafter Wu, The End of an Era for Global Trade]. For a rational institutional approach, 
see ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY ix (2008). For a 
constructivist approach, see JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 13 (2010), and for its application to China, see 
ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 1980–2000 38 (2008). 
For an application of the English School of international relations to China regarding China’s place in “inter-
national society,” see Ian Clark, International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of Pow-
er, CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 315, 316, 319, 321, 334 (2014). On historical institutionalism, see generally Thomas 
Rixen & Lora Anne Viola, Historical Institutionalism and International Relations: Towards Explaining 
Change and Stability in International Institutions, in HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM & INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD POLITICS 4 (Thomas Rixen et al. eds., 
2016). For an overview of such approaches, see generally ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1997). For a discussion of these theories in relation to China in international rela-
tions, including “power transition theory,” which is a variant of realism applied to rising powers, see Christo-
pher Herrick, The Perspectives of International Relations Theory, in CHINA’S PEACEFUL RISE: PERCEPTIONS, 
POLICY AND MISPERCEPTIONS 43, 44 (Christopher Herrick et al. eds., 2016). 
 26. For excellent overviews, see generally Xue Hanqin et al., China, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 155 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005); Xue Hanqin & Jin Qian, International Treaties in the Chi-
nese Domestic Legal System, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 299 (2009). See also XUE HANQIN, CHINESE 
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international law.27 Its aim is to more deeply probe the impact of the interna-
tional trade law regime on institutions and professions within China, including 
impacts within government, academia, law firms, business, and private trade 
associations.28 The approach provides a framework for our empirical investiga-
tion of how the development of transnational legal ordering depends on legal 
infrastructure that penetrates and permeates national institutions and profes-
sions. We aim to open the black box of the development of China’s interna-
tional trade-related legal capacity by disaggregating the Chinese state.29 Our 
approach, thus, contrasts with those treating China as if it were a billiard ball—
a homogenous, singular, coherent entity whose policies can be fully under-
stood from its structural position in international relations.30 
We do not suggest that structural context and strategic exercise of power 
do not matter. Rather, we contend that developments in international regimes 
and domestic institutions interact, and we should analyze these interactions. 
Thus, our transnational framework calls for the reciprocal assessment of the 
implications of internal changes within China for the international trade legal 
order itself.31 From the perspective of transnational legal ordering, internation-
                                                                                                                                      
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 22–40 (2012) [hereinafter HANQIN, CHINESE 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES] (addressing Chinese views of international law generally). 
 27. See, e.g., Timothy Webster, China’s Implementation of WTO Decisions, in CHINA IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 98, 110 (Lisa Toohey et al. 
eds., 2015) [hereinafter Webster, China’s Implementation] (noting that China’s compliance record is better 
than that of the U.S. and the E.U. and further noting that “China has made major revisions to its domestic legal 
system in order to comply with the DSB rulings. Moreover, China has done so typically within the reasonable 
period of time in which it agreed to do so”); see also Guang Ma & Jiang Li, A Legalization Theory Based Re-
sponse to Timothy Webster’s ‘Paper Compliance’ of China in WTO Dispute Settlement, 10 ASIAN J. WTO & 
INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 541, 575 (2015); Timothy Webster, Paper Compliance: How China Implements 
WTO Decisions, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 525, 528 (2014) [hereinafter Webster, Paper Compliance]. 
 28. On professionalization in China, see generally PROSPECTS FOR THE PROFESSIONS IN CHINA, (William 
P. Alford et al. eds., 2011); Sida Liu & Hongqi Wu, The Ecology of Organizational Growth: Chinese Law 
Firms in the Age of Globalization, 122 AM. J. SOC. 798, 828 (2016). For previous studies on India and Brazil 
in relation to the global trade regime, see Hugo Perezcano, Peeling NAFTA Layers: Twenty Years Later, CTR. 
FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (CIGI Papers No. 68), May 2015, at 3–6 (discussing the impact of 
NAFTA on Mexico); Gregory Shaffer et al., State Transformation and the Role of Lawyers: The WTO, India 
and Transnational Legal Ordering, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 595 (2015); Gregory Shaffer et al., The Trials of 
Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383, 384–85 (2008) [herein-
after Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning]; see also Shaffer, WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, supra note 
24, at 10.  
 29. See SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 5 (2007) (“Our best chance of avoiding antago-
nism with China is to open up the black box of Chinese domestic politics, look inside, and figure out what 
makes China act as it does on the world stage. We find a society drastically changed by economic reforms and 
opening to the world.”).  
 30. Cf. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 5–6 (2004) (“Stop imagining the international 
system as a system of states—unitary entities like billiard balls. . . . Seeing the world through the lenses of 
disaggregated rather than unitary states allows leaders, policymakers, analysts, or simply concerned citizens to 
see features of the global political system that were previously hidden.”); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 180 (1979); Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, 
19 INT’L SECURITY 5, 12 (1994) (“Realism takes the view that even if states change internally, the structure of 
the international political system remains the same. As systematic structure is the primary determinant of in-
ternational political outcomes, structural constraints mean that similarly placed states will act similarly, regard-
less of their domestic political systems.”). 
 31. Cf. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 14 (2000) (“Micro-
macro theory” attempts to build theory “by comprehending micro processes that constitute structural change, 
just as those micro processes are constituted and contained by the structural.”). 
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al trade law involves not just law at the international level, but dynamic inter-
actions within states, between states, and with international organizations, im-
plicating international, national, and local law and practice. These interactions 
drive transnational legal settlement, unsettlement, and change. In the case of 
China’s rise and the U.S. response to it, current developments in the U.S.-
China relationship could put the international trade legal order at risk. 
B. Methodology 
This Article builds from over a decade of fieldwork and in-depth, semi-
structured elite interviews with Chinese officials, Chinese academics, Chinese 
lawyers, and foreign lawyers, the latter respectively representing China, the 
U.S., the E.U., and companies implicated by Chinese practices, members of 
Chinese think tanks, and Chinese company and industry association repre-
sentatives. We conducted forty formal interviews with over sixty individuals in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Brussels, Geneva, and Washington D.C. The 
vast majority of the interviews were with one interviewee, but some interviews 
included small groups of colleagues in government, law firms, academia, and 
think tanks. The interviews lasted from one to two hours. We arranged them 
most frequently in the interviewee’s office, but we also held them in neutral 
fora like restaurants and cafes. We conducted the vast majority of the inter-
views together. 
We began the interviews with open-ended questions regarding the inter-
viewee’s background and experience, the challenges China faces, and the de-
velopment of Chinese legal capacity. We did so to gain the interviewee’s trust 
and to obtain the interviewee’s perspectives without steering them with our 
questions.32 We also asked each interviewee a common set of questions to 
cross-check what we learned. We asked the questions to a diverse range of in-
formants with different interests—such as in government, in the private sector, 
and from outside China—to check statements for consistency, complementari-
ty, and contradiction. In a number of cases, we interviewed the same individual 
more than once, which allowed us to corroborate information, assess trends, 
and evaluate ideas raised over the project’s course.33 
We also engaged in participant observation as we were each part of meet-
ings with Chinese officials and other Chinese stakeholders. Shaffer worked 
with the nongovernmental organization, the International Center of Trade and 
Sustainable Development (“ICTSD”), on its WTO dispute settlement and de-
                                                                                                                                      
 32. See LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, ELITE AND SPECIALIZED INTERVIEWING 5–6 (1970) (“In elite inter-
viewing . . . the investigator is willing, and often eager to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the 
question, the situation is—to the limits, of course, of the interviewer’s ability to perceive relationships to his 
basic problems, whatever these may be. . . . [I]n an elite interview, an exception, a deviation, an unusual inter-
pretation may suggest a revision, a reinterpretation, an extension, a new approach.”).  
 33. Id. at 43 (“Field research, that is, always ought to be and frequently is a process of continuing dis-
covery. One is learning how to reformulate or at least modify one’s formulation of a problem; one is locating 
new data. So, the decision as to whom to see depends largely upon one’s on-going reflection about the issues, 
upon new data and hypotheses that come to one’s attention, from whatever source—often from earlier inter-
views.”) (footnote omitted).  
SHAFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2018 9:58 AM 
124 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
veloping countries project in which Chinese officials participated in Beijing, 
Geneva, and Jakarta.34 Gao worked as a dispute settlement lawyer in the WTO 
Secretariat, as a consultant to the Chinese government, and as a resource per-
son in various technical assistance initiatives sponsored by the WTO, such as 
the Regional Trade Policy Course for Asia Pacific and the WTO Chairs pro-
gram. This work enabled us to observe discussions among stakeholders, as 
well as to engage in informal discussions that supplemented our formal inter-
views. 
Qualitative empirical studies such as this one enable us to unpack the 
processes and mechanisms through which legal ordering takes place, and, in 
this respect, complement and help orient quantitative empirical studies. As 
with all empirical studies, this study needs to be wary of biases.35 We have 
done our best to reduce those biases by cross-checking information obtained 
from informants with people who have different material interests, as well as 
by corroborating such information through a review of primary and secondary 
sources in Chinese and in English. In this way, we aimed to triangulate infor-
mation from multiple sources. 
As with any empirical study, there are limits to this one. The information 
we present captures predominantly one part of China’s government, which is 
that involved directly in trade policy, and predominantly one group of stake-
holders, those whose profession or business is linked to international trade. The 
information we provide, about this part of China’s government and professions 
in relation to other parts, reflects our informants’ views. Nonetheless, our 
sources stressed the limits of their positions in the context of internal Chinese 
contests over the role of trade law and the directions of China’s economic poli-
cy, as our Article shows. Moreover, we combined our fieldwork with a review 
of primary and secondary sources in Chinese and English, and we tried to limit 
bias by asking questions to those with different interests in China and abroad. 
In any case, this research provides the most original, thorough, and empirically 
grounded analysis of China’s development of legal capacity in trade and that 
development’s implications within China, as well as for the international trade 
legal order itself. 
                                                                                                                                      
 34. The project gave rise to the book DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
EXPERIENCE (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz eds., 2010). 
 35. As with any study, there is the challenge of the writers’ backgrounds reflecting their experiences and 
presuppositions, which we acknowledge and have been transparent about. See, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Partici-
pant Observation, 9 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 281, 283–85 (2003). Empirical study nonetheless is 
vastly superior to the alternative of armchair theorizing provided it is sufficiently reflexive of its approach and 
findings, and thus Bourdieu grounded his social theory in empirical study. While empirical approaches are 
never entirely “correct” in the sense of finding truth, from a pragmatist perspective, they are “the best way for 
us to proceed toward a better understanding of the world in which law operates.” See Gregory C. Shaffer, New 
Legal Realism and International Law, in 2 STUDYING LAW GLOBALLY: NEW LEGAL REALIST PERSPECTIVES 
(Heinz Klug et al. eds., 2016); see also Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, 2 WIS. L. 
REV. 482, 483–84 (2005) (“[T]he power of social science methodology [is] to push us beyond our personal 
politics or situations, to enforce a form of humility in which we must listen to voices other than our own.”). 
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III. CHINA’S CHALLENGES IN JOINING THE WTO 
The WTO is conventionally viewed as a creation of the U.S. and the 
E.U., which harnessed the opportunities provided by greater ideological con-
sensus at the end of the Cold War and the shift toward export-oriented devel-
opment models to advance liberal trade norms.36 At the time that the WTO 
agreements were signed in 1994, the U.S. and E.U. collectively represented 
56% of global gross domestic product (“GDP”) in real terms and 45% in terms 
of purchasing power parity.37 Because of the importance of their markets, they 
exercised considerable economic power and leverage during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations that led to the WTO’s creation.38 Commentators viewed 
the WTO as a victory of economic liberalism and described it in constitutional 
terms.39 
China was not an original WTO member.40 To join the organization, it 
agreed to a stringent accession protocol in November 2001 that granted greater 
rights to other WTO members against China, and reduced China’s rights 
against them, compared to standard WTO rules.41 China agreed to open its 
markets to eliminate state monopolies on imports and exports and to signifi-
cantly change its laws, regulations, and practices.42 Scores of Chinese officials, 
judges, and scholars came to the U.S. for training in WTO law, and scores of 
experts went to China to teach WTO law under technical-assistance and capac-
                                                                                                                                      
 36. See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 56 (2006). Ikenberry views the Bretton Woods institutions as an 
example of the constitutional ordering of international relations in line with the interests of a hegemonic or 
leading state that, in turn, agrees to limits its power through these institutions. G. John Ikenberry, Constitution-
al Politics in International Relations, 4 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 147, 168 (1998); GRUBER, supra note 11.  
 37. See GDP (Current Prices, US Dollars) Data for Year 1994, All Countries, ECON. WATCH, 
http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/economic-
indicators/GDP_Current_Prices_US_Dollars/1994/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2017); GDP (PPP), US Dollars Data 
for Year 1994, All Countries, ECON. WATCH, http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/economic-
indicators/GDP_PPP_US_Dollars/1994/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
 38. See HUGO PAEMEN & ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 91, 93 (1995). 
 39. See, e.g., DEBORAH CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 16 (2005); JOHN 
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 8 (1998); ERNST-ULRICH 
PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND 
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS 129 (2012); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional 
Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 651 
(2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623, 633 (2006). These changes 
at the international level were complemented by the rise of constitutional courts and judicial review of national 
legislation in countries around the world, which further diffused a liberal order. See, e.g., CULTURES OF 
LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA 142 (Javier Couso et al. eds., 
2010); COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 2 (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Ríos-Figueroa eds., 2011); TOM GINSBURG, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 21 (2003); Victor Fer-
reres Cornelia, The Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 265, 
265 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). 
 40. Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge, supra note 3, at 265 (2016). 
 41. See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 42. Henry Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SING. Y.B. INT’L 41, 49 
(2007) [hereinafter Gao, China’s Participation]. 
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ity-building initiatives.43 The U.S. and the E.U. hoped to use China’s accession 
to the WTO to transform China into a market economy and to encourage it to 
move towards a liberal democracy.44 It was a time of U.S. triumphalism. 
By 2009, however, following the global financial crisis, the continued 
rise of China as an economic power and the significant strengthening of Chi-
na’s legal capacity to defend its interests in WTO dispute settlement and nego-
tiations dramatically changed the situation.45 China increasingly asserted its 
rights as a rival to the U.S. and E.U.46 It had little to learn from them after their 
economic governance models lost credibility during the 2008 Great Recession. 
By 2010, China had become the world’s second largest economy, surpassing 
Japan.47 By 2013, it became the world’s largest trader in goods, surpassing the 
United States.48 Forecasters expect that China will surpass the U.S. as the 
world’s largest economy by 2028.49 In law and development circles, one heard 
of a new “Beijing consensus” as displacing, or at least rivaling, the neoliberal 
“Washington consensus.”50 
A. The WTO’s Significance for China 
Economic development is critical for the Chinese government, which 
hopes to avoid being mired in a “middle-income trap” where the country is 
both less competitive in low-wage production (because wages have risen) and 
unable to compete in high-value-added markets.51 Trade (imports plus exports) 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR 
WTO MEMBERSHIP AND FOREIGN TRADE LAW REFORM 3–4 (2001); Yang Guohua, China in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement: A Memoir, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 3–5 (2015) [hereinafter Guohua, A Memoir]. 
 44. See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 45. Cf. HO-FUNG HUNG, THE CHINA BOOM: WHY CHINA WILL NOT RULE THE WORLD 83 (2016); 
MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE BIRTH OF A 
NEW GLOBAL ORDER 163 (2009). 
 46. See generally JACQUES, supra note 45. 
 47. The World Bank in China: Overview, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/ 
en/country/china/overview (last visited Nov. 11, 2017); see David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-
Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/ 
16yuan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. But compare the UN measurement of “inclusive wealth” regarding a 
country’s underlying “stock of assets” in terms of “(i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, and 
equipment, (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, ecosys-
tems, the atmosphere),” in which the U.S. is estimated to have an inclusive wealth of almost $144 trillion, 
which is 4.5 times that of China’s $32 trillion. See Stephen Brooks & William Wohlforth, The Once and Fu-
ture Superpower: Why China Won’t Overtake the United States, FOREIGN AFF. 91, 93–94 (2016).  
 48. Angela Monaghan, China Surpasses U.S. as World’s Largest Trading Nation, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/10/china-surpasses-us-world-largest-trading-nation. 
 49. Pankaj Ghemawat & Thomas Hout, Can China’s Companies Conquer the World?, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 
86 (2016). 
 50. See STEFAN HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: LEGITIMIZING AUTHORITARIANISM IN OUR TIME 26 
(2012); John Williamson, Is the “Beijing Consensus” Now Dominant?, 13 ASIA POL’Y 3 (2012). 
 51. RANDALL PEERENBOOM & TOM GINSBURG, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE INCOME 
COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP (2014); Randall Peerenboom, Revamping the China Model 
for the Post-Global Financial Crisis Era: The Emerging Post-Washington, Post-Beijing Consensus, in CHINA 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 11 (Lisa Toohey et 
al. eds., 2015). This development model has been extraordinarily successful, as China experienced an average 
of 10% growth over thirty years, the poverty rate plummeted from 84% in 1981 to 16% in 2005, and China has 
become the world’s largest trader in goods. See The World Bank in China: Overview, supra note 47; William-
son, supra note 50, at 4.  
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represents over 30% of China’s GDP,52 so international trade law has huge im-
plications for the Chinese economy and the Chinese government. 
Managing its trade relations is crucial not only for China’s economic de-
velopment, but also for its political stability. China has a strong state under an 
authoritarian (formally Marxist) government.53 The Chinese state significantly 
invests in industrial policies, ranging from direct state ownership to state sub-
sidization of economic sectors, including (as alleged by the U.S. and E.U.) 
through state bank financing at lower-than-market rates, state companies sell-
ing manufacturing inputs at less-than-market value, and a state innovation pol-
icy that promotes indigenous research and development to upgrade China’s 
economy.54 China’s state-owned enterprises still control over 38% of China’s 
industrial assets.55 At the same time, however, there is intense competition be-
tween firms. Even where the Chinese state controls an economic sector, it has 
tried to foster competition among different state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) 
within that sector.56 Law and lawyers play increasingly important roles in this 
mixed economy, whether one views it as “socialist with Chinese characteris-
tics” or “capitalist with Chinese characteristics.”57 Although many commenta-
                                                                                                                                      
 52. Merchandise Trade (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). China’s trade with Asia and the United States has in-
creased over four-fold since China joined the WTO in 2001, and over eight-fold since 1998. See CHRISTENSEN, 
supra note 3, at 58.  
 53. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at xvii. 
 54. See David Wertime, It’s Official: China Is Becoming a New Innovation Powerhouse, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Feb. 7, 2014,, 12:05 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/07/its-official-china-is-becoming-a-new-
innovation-powerhouse/. 
 55. See Fan Gang & Nicholas Hope, The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy, in 
US–CHINA 2022: ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS (China-United States Exchange Foundation 
ed., 2013), http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/index-page_id=1480.html (over 40%); Enda Curran, State 
Companies: Back on China’s To-Do List, BLOOMBERG BUSSINESSWEEK., (July 30, 2015. 2:19 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-30/china-s-state-owned-companies-may-face-reform (cit-
ing JPMorgan Chase). See generally NICHOLAS LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESS 
IN CHINA (2014).  
 56. See Henry Gao, Telecommunications Reform in China: Fostering Competition Through State Inter-
vention, in WTO DOMESTIC REGULATION AND SERVICES TRADE: PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE 142, 142 
(Aik Hoe Lim & Bart De Meester eds., 2014) (noting how China deliberately created and reorganized the tele-
com firms to foster competition in the sector and promote its development); see also Angela Huyue Zhang, 
Antitrust Regulation of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND 85, 105–06 
(Liebman & Milhaupt eds., 2015) (“Contrary to the popular perception that all SOEs are monopolies, the vast 
majority of SOEs operate in competitive sectors and compete head-to-head with nonstate firms.”). There is 
nonetheless some pressure to consolidate for purposes of international competitiveness. 
 57. The government’s official stance is “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” but some contend that 
“capitalism with Chinese characteristics” is a better label. See JOHN BRYAN STARR, UNDERSTANDING CHINA: 
A GUIDE TO CHINA’S ECONOMY, HISTORY AND POLITICAL CULTURE 116 (3d ed. 2010). There is some ambiva-
lence in the government as well, as reflected in China’s contention that it has a “market economy” for purposes 
of anti-dumping cases abroad and before the WTO. Cf. YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE (2008); Zheng Liang & Lan Xue, The Evolution of 
China’s IPR System and its Impact on the Innovative Performance of MNCs and Local Firms in China, in 
LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (David Kennedy & Joseph Stiglitz eds., 2015); see also REGULATING THE VISIBLE 
HAND (Liebman & Milhaupt eds., 2015) (book on China’s “state capitalism” involving “the combination of 
capitalist institutions and state power”). 
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tors maintain there has been a turn away from law in general,58 business, in-
vestment, and trade law flourish, creating new career opportunities for law-
yers.59 
The WTO system is more legalized and judicialized than any other area 
of international relations at the multilateral level.60 The WTO’s complex legal 
framework includes nineteen main agreements, the acquis developed under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) since 1948, and the deci-
sions and understandings adopted by various WTO bodies since 1995.61 The 
WTO’s compulsory dispute settlement system has given rise to over 90,000 
pages of jurisprudence developed by WTO dispute settlement panels and the 
Appellate Body in over three hundred decisions.62 
Given the extent of Chinese trade and the role of the state in China’s de-
velopment, Chinese exports face close regulatory and legal scrutiny around the 
world. They have triggered far more anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and 
other import relief measures than products from any other country.63 By 2009, 
China “was the object of 40 percent of total anti-dumping investigations and 
75 percent of countervailing duties (tariffs) in the world.”64 China also faces a 
growing number of international trade disputes regarding Chinese internal 
measures, particularly with the U.S. and E.U. Since joining the WTO, China 
has been a party in fifty-four WTO cases and a third party in an additional 136 
cases.65 As a respondent, it has had to defend more cases than any other WTO 
member except the U.S. or the E.U., even though it only acceded to the WTO 
in late 2001, seven years after the WTO’s creation.66 In contrast, China has 
never agreed to be a party before any other international tribunal, such as the 
                                                                                                                                      
 58. Cf. Minzner, supra note 6, at 960. But cf. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD 
RULE OF LAW 468 (2002); Neysun A. Mahboubi et al., The Future of China’s Legal System, CHINAFILE (Aug. 
11, 2016), http://www.chinafile.com/viewpoint/future-of-chinas-legal-system. 
 59. In a book otherwise criticizing U.S. optimists about change in China, James Mann wrote,  
[T]he initiatives for rule of law in China appear to have made some progress when it comes to business 
disputes. The leadership knows that in order to continue to attract and retain foreign investment, it needs 
to show that there are courts, arbitration panels, or other mechanisms for resolving disputes about money. 
JAMES MANN, THE CHINA FANTASY 20–21 (2007); see also Sida Liu et al., Mapping the Ecology of China’s 
Corporate Legal Sector: Globalization and Its Impact on Lawyers and Society, ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 273, 273 
(2016); see infra Part VI. 
 60. Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning, supra note 28, at 388. 
 61. Id. at 406. 
 62. Shaffer, WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, supra note 24, at 5. 
 63. Gao, China’s Participation, supra note 42, at 62. 
 64. DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA GOES GLOBAL: THE PARTIAL POWER 160 (2013). Chinese products are 
far more subject to anti-dumping measures worldwide than products from other countries. See PETER VAN DEN 
BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 680 (3d ed. 2013). Between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2014, other countries initiated 
1,052 anti-dumping investigations and applied 759 anti-dumping duties against Chinese products. Statistics on 
Anti-Dumping, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsByExp 
Cty.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 65. Disputes by Member, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 66. Id. 
SHAFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2018 9:58 AM 
No. 1] CHINA’S RISE 129 
International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal of the Law of the 
Sea, despite its many territorial disputes with other countries.67 
In the area of international trade, the U.S., the E.U., and China have con-
fronted their differences and resolved their disputes through law before WTO 
dispute settlement panels.68 As a consequence, China has had to develop sig-
nificant legal capacity to engage effectively with the WTO system; it has de-
voted significant resources to build that capacity within the government, aca-
demia, law firms, and business.69 
B. China’s Challenges 
On November 10, 2001, WTO members approved the terms of China’s 
accession to the WTO at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha.70 It was a 
momentous occasion for China, which had formally filed a request to resume 
its status as a contracting party to the GATT in July 1986, over fifteen years 
earlier, and nine years before the WTO’s creation.71 As a new WTO member, 
China could enjoy guaranteed access to other members’ markets on a most-
favored-nation basis, backed by a quasi-automatic dispute settlement process.72 
It could also participate in the creation of new WTO law through trade negotia-
tions and the interpretation of existing WTO law through trade litigation.73 
Although the terms of China’s negotiations pitted rival factions within 
China against each other,74 there was huge enthusiasm in China once the coun-
try joined the WTO.75 The government sponsored numerous WTO-related ini-
                                                                                                                                      
 67. Marcia Don Harpaz, China and International Tribunals: Onward from the WTO, in CHINA IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 45 (Lisa Toohey et al. eds., 
2015); cf. supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 68. Xiaowen Zhang & Xiaoling Li, The Politics of Compliance with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement 
Rulings in China, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 143, 144–47 (2014). 
 69. Id. at 144. 
 70. WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 10, 2001), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm.  
 71. China was an original member of the GATT in 1948, but the Kuomintang government in Taiwan, 
which occupied the Chinese seat at that time, withdrew from the GATT in May 1950. For more details on the 
legal controversy surrounding the withdrawal and the history of the accession process, see Gao, China’s Par-
ticipation, supra note 42, at 41–48. 
 72. Id. at 48. 
 73. Henry Gao, China in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: From Passive Rule-Taker to Active Rule-
Maker?, in A DECADE IN THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE 17 (Ricardo 
Meléndez-Ortiz et al. eds., 2011). 
 74. SHIRK, supra note 29, at 228–30. For example, when the U.S. released a negotiating text, China’s 
Premier Zhu Rongji “was met by a firestorm of criticism from agriculture and industry, the Internet public, and 
other leaders. Zhu was attacked as a ‘national traitor’. . . .” Id. at 230.  
 75. Guohua, A Memoir, supra note 43, at 3. Stories of common peoples’ interests in the WTO in China 
are legion. To give one other example, New Yorker writer Peter Hessler’s popular book ORACLE BONES fre-
quently referred to the excitement regarding China’s joining the WTO among the people Hessler encountered. 
At one point, Hessler encountered a photographer on a bridge on the Yalu River in the town of Yabaolu across 
from North Korea who  
kept bringing up the WTO. I asked him why he was so interested. “The newspapers say that if we join the 
WTO, we’ll have more foreign visitors coming to China,” he explained. “And of course if China’s econ-
omy improves, then there will be more Chinese tourists coming here, too. So it has an effect on me.” 
PETER HESSLER, ORACLE BONES: A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME IN CHINA 67 (2006). This popular response was 
driven by government information campaigns. See Pearson, supra note 18, at 364–65. 
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tiatives, such as the establishment of WTO centers around the country.76 Thou-
sands of seminars were held and books published on WTO law, arguably con-
stituting more publications on the WTO than the total published elsewhere in 
the world combined.77 In 2003, the government even organized a national con-
test regarding knowledge of the WTO in which over 5 million people reported-
ly participated.78 The final session broadcast like a game show on China Cen-
tral Television, and the winner was flown to Geneva to visit the WTO and 
meet with its Director-General.79 Such popular participation in learning tech-
nical international law rules is unheard of and, we imagine, would be the envy 
of international law professors and international law enthusiasts around the 
world. 
China faced daunting challenges in joining the WTO. It agreed to open its 
economy to competition and to overhaul its laws, regulations, procedures, and 
administrative and judicial institutions across all levels of government.80 It 
made deep tariff commitments for imports, and it agreed to significantly liber-
alize services.81 It agreed that all regulations affecting trade would be nondis-
criminatory and that government standard-setting would be transparent and 
based on international standards.82 It committed to stringent intellectual prop-
erty protection83 and independent review of all trade-related administrative ac-
tions by judicial or administrative tribunals.84 
China made deeper market access tariff commitments than any other 
emerging economy. For trade in goods, it agreed to reduce its average bound 
tariff to 10% by 2008, with an average of 9.1% for industrial products and 
15.1% for agricultural goods.85 In comparison, Brazil agreed to an average 
                                                                                                                                      
 76. See infra notes 175–92, 388–402. 
 77. HANQIN, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 56 n.94 (citing Julia Qin, 
Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System, 191 CHINA Q. 720 
(2007)). 
 78. Zhenyu Sun, China’s Experience of 10 Years in the WTO, in A DECADE IN THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE 11, 12 (Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz et al. eds., 2011). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Xiaozhun Yi, A Decade in the WTO, A Decade of Shared Development, in A DECADE IN THE WTO: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND TRADE GOVERNANCE 1 (Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz et al. eds., 2011). 
 81. Gao, China’s Participation, supra note 42, at 52, 60. 
 82. See, e.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493; Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 1, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 3 & 10, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
 83. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; see Andrea Wechsler, China’s WTO 
Accession Revisited: Achievements and Challenges in Chinese Intellectual Property Law Reform, in 
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 125 (Christoph Herrmann & Jörg Philipp eds., 
2012).  
 84. World Trade Organization, Accession of the People’s Republic of China Ministerial Decision of 10 
November 2001, art. 2(D)(1), WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (2001) [hereinafter WTO China Accession Protocol].  
 85. Shi Guangsheng, Working Together for a Brighter Future Based on Mutual Benefit, in CHINA’S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 15 (Henry Gao & Don Lewis eds., 2005) [hereinafter Guangsheng, CHINA’S 
PARTICIPATION]. According to Nicholas Lardy, China’s average statutory tariff in 2001 was 15.3%, and these 
tariff rates were not bound and so could be raised at any time. See NICHOLAS LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA 
INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 33–35 (2002) [hereinafter LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA].  
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bound tariff of 31.4% (30.8% for industrial products and 35.4% for agricultural 
goods) and India an average bound tariff of 48.6% (41.6% for industrial and 
113.5% for agricultural goods).86 China also made much broader and deeper 
commitments on services liberalization than any other emerging economy, 
covering such key sectors as financial, telecommunication, professional, and 
distribution services.87 China implemented its tariff commitments three years 
ahead of schedule88 and its services commitments largely on schedule.89 
The country started the complicated process of revising its laws before it 
formally joined the WTO, pursuant to a bilateral agreement with the U.S. on 
November 15, 1999.90 At the time, the U.S. wielded significant leverage since 
it was essentially the gatekeeper to China’s WTO accession.91 To implement 
the bilateral agreement and China’s subsequent WTO commitments, the Chi-
nese government established an “Office for the Clean-up of Laws and Regula-
tions” on December 1, 1999, under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce 
(then named “MOFTEC,” or Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coop-
eration).92 The “clean up” operation was immense, involving bureaucrats at all 
levels, from the central government to provincial and local ones.93 The Office 
first focused on the “clean up” of laws and regulations at the central level, 
starting with MOFTEC and expanding to other Ministries.94 It then turned to 
provincial and local regulations.95 It classified laws and regulations into one of 
four categories: regulations “to be kept,” “to be revised,” “to be abolished,” 
and “to be reenacted.”96 Overall, the Office reported that it oversaw the “clean-
ing up” of more than 3,000 laws and regulations, including around 1,150 at the 
central government level, in order for China to meet its WTO commitments.97 
The Office completed its work in around two years,98 constituting arguably the 
largest condensed exercise of law-making and law revision in China’s (and 
perhaps the world’s) history. 
As a condition of China’s accession, the U.S., the E.U., and other WTO 
members pressed China to agree to China-specific rules that granted other 
                                                                                                                                      
 86. WORLD TRADE ORG., INT’L TRADE CENTRE, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., 
WORLD TARIFF PROFILES 2013 6–18 (2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles 
13_e.pdf. 
 87. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA, supra note 85, at 66–75. 
 88. It reduced its overall tariff to 9.9% percent in 2005, with an average tariff rate of 9% for industrial 
goods and 15.3% for agricultural products. Guangsheng, CHINA’S PARTICIPATION, supra note 85, at 15–16. 
 89. Shi Miaomiao, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations and Implementation of its Accession 
Commitments, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 30–32 (Henry Gao & Don Lewis eds., 2005).  
 90. 8 THE LONDON-LEIDEN SERIES ON LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: IMPLEMENTATION 
OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA vii–viii (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002). 
 91. COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA GLOBALIZATION AND EMPIRE 103 (Oliver Boyd-Barrett ed., 2016). 
 92. Zhang Yuqing Interview, in RUSHI SHINIAN FAZHI ZHONGGUO [10 YEARS IN THE WTO, RULE OF 
LAW IN CHINA] 6–7 (Lu Xiaojie et al. eds., 2011).  
 93. YU KEPING, GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGES IN CHINA’S GOVERNANCE 30 (2008). 
 94. Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat: People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc. 
WT/TPR/S/161 (Feb. 28, 2006). 
 95. Zhang Yuqing Interview, supra note 92, at 6–7. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 6–11. 
 98. KEPING, supra note 93. 
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WTO members greater rights against China than China had against them.99 All 
of these provisions constitute discrimination authorized by China’s accession 
protocol in violation of what is otherwise the core nondiscrimination norm in 
WTO law.100 These provisions are particularly controversial for China given 
the legacy of its being forced to sign “unequal treaties” with foreign imperialist 
powers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.101 
C. China’s Participation in the WTO over Time 
To participate effectively in the multilateral trading system, China invest-
ed in building legal capacity.102 Only then could it attempt to shape the inter-
pretation of WTO law to better protect its access to foreign markets and defend 
its domestic trade-related policies. Most of its initial programs focused on 
building the capacity of government officials, but gradually, the government 
turned toward enhancing the capacity of nongovernmental actors since it real-
ized that private actors play important roles at the WTO, particularly in dispute 
settlement.103 By 2006, within five years of its accession, China emerged from 
being a reluctant participant that tried to avoid WTO litigation to being an ac-
tive and formidable player that used the system to defend its interests.104 
                                                                                                                                      
 99. For a detailed discussion of these clauses, see Gao, China’s Participation, supra note 42, at 54–57; 
see also Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and their Implications for the WTO Legal System: An Ap-
praisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483, 491–509 (2003). Examples of China’s 
WTO-plus obligations (those that exceed what is normally required of WTO members) include its obligation 
not to use export taxes except as scheduled, the expansion of its national treatment commitment to cover for-
eign individuals and enterprises in addition to foreign products (the latter being the WTO requirement for other 
members), its commitment to translate all “foreign trade laws” into one of the official languages of the WTO 
(which in practice means English), and a special enhanced trade policy review mechanism for the first decade 
after its accession. Examples of China’s WTO-minus rights (those that provide less protection than generally 
enjoyed by WTO members) include the grant to other members of the ability to categorize China as a “non-
market economy” in their anti-dumping investigations for a fifteen-year period (and thus making it easier to 
impose anti-dumping duties against Chinese products), to use alternative benchmarks in their subsidy and 
countervailing duty investigations of Chinese products (and thus making it easier to impose countervailing 
duties), and to apply special textile safeguards and a transitional product-specific safeguards for seven and 
twelve years respectively against Chinese products under criteria that are less demanding than for products 
from other WTO members (which enabled quotas and increased tariffs against Chinese goods). See WTO Chi-
na Accession Protocol, supra note 84, ¶ 2(d), ¶ 11(3), ¶ 5(1), ¶ 15(a), ¶ 15(b), ¶ 16; see also World Trade Or-
ganization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49, ¶ 334 (Oct. 
1, 2001). Most of the provisions in China’s accession protocol, and in particular the WTO-minus rights provi-
sions, were time bound so that they expired by December 11, 2016, which was the fifteenth anniversary of 
China’s accession. 
 100. Gao, China’s Participation, supra note 42, at 15, 18. 
 101. See HANQIN, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 23; see also TEEMU 
RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM 127–30 (2013); Dong Wang, The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern 
China, 76:3 PACIFIC AFF. 399, 399 (2003). After China joined the WTO, officials had to respond to domestic 
political backlash that China had “sold out” its interests by making such concessions. See Margaret M. Pear-
son, China in Geneva: Lessons from China’s Early Years in the World Trade Organization, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 242, 246 (Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert Ross eds., 
2006). 
 102. Pasha L. Hsieh, China’s Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal Capacity 
Building, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 997, 999 (2010). 
 103. See generally GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
WTO LITIGATION (2003). 
 104. Gao, China’s Ascent, supra note 15, at 153, 167–72.  
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In WTO negotiations, China deliberately kept a low profile in its first 
years as a Member.105 During the Doha Round, China contended that it made 
such huge commitments in its accession protocol that its market access com-
mitments already exceeded what other emerging economies were being asked 
to make.106 Initially, the major players left China alone as they bargained on 
agricultural commitments—an issue of little relevance to China.107 After a ma-
jor breakthrough on agriculture in 2006, however, their focus shifted to non-
agricultural market access (“NAMA”), and China, as the world’s largest ex-
porter of industrial products, became the elephant in the room.108 
The major players invited China to join the G6 group of key WTO Mem-
bers, which became the G7 at the July 2008 Mini-Ministerial in Geneva. They 
urged China to be “more responsible” in negotiations and to make greater con-
cessions in such key sectors as industrial machinery, chemicals, and electron-
ics.109 China responded by showing greater flex-ibility on some issues, but it 
resisted efforts by the U.S. and the E.U. to press it to make more concessions 
than other developing countries and linked itself to developing country posi-
tions.110 Over time, however, China moved away from simply supporting de-
veloping country positions, as it realized the role it would need to play to up-
hold the overall system.111 
China gradually played a more active role in making proposals in WTO 
negotiations.112 By February 2005, it had made over ten submissions.113 Less 
than three years later, by the end of December 2007, it had made sixty-seven 
submissions, and just seven months later, after the flourish of meetings in late 
July 2008 that gave rise to a “July 2008 package,” China had made more than 
100 submissions.114 Its proposals covered a wide range of issues, including ag-
riculture, NAMA, import relief rules, and dispute settlement.115 In parallel, the 
Chinese government negotiated bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements pur-
suant to which countries agreed to recognize China as a “market economy” so 
                                                                                                                                      
 105. Id. at 156–57. 
 106. Miaomiao, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations and Implementation of its Accession 
Commitments, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 28–29 (Henry Gao & Don Lewis eds., 2005). 
 107. For a detailed discussion of China’s growing role in the Doha Round, see Henry Gao, From the Do-
ha Round to the China Round: China’s Growing Role in WTO Negotiations, in CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER: NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 79, 91 (Lisa Toohey et al. eds., 2015) [here-
inafter Gao, From the Doah Round to the China Round]. 
 108. Id. at 92. 
 109. Id.; see also HENRY M. PAULSON JR., DEALING WITH CHINA: AN INSIDER UNMASKS THE NEW 
ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER 398 (2015) (“We should want China to play a bigger, more responsible leadership 
role in international groups like the World Trade Organization . . . .”). 
 110. Gao, From the Doha Round to the China Round, supra note 107, at 90. 
 111. Interview with Anonymous (July 28, 2016) (Interview #32) [hereinafter Interview #32] (on file with 
authors); see also Gao, From the Doha Round to the China Round, supra note 107, at 92–93. 
 112. Gao, From the Doha Round to the China Round, supra note 107, at 94–96. China made its first 
submission in the Doha Round of negotiations on June 20, 2002 with a proposal on fisheries subsidies. Negoti-
ating Group on Rules, Proposal from the People’s Republic of China on Fisheries Subsidies, WTO Doc. 
TN/RL/W/9 (June 20, 2002). 
 113. Gao, China’s Ascent, supra note 15, at 161. 
 114. Gao, From the Doha Round to the China Round, supra note 107, at 94. 
 115. Id. 
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as not to discriminate against it in anti-dumping investigations.116 Ninety-seven 
nations had granted China “market economy” status by 2009, but China made 
less headway with the world’s major economies.117 
Similarly, China began to participate more actively in the WTO’s web of 
over seventy councils, committees, working parties, and other groupings that 
involve over 1,000 meetings (and, according to one estimate, has reached over 
5,000 meetings) each year.118 Through this monitoring and deliberative pro-
cess, officials can place pressure on other WTO members to respect their legal 
commitments and are themselves pressed to justify or reconsider their own 
domestic policies. To give one example, “China has submitted over 850 TBT 
[technical barriers to trade] notifications, . . . in some years exceeding the more 
established Members. . . . [O]ther Members praised China for making many of 
its regulations and policies more transparent and predictable.”119 Over time, 
Chinese officials found that the committee system, coupled with the WTO’s 
trade policy review mechanism, was “helpful in placing pressure on officials” 
who “must come and explain” and “need to answer questions” so that officials 
“may think twice before adopting a measure,” and “protectionism” can be 
“combatted.”120 
In WTO dispute settlement, China started passively. In the first few 
years, it tried to avoid WTO litigation by settling every WTO complaint 
brought against it.121 As one of a series of proposals for “special and differen-
tial treatment” for developing countries, China formally proposed to limit the 
number of complaints that a developed country could bring against a develop-
ing-country Member in a calendar year to two.122 It contended that “the lack of 
human and financial resources as well as capacities and experiences of devel-
oping-country Members results in de facto imbalance in the participation in the 
dispute settlement mechanism.”123 As a Chinese official working on WTO 
matters confirmed in 2003, “China is uncertain about the [World Trade Organ-
                                                                                                                                      
 116. Gao, China’s Ascent, supra note 15, at 172–75. 
 117. SHAMBAUGH, CHINA GOES GLOBAL, supra note 64, at 160; see Alessia Amighini, Beijing’s Econo-
my: Dream a Little Dream of China?, in CHINA DREAM: STILL COMING TRUE? 33, 45 (Alessia Amighini ed., 
2016) (“[M]ore than 80 countries have already granted China Market Economy Status (MES), including . . . 
Russia and Brazil, but also advanced economies, including Switzerland, Singapore, Australia and New Zea-
land, but not any of its major trading partners, including the EU and the US.”); Ben Blanchard & David 
Lawder, China Launches WTO Complaint Against U.S., EU Over Dumping Rules, REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2016, 
4:52 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-trade-wto-idUSKBN14112M; Gary Clyde Hufbauer & 
Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, The Outlook for Market Economy Status for China, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. 
(Apr. 11, 2016, 8:45 AM), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/outlook-market-economy-
status-china.  
 118. Bernard Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 
324, 330 (2011). 
 119. Robert Wolfe, Letting the Sun Shine in at the WTO: How Transparency Brings the Trading System 
to Life 33–34 (WTO Economic Research and Statistics Division, Working Paper ERSD-2013-03 2013). 
 120. Interview with Anonymous (May 25, 2012) (Interview #19) [hereinafter Interview #19] (on file with 
authors). 
 121. See Henry Gao, Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China, in 
CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 315–51 (Henry Gao & Don Lewis eds., 2005). 
 122. Id. at 300. 
 123. Communication from China, Responses to Questions on the Specific Input of China, WTO Doc. 
TN/DS/W/57 (May 19, 2003). 
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ization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding]”; “people in government do not 
like to bring cases,” and “they also fear the U.S. bringing cases against 
them.”124 Thus, the official said that, in line with “Asian values,” “you negoti-
ate over disputes; you do not litigate.”125 After the U.S. filed two cases against 
China in 2007 regarding intellectual property protection and market access for 
audio-visual products, the Chinese government reacted vehemently that “the 
American decision . . . will seriously undermine cooperative relations.”126 In 
the meantime, however, the government invested in learning about the dispute 
settlement process through attending proceedings as a third party before almost 
every WTO panel.127 In the words of another official, China was learning from 
“the example of the United States and E.U.”128 As a result, China has become 
the fourth most active WTO participant as a third party after the U.S., the E.U., 
and Japan, despite its late accession.129 
After learning how the dispute settlement system operated, the govern-
ment became more active as a litigant—first as a respondent and then as a 
complainant.130 Starting with the China-Auto Parts case in 2006, China no 
longer favored settling claims over litigating them but, instead, strove to raise 
strong defenses in almost every case through substantive and procedural argu-
ments.131 In 2008, its litigation strategy became even more aggressive as it ad-
vanced creative interpretations of its accession protocol commitments to re-
duce asymmetries. 132  As an official told us, this change represented a 
“transformation for China from the perspective that litigation is not the goal” 
to one where “we now accept that multilateral dispute settlement process is an 
appropriate channel for resolving disputes. Although many in government feel 
shocked that we are a defendant in an international court, and still think that 
litigation is not good, which is a reflection of our heritage, our culture, we now 
accept it.”133 The official thought “highly of the system” because it ultimately 
makes it “easier to settle” disputes thanks to the third-party ruling.134 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. Interview with Anonymous (June 19, 2003) (Interview #20) [hereinafter Interview #20] (on file with 
authors). 
 125. Id. As another official remarked in a July 2005 interview, “it is contrary to Chinese philosophy and 
culture” to litigate. If you litigate against a friend, then they “will no longer be a friend.” Interview with Anon-
ymous (June 12, 2005) (Interview #21) [hereinafter Interview #21] (on file with authors). 
 126. Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Remarks 
Before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Feb. 2, 2007), http://2001-2009. 
state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/79866.htm (delivered by John Norris, Director of the Office of Chinese and Mon-
golian Affairs on Mr. Christensen’s behalf). 
 127. Jessica C. Liao, China’s Reluctant Usage of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, USC  
US-CHINA INSTITUTE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://china.usc.edu/china%E2%80%99s-reluctant-usage-wto-dispute-
settlement-system. 
 128. Interview #21, supra note 125. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Gao, China’s Ascent, supra note 15, at 167–72. Moreover, China also started to hold leadership 
roles in WTO committees. As noted proudly by former Chinese ambassador Sun Zhenyu, Chinese officials 
have been elected to chair the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and Working Party on State Trading 
Enterprises. Id. at 170–72. 
 131. Id. at 170. 
 132. Id. at 170–72. 
 133. Interview #19, supra note 120. 
 134. Id. 
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As a relatively new member of a legalistic regime, China’s record in the 
WTO is impressive. In terms of metrics of China’s success, one can start by 
looking at the number of WTO cases that China has won against the U.S. and 
the E.U., the amount of trade involved in these cases, and the number and im-
portance of administrative law changes that the U.S. and the E.U. have made 
because of these losses. Since 2010, the U.S. and the E.U. have lost, in whole 
or in part, four important WTO cases brought by China, involving billions of 
dollars of imports.135 For example, just one of the products (rubber pneumatic 
tires) covered in one case (DS379) against the U.S. involved over $17 billion 
in imports.136 Similarly, just one case against the E.U. involving just steel fas-
teners (DS397) involved almost $5 billion of imports.137 These cases, moreo-
ver, created precedent regarding the legality of U.S. and E.U. anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty methodologies that potentially affect all trade from 
China, which respectively totaled $462.8 billion in imports to the U.S. and 
$368 billion in imports to the E.U. in 2016.138 Following these cases, the U.S. 
and the E.U. changed their administrative regulations, but these regulations too 
are subject to challenge.139 Daku and Pelc have created a statistical measure of 
parties’ influence in the development of WTO jurisprudence and have found 
that “across a single decade, China has effectively doubled its average influ-
ence over panel and [Appellate Body] rulings.”140 There is no single metric for 
measuring success, and simply counting disputes and the amount of affected 
trade is insufficient. But the extent of U.S. and European trade with China po-
                                                                                                                                      
 135. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products 
from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report DS449]; Ap-
pellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from 
China, WTO Doc. WT/DS449/AB/R (July 7, 2014); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—
Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS397/AB/R (July 15, 2011); Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Coun-
tervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report DS379]. 
 136. See WTO DISPUTE DATA, http://www.wtodisputedata.com/data (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (follow 
the “Download” link under “Disputed Product Imports” to view the dataset using Stata) (listing bilateral im-
ports of Chinese rubber pneumatic tires into the U.S. totaling $17,125,810,660 from 1996 to 2010—an average 
of $1,141,720,710 per year). 
 137. See id. (listing bilateral imports of Chinese steel fasteners into the E.U. totaling $4,945,502,110 from 
1996 to 2010—an average of $329,700,140 per year). 
 138. See Foreign Trade, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/ 
c5700.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (2016: U.S. Trade in Goods with China); Trade, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ (last visited Nov. 11, 
2017) (EU-China: Trade in Goods, click on table icon on graph for table view) (figures converted from euros 
to U.S. dollars). 
 139. See, e.g., Implementation of Determinations Under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act: Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires; Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe; Laminated Wo-
ven Sacks; and Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube From the People's Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg. 
52,683, 52,684 (Aug. 30, 2012); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/278, Repealing the Defini-
tive Anti-Dumping Duty Imposed on Imports of Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners Originating in the People’s 
Republic of China, as Extended to Imports of Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners Consigned from Malaysia, 
Whether Declared as Originating in Malaysia or Not, 2016 O.J. (L 52) 1, 24. 
 140. Mark Daku & Krzystof J. Pelc, Who Holds Influence over WTO Jurisprudence, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
233, 252 (2017) (using text analysis of country submissions compared to the content of rulings). 
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tentially affected by anti-dumping and countervailing investigations,141  and 
U.S.-European reactions to these losses and the jurisprudence developed,142 
especially compared to earlier losses in WTO disputes, highlight Europe’s and 
the United States’ sense of vulnerability to Chinese legal challenges. 
Without building strong capacity in WTO law, China’s record would not 
have been possible. How did China, a country with an anti-legalist, Confucian 
tradition not known for lawyering,143 a country also facing considerable lan-
guage barriers in an organization where English is the de facto governing lan-
guage, build its trade law capacity? What broader effects might those efforts 
have in embedding international trade law in China? In the following sections, 
we explain the strategies that lie behind China’s success and their potential im-
plications within China and for the international trading system. 
IV. BUILDING TRADE LAW CAPACITY IN GOVERNMENT 
Even before its accession to the WTO, the Chinese government realized 
that its lack of legal capacity could be a major challenge. For example, in early 
2002, President Jiang Zemin stated that it was inevitable that China would suf-
fer losses in WTO dispute settlement due to its unfamiliarity with WTO 
rules.144 To prepare China for its post-accession challenges, Jiang urged the 
government to prioritize the development of a team of professionals well-
versed in WTO rules, including experts on international trade policy, trade law, 
trade negotiations, and anti-dumping investigations. Pursuant to the high-level 
exhortations, central, provincial, and local government departments signifi-
cantly invested in WTO-related capacity-building initiatives, expanding the 
role for lawyers.145 
                                                                                                                                      
 141. China is the largest trading partner of the U.S. and the second largest trading partner of the E.U. 
after the U.S. 
 142. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, ¶¶ 46–50, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/322 
(Nov. 23, 2012) (E.U. expressing disagreement with China on whether E.U. had fully implemented the DSB’s 
recommendations and rulings); Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, ¶¶ 92–102, WTO Doc. 
WT/DSB/M/294 (Jun. 9, 2011) (U.S. expressing concern over definition of several terms included in the Ap-
pellate Body Report in WT/DS379/R); Statement by the United States to the Dispute Settlement Body, United 
States–Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS379 (Mar. 25, 2011), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds379_e.htm (“The United 
States is deeply disappointed with the findings in the Appellate Body report related to the interpretation of the 
term ‘public body’ and China’s claims related to the concurrent application of CVDs and NME ADs, and con-
siders that the report’s reasoning is based on a number of problematic assertions and assumptions.”); WTO’s 
Appellate Body Reverses Ruling in China Challenge to U.S. AD/CVD Measures, BLOOMBERG INT’L TRADE 
REP. (Mar. 17, 2011), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/results/a12c13f18d6f72238a9c538c62642e27/ 
document/XAMVGRG5GVG0?search32=ohR_SsS1El9LIkpPOMzmLQ==RDiNe5sb4MzhKADYeA4PkQjr 
lQ2Xj6877kLQyoa4mMoHbVXBw3wySpKh-VLlhQKd (“U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said in a 
statement that he was ‘deeply troubled’ by the ruling. ‘It appears to be a clear case of overreaching by the Ap-
pellate Body. We are reviewing the findings closely in order to understand fully their implications.’”). 
 143. See PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN THE LAW Ch. 
9 (5th ed. 2015). 
 144. JIANG ZEMIN, Zai Jilie de Guoji Jingzheng zhong Zhangwo Zhudong [Seize the Initiative Amidst 
Intense International Competition], in 3 JIANG ZEMIN WENXUAN: DISAN JUAN [SELECTED WORKS OF JIANG 
ZEMIN] 455 (2006). 
 145. Id. 
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In the central government, the State Council and the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (“CPC”) issued a joint Notice on China’s 
WTO Accession to all Ministries and provincial governments on November 
20, 2001, in which they called for Party organs and government organizations 
at all levels to strengthen the study of WTO rules and the training of WTO ex-
perts.146 Many ministries restructured their internal organization in preparation 
for the upcoming accession.147 They worked with MOFTEC to “clean up” laws 
and regulations to meet China’s new obligations and to ensure that new laws 
and regulations would comply with WTO rules.148 
The government reorganized its lead ministry for international trade and 
renamed it the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”).149 MOFCOM has a Ja-
nus-faced role of looking inward and outward.150 Internally, MOFCOM over-
sees China’s compliance with its WTO obligations.151 Externally, MOFCOM 
protects China’s trading interests abroad, including before the WTO.152 Fol-
lowing China’s accession, MOFCOM (then named MOFTEC) established two 
new departments to address WTO matters, which, likewise, have Janus-faced 
missions: the Fair Trade Bureau and the Department of WTO Affairs.153 Inter-
nally, the Department of WTO Affairs reviews draft Chinese legislation and 
policy to ensure it is WTO consistent.154 Externally, it represents China in 
WTO negotiations, WTO trade policy reviews, and before WTO committees, 
where it is responsible for notifying the committees of new and amended Chi-
nese regulations as required under the WTO agreements.155 This dual role en-
hances its sensitivity to the importance of China’s compliance with its WTO 
                                                                                                                                      
 146. Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting, Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Woguo Jiaru Shijie Maoyi 
Zuzhi Youguan Qingkuang de Tongbao [Announcement by the General Office of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on China’s Accession to the WTO], 
ZHONGBANFA (Nov. 20, 2001). Within the Chinese system, the State Council is the Central Government, head-
ed by the Premier. Overview of the PRC Political System, US-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, https://www. 
uschina.org/overview-prc-political-system (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 147. Gong Baihua, Shanghai’s WTO Affairs Consultation Center: Working Together to Take Advantage 
of WTO Membership, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES 167–77 
(Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005). 
 148. Id. at 168. 
 149. Dennis D. Trinidad, The Foreign Aid Philosophy of a Rising Asian Power: A Southeast Asian View, 
in A STUDY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN AID: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 19, 33 (Y. Shimomura & H. Ohashi eds., 
2013). 
 150. Mission, MINISTRY COM. CHINA, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. THOMAS W. HUANG, TRADE REMEDIES: LAWS OF DUMPING, SUBSIDIES, AND SAFEGUARDS IN CHINA 
29 (2013). 
 154. Interview with Anonymous (July 22, 2016) (Interview #26) [hereinafter Interview # 26] (on file with 
authors); Interview with Anonymous (July 20, 2016) (Interview #25) [hereinafter Interview #25] (on file with 
authors); Zhuyao Zhize [Main Duties], MINISTRY COM. CHINA: DEP’T WTO AFF. (June 23, 2015), 
http://sms.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gywm/200606/20060602467456.shtml. 
 155. Zhuyao Zhize [Main Duties], supra note 154; see also Li Chengang, Zhongguo Canyu Shimao Zuzhi 
Zhengduan Jiejue Shijian Gaishu [Overview of China’s Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practices], 
in SHIMAO ZUZHI GUIZE BOYI: ZHONGGUO CANYU WTO ZHENGDUAN JIEJUE DE SHINIAN FALU SHIJIAN 
[GAMING WITH WTO RULES: CHINA’S TEN YEAR’S EXPERIENCE IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PRACTICES] 
14–15 (Li Chengang ed., 2011) [hereinafter Chengang, Overview].  
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commitments since it needs credibility when pressing other countries to meet 
their commitments toward China. 
MOFCOM’s Fair Trade Bureau, in parallel, has internal and external re-
sponsibilities regarding anti-dumping, subsidy, and safeguards law (collective-
ly known as import relief law).156 Internally, it conducts import relief investi-
gations of foreign products, administering these laws.157 Externally, it follows 
foreign import relief investigations of Chinese products.158 In this way, it dif-
fers from the U.S. Department of Commerce and the E.U. trade directorate that 
largely let companies fend for themselves in foreign anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duty investigations. In contrast, MOFCOM’s Fair Trade Bureau 
spends much of its time helping Chinese exporters in foreign proceedings, in-
cluding through bilateral bargaining.159 In particular, MOFCOM always pays 
the lawyers’ fees in foreign countervailing duty investigations to defend Chi-
nese interests.160 Since most WTO disputes brought by China involve foreign 
import relief measures, the Fair Trade Bureau must keep abreast of WTO juris-
prudence in this area. This dual internal-external role can socialize the Fair 
Trade Bureau in its application of China’s import relief laws. 
MOFCOM has a separate Department of Treaty and Law (“DTL”) that is 
responsible for legal issues in China’s international economic relations and 
handles cases before the WTO dispute settlement system. 161  In 2001, 
MOFCOM created a division on WTO law within DTL to handle WTO dis-
putes.162 It established a second DTL division on WTO Law in 2009 when 
China faced a slew of new disputes.163 The total number of DTL officials dedi-
cated to WTO litigation increased from five to nine.164 These officials work 
with China’s diplomats responsible for WTO dispute settlement in China’s 
WTO mission in Geneva, so that China has around a dozen officials specializ-
ing in WTO dispute settlement in total.165 Overall, the size of China’s WTO 
dispute settlement team doubled despite a wave of downsizing in the central 
government,166 enhancing lawyers’ roles in China’s international trade rela-
tions. 
                                                                                                                                      
 156. Functions, MINISTRY COM. CHINA: DEP’T INT’L TRADE & ECON. AFF., http://english.mofcom. 
gov.cn/departments/fms2/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 157. See, e.g., MOFCOM Announcement No.45 of 2017 on Filing of Anti-Dumping Investigation against 
Imports of Halogenated Butyl Rubber Originating in the United States, EUR. UNION & SING., MINISTRY COM. 
CHINA (Aug. 31, 2017), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201709/20170902 
637955.shtml. 
 158. Zhuyao Zhize [Main Duties], supra note 154. 
 159. Interview with Anonymous (June 10, 2014) (Interview #3) [hereinafter Interview #3] (on file with 
authors). 
 160. Interview with Anonymous (June 8, 2014) (Interview #2) [hereinafter Interview #2] (on file with 
authors). 
 161. The Department of Treaty and Law, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. CHINA, http://www.fmprc. 
gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
 162. Chengang, Overview, supra note 155, at 15. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 27.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  
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The GATT requires WTO members to take “reasonable measures” to en-
sure local compliance with GATT obligations.167 China’s central government 
has used this provision to try to assert greater control over local actors, which 
generally is a challenge.168 The central government aimed to spur local gov-
ernment officials to become familiar with WTO rules.169 In February 2002, two 
months after China’s formal WTO accession, the central government held a 
one-week training course for senior officials at the provincial and ministerial 
levels.170 The lecturers included President Jiang and Premier Zhu Rongji, as 
well as high-level officials from MOFCOM and other ministries, highlighting 
the political importance that the central government wished to convey. The 
training course explained the main rules in the WTO to senior officials and re-
minded them that all new laws and regulations needed to be consistent with 
WTO requirements.171 
After the training course, many provinces drafted Plans of Actions in re-
sponse to China’s WTO accession.172 A key component was to strengthen 
trade law capacity.173 To achieve this objective, local governments established 
what they called “WTO Centers.”174 Funded by the local governments, these 
centers are semi-governmental institutions that conduct WTO-related training, 
research, and outreach activities.175 In the two-to-three years before and after 
China’s WTO accession, the centers were the favorite pet projects of ambitious 
local officials, who established centers across the country.176  In 2014, the 
Shanghai center employed about forty professionals and the Shenzhen center 
employed about thirty.177 
The centers have served important internal and external roles. Internally, 
when the local government passes a regulation, it is to consult with the local 
WTO center to confirm that the regulation is WTO consistent and amend it as 
needed.178 Externally, the centers are to provide information to companies to 
                                                                                                                                      
 167. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 168. Pittman Potter, China and the International Legal System: Challenges of Participation, in CHINA’S 
LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES 145, 150 (Donald C. Clarke ed., 2008); see also 
HUNG, supra note 45, at 54–61 (regarding some of the challenges of decentralization in China for the central 
government). Hung noted “the central government’s weakening power vis-à-vis that of local governments in 
direct economic management.” Id. at 57. 
 169. HUNG, supra note 45, at 54–61. 
 170. SUN ZHENYU, RINEIWA KONGZONG SUIYUE [BUSY YEARS IN GENEVA] 37 (2011).  
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., ZHONGGUO JIARU SHIJIE MAOYI ZUZHI GUODUQI BEIJING XINGDONG JIHUA [ACTION PLAN 
FOR BEIJING DURING CHINA’S TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE WTO] (Zhang Mao ed., 2003).  
 173. Hsieh, supra note 102, at 999. 
 174. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S 
WTO COMPLIANCE (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Report-to-Congress-China-WTO-
Compliance.pdf. 
 175. Hsieh, supra note 102, at 1013–14. 
 176. Id. at 1013–15. 
 177. Interview with Anonymous (June 12, 2014) (Interview #16) [hereinafter Interview #16] (on file with 
authors); Interview with Anonymous (June 13, 2014) (Interview #17) [hereinafter Interview #17] (on file with 
authors).  
 178. Interview #17, supra note 177. Cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen are reputed to be trade liberal in 
their orientation. As an example, an individual at the Shanghai center noted to us how the Shanghai govern-
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help them address trade barriers, such as anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
investigations and seizures of goods on intellectual property grounds.179 As 
Chinese companies move up the value chain and produce technology-intensive 
goods, intellectual property issues have become more salient, as when U.S. 
Customs seizes imported products that allegedly violate U.S. intellectual prop-
erty rights under U.S. Section 337.180 The centers also help MOFCOM prepare 
an annual trade barriers report regarding measures that Chinese exporters 
face.181 It is modeled after the annual U.S. National Trade Estimates Report on 
Foreign Trade Barriers—once more illustrating the influence of U.S. models in 
transnational legal ordering.182 
When China first joined the WTO, WTO matters represented the cutting 
edge for policy, and the leadership spurred officials to exhibit WTO aware-
ness.183 The WTO “craze” has since faded, in part because of the turn away 
from multilateral trade negotiations to bilateral and regional ones, and in part 
because of disenchantment with the WTO given the widespread use of anti-
dumping and other measures against Chinese products.184 The U.S. election of 
President Trump may deepen these trends. Most provincial and local govern-
ments quietly abandoned their WTO centers so that, by 2014, only the WTO 
centers in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen remained active.185 These centers 
broadened their mandates to encompass bilateral and plurilateral trade and in-
vestment agreements. For example, in 2012, the Shanghai center established an 
Institute of Global Trade and Investment under its auspices,186 and it played an 
important supporting role in the creation of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free 
Trade Zone.187 In addition, while in the early years, the majority of the Shang-
hai center’s staff had a legal background and focused on WTO implementa-
tion, a growing proportion of the staff now has an economic background and 
provides economic analysis to support bilateral and plurilateral trade and in-
vestment negotiations.188 Although the WTO has declined in importance in 
                                                                                                                                      
ment asked the Center to review a regulation that gave different quotas to imported and domestic manufac-
tured cars in Shanghai for license plates, and when the Center raised a national treatment issue, the local gov-
ernment amended the rules so as to be WTO compliant. See Baihua, supra note 147, at 167–77. 
 179. Interview #17, supra note 177. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Interview #16, supra note 177. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Interview with Anonymous (June 12, 2014) (Interview #7) [hereinafter Interview #7] (on file with 
authors). 
 184. Interview #17, supra note 177. 
 185. Interview #16, supra note 177. 
 186. About the Center, SHANGHAI WTO AFF. CONSULTATION CTR., http://www.sccwto.org/ 
introduce?locale=zh-CN (visited on Nov. 11, 2017).  
 187. Id. The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (“SPFTZ”) was first established in the Pudong area 
in Shanghai in September 2013. It aims to become China’s testing ground for new regulatory regimes on trade 
and investment. Initially covering only twenty-eight square kilometers, the SPFTZ quickly introduced many 
new regulatory reforms in a host of areas ranging from investment and financial liberalization to the shift of 
government functions. For more detailed analysis, see Henry Gao, TPP, Regulatory Coherence and China’s 
Free Trade Strategy from A to Z, EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 507–14 (2016).  
 188. Interview #16, supra note 177. 
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China, a member of the Shenzhen center told us that, in the early years, China 
likely “was overheated about the WTO; right now it is overcooling.”189 
V. WTO LAW AND ACADEMIA 
In addition to boosting WTO-related capacity within central, provincial, 
and local governments, the central government took steps to build the capaci-
ties of other actors and incentivize them to invest in developing expertise in 
WTO law.190 These capacity-building initiatives spanned academia, law firms, 
private businesses, and industry associations.191 We start with academia, which 
illustrates longer-term thinking about developing WTO-related legal capacity 
and the implications for legal study, research, and practice in international eco-
nomic law in China. 
A. Teaching 
China is an authoritarian regime in which the government exercises a 
heavy influence in academia. 192  With the government’s promotion of the 
WTO’s importance for China, WTO law became a popular subject and disci-
pline in Chinese universities. In 2000, the year before China joined the WTO, 
the government made International Economic Law (which includes WTO law) 
a mandatory subject on the national bar exam.193 China’s Ministry of Educa-
tion included International Economic Law (and thus WTO law) as one of six-
teen mandatory courses for all Chinese law schools.194 As a result, in most of 
the more than 600 law schools in China, there is at least one professor who 
claims to specialize in WTO law,195 a much greater number and percentage 
than in the U.S. where the study of WTO law has waned.196 
Because of the concentration of universities in major cities, the most rep-
utable centers for WTO teaching and research are in cities such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing, and Xiamen. Many of the specialists teach 
in the traditional elite law schools, the so-called “Five Institutes and Four De-
partments,” which refers to the five independent law institutes and four law 
departments in comprehensive universities that resulted when the government 
                                                                                                                                      
 189. Interview #17, supra note 177. 
 190. Hsieh, supra note 102, at 1016. 
 191. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 192. See, e.g., Interview with Anonymous (July 25, 2016) (Interview #28) [hereinafter Interview #28] (on 
file with authors) (“[E]ven WTO academics in china in chat rooms don’t use legal reasoning but rather only 
reason in terms of policy outcomes desired.”). 
 193. Ministry of Justice, Lvshi Zige Kaoshi Banfa [Rules on Lawyer’s Qualification Exam], Art. 16, Or-
der 61, July 26, 2000. 
 194. Putong Gaodeng Xuexiao Benke Zhuanye Mulu & Zhuanye Jieshao [Overview of the Catalogue of 
Majors for Institutions of Higher Education], MINISTRY EDUC. CHINA (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www. 
moe.edu.cn/s78/A08/A08_gggs/s8468/201212/t20121218_181006.html. 
 195. Interview #28, supra note 192. 
 196. See generally John J. Barceló III, The Status of WTO Rules in U.S. Law, CORNELL L. FAC. 
PUBLICATIONS (Jan. 6, 2006), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035& 
context=lsrp_papers (explaining the separation between WTO and U.S. law in the U.S. legal system). 
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restructured higher education institutions in 1952.197 In addition, the govern-
ment established two main foreign trade institutes, in Beijing in 1951 and 
Shanghai in 1960 respectively, under the auspices of the trade ministry.198 
These elite schools have multiple professors who teach international trade law, 
including specialized seminars on WTO law and specific topics such as WTO 
dispute settlement, trade in services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”).199 These classes are offered as part of the upper-
year undergraduate curriculum and as postgraduate courses.200 
Most WTO scholars in China are graduates from these elite law schools, 
and the leading ones couple their degrees with overseas experience. For exam-
ple, Professor Zhang Naigen at Fudan University Law School, a senior figure 
in the field, conducted a year of study on WTO law under the supervision of 
Professor John Jackson at the University of Michigan Law School as a Ful-
bright Scholar in 1996–1997, and he spent time as a visiting scholar at the law 
schools of Columbia University (1989–1990) and George Washington Univer-
sity (1993–1994), and the Max Planck Institute of Comparative Public Law 
and International Law in Heidelberg, Germany (2000).201 He since founded, 
and is the director of, the Center for Intellectual Property Study, which in-
volves the study of international, domestic, and comparative intellectual prop-
erty law, and he became Vice President of the Shanghai Society for Intellectual 
Property Law.202 In light of the TRIPS Agreement and China’s innovation pol-
icies which seek to promote patents, Chinese law firms have developed strong 
intellectual property practices,203 and Chinese courts have applied the TRIPS 
Agreement in dozens of cases between private parties.204 The foreign study and 
experience of China’s WTO scholars exemplifies the transnational nature of 
                                                                                                                                      
 197. The five institutes specialized in legal education are the Beijing Institute of Politics and Law (up-
graded to China University of Politics and Law or “CUPL” in 1983); the Eastern China Institute of Politics and 
Law in Shanghai (upgraded to Eastern China University of Politics and Law in 2007); the Southwest Institute 
of Politics and Law in Chongqing (upgraded to Southwest University of Political Sciences and Law in 1995); 
the Northwest Institute of Politics and Law in Xi’an (upgraded to Northwest University of Politics and Law in 
2006); and the Zhongnan Institute of Politics and Law in Wuhan (merged with Zhongnan University of Fi-
nance and Economics to form the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law in 2000). The four elite law 
departments in elite universities are Peking University and People’s University in Beijing, Jilin University in 
Changchun, and Wuhan University in Wuhan. There are also well-established WTO programs in several other 
elite universities, such as Xiamen University in Fujian province, Fudan University and Shanghai Jiaotong Uni-
versity in Shanghai, and Tsinghua University in Beijing. 
 198. These institutes were later upgraded to universities and are now known as the University of Interna-
tional Business and Economics (“UIBE”) in Beijing, and Shanghai University of International Business and 
Economics (“SUIBE”). Both have strong WTO law and policy programs. Both authors have taught at UIBE in 
a program organized by its Institute for WTO Studies. 
 199. Hsieh, supra note 102, at 1009. 
 200. Interview with Anonymous (June 12, 2014) (Interview #13) [hereinafter Interview #13] (on file with 
authors). 
 201. Zhang Naigen, WTO Fa yu Zhongguo Shean Zhengduan Jiejue [WTO Law and Disputes Relating to 
China], 1 SHANGHAI PEOPLE’S PRESS (2013); see also Zhang Naigen, Dispute Settlement Under the TRIPS 
Agreement from the Perspective of Treaty Interpretation, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 199, 199 n.* (2003) 
[hereinafter Zhang, Dispute Settlement]. 
 202. See Zhang, Dispute Settlement, supra note 201, at 199. 
 203. Interview #13, supra note 200. 
 204. See Congyan Cai, International Law in Chinese Courts During the Rise of China, 110 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 269, 286–87 (2016).  
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this legal field. Each of the eight Chinese academics on China’s Indicative List 
of WTO Panelists have either studied overseas or have been visiting scholars 
abroad.205 
Given the role of studying abroad, some academics speak of a paternal-
istic relationship in academia in which U.S. and European academics hold 
privileged positions.206 They point to the hegemony of English and English-
language journals for WTO law, as well as the strength of U.S. academic insti-
tutions. Over time, Chinese academics have developed their own perspectives 
on WTO law. Some Chinese law professors believe that, through developing 
their own expertise, they now have a more independent relationship with the 
Chinese government than in the past as well.207 
Professors teaching WTO law in China have spearheaded the use of the 
case study method in China.208 China is a civil law country where judges do 
not create jurisprudence, and it has thus been difficult to adopt the case law 
method in Chinese law schools.209 The WTO legal field, however, is complete-
ly different. WTO panels and the Appellate Body have decided over 300 cases 
and built an elaborate, evolving jurisprudence.210 These decisions create de 
facto precedent that affects the interpretation and application of the law in fu-
ture cases, so that Chinese students need to study them carefully.211 The stu-
dents cannot simply study legal texts and general principles, as in other subject 
areas, to learn and appreciate WTO law. To teach WTO law, Chinese profes-
sors thus include cases in the advanced curriculum.212 
In the beginning, most professors translated the WTO case reports into 
Chinese since the students lacked sufficient English language skills.213 Given 
the length of WTO reports, which can vary from over 100 to over 1,000 pages, 
the task of translation can be considerable. Gradually, some professors started 
to include excerpts in English and even publish entire books of cases in Eng-
lish. For example, in 2003, Professor Huang Dongli from China Academy of 
Social Sciences (“CASS”) published International Trade Law: Economic The-
ories, Law and Cases, which reflected the casebooks used in American law 
schools.214 
                                                                                                                                      
 205. See generally Dispute Settlement Body, Indicative List of Governmental and Non-Governmental 
Panelists, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/44/Rev.39 (Aug. 22, 2017). 
 206. Interview #13, supra note 200. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Interview with Anonymous (June 11, 2014) (Interview #11) [hereinafter Interview #11] (on file with 
authors). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
dispu_e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 211. Interview #11, supra note 208. 
 212. Hsieh, supra note 102, at 1011. 
 213. Prominent examples include three series of Case Commentaries published respectively by Zhu 
Lanye from ECUPL, Han Liyu from Renmin University, and Gong Baihua from Fudan University. See GONG 
BAIHUA, WTO ANLI JI [COLLECTION OF WTO CASES] (2001–2008); ZHU LANYE, SHIJIE MAOYI ZUZHI GUOJI 
MAOYI JIUFEN ANLI PINGXI [ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CASES AT THE WTO] 
(2000); HAN LIYU, SHIMAO ZUZHI ANLI FENXI [WTO CASE COMMENTARIES] (2002). 
 214. Huang Dongli, CHINESE ACAD. SOC. SCI., http://www.iolaw.org.cn/global/EN/showNews. 
aspx?id=33215 (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
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In 2007, the Ministry of Education of China launched a comprehensive 
teaching reform plan to improve the teaching quality in Chinese universities.215 
One important component of the plan is to develop “Bilingual Courses” that 
can “substantially improve the English levels of college students in their areas 
of studies and enhance their capacities to conduct research in English.”216 
Among law school subjects, WTO law is considered one of the most suitable 
for teaching in English.217 Many law schools thus began to offer courses on 
WTO law in English to build students’ English language facility.218 In turn, 
this development helped professors and students become more familiar with 
foreign scholarship on WTO law. 
To build students’ understanding of WTO rules, MOFCOM organizes the 
China WTO Moot Court Competition with two of China’s elite law schools, 
the China University of Politics and Law (“CUPL”) and the Southwest Univer-
sity of Political Science and Law (“SWUPL”).219 The competition, which is 
conducted in English and simulates WTO panel procedures, aims to “promote 
the training and selection of [China’s] personnel for WTO negotiations and 
dispute settlement.”220 The first competition was held at CUPL in Beijing in 
November 2012, and it drew teams from eight universities from four cities.221 
The number of teams doubled to sixteen in 2013 and rose to eighteen in 
2014. 222  The panelists include Chinese trade lawyers, professors, and 
MOFCOM officials who handle WTO cases.223 The MOFCOM officials and 
private lawyers use the opportunity to identify and recruit young talent.224 
The study of WTO case law can have broad implications on the for-
mation of legal professionals in China, especially those who will enter com-
mercial practice but also for those who enter government or become judges. 
                                                                                                                                      
 215. A Brief Overview of Chinese Higher Education System, BRIT.COUNCIL INDIA, https://www. 
britishcouncil.in/sites/default/files/higher_education_system_of_china.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
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 217. Interview #11, supra note 208. 
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 219. It is “the first Moot Court Competition officially sponsored by a Ministry” in China, revealing the 
importance that the government gives to WTO law and dispute settlement. Xie Yangjin, Nankai Daibiaodui 
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WTO Moot Court Competition], NANKAI NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 6, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://news.nankai. 
edu.cn/nkyw/system/2012/12/06/000104613.shtml.  
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 221. They were from CUPL, Central University of Finance and Economics, University of International 
Economics and Business (“UIBE”), Capital University of Economics and Business, Xiamen University, Nan-
kai University, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, and SWUPL. See Feng Xuewei Attends the First 
College WTO Moot Court Debate, ALL BRIGHT L. OFF. BEIJING (Mar. 24, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.allbrightlawbj.com/CN/NEW/201303241133.html. 
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 223. Xie Yangjin, supra note 219. 
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When graduates work in ministries outside of MOFCOM, not only does basic 
knowledge of WTO law diffuse through the government, MOFCOM also gains 
interlocutors in other ministries acquainted with WTO legal rules and princi-
ples.225 Such diffusion of expertise facilitates compliance with China’s WTO 
commitments and potentially deepens socialization processes regarding trade 
law principles and legal reasoning. 
Some of these students and professors become judges in China, including 
at a high level. For example, Cao Jianmin, a well-known WTO scholar and 
former President of the East China University of Politics and Law, served as 
Deputy President of the Supreme People’s Court, starting in 1999.226 Similarly, 
in 2015, the government appointed WTO scholar Liu Jingdong from the Insti-
tute of Law at the China Academy of Social Sciences to be the Deputy Presid-
ing Judge for the Fourth Division on Civil Cases of the Supreme People’s 
Court of China.227 They can bring their experiences to courts in China. 
A senior MOFCOM official stressed to us how the judges of the Supreme 
People’s Court know WTO law.228 Although the Supreme People’s Court re-
jected proposals that WTO law should be directly applic-able before Chinese 
courts, their rules provide that Chinese law is to be interpreted where possible 
to comply with WTO requirements.229 Chinese courts have referenced WTO 
law in several decisions.230 
China often includes Chinese law professors in its delegations to WTO 
hearings before panels and the Appellate Body, and they take these experienc-
es back home with them. A law professor attending an Appellate Body hear-
ing, for example, emphasized how quickly and repeatedly the legal issues 
arose, reflecting more of an “inquisitorial process” involving “common law” 
reasoning.231 From the experience of the hearing, he highlighted how “the 
training of our students should be harder, should be tougher.”232 Another law 
professor attending a WTO hearing noted that the experience gave him a com-
                                                                                                                                      
 225. Id. 
 226. See The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China: Cao Jianmin Biog-
raphy, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 16, 2013), http://www.spp.gov.cn/gjyld/sxdjcg1/201209/t2012 
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 227. See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Renmian Mingdian [List of New Ap-
pointments and Removals by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China], NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/cwhhy/12jcwh/2015-04/25/ 
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 228. Interview #25, supra note 154.  
 229. Article 9 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Regulations on Issues Concerning the Trial of  
Administrative Cases Relating to International Trade provides: 
If there are two or more reasonable interpretations for a provision of the law or administrative regulation 
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See Cai, supra note 204, at 275–77. 
 230. Id. at 286–87.  
 231. Interview #11, supra note 208.  
 232. Id. 
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pletely new perspective of the WTO that he brings to his classroom.233 Now he 
gives factual scenarios to his students and lets them work through the facts 
while studying the WTO background rules on their own.234 Professor Yang 
Guohua, the former Deputy-Director of DTL, stressed how WTO reports pro-
vide “excellent teaching materials to help the students to develop a good sense 
of legal reasoning and rule of law.”235 He wrote of “the appeal of the legal rea-
soning in the Panel and Appellate Body reports which were very rare in [his] 
legal education” during the 1990s.236 
The experiences of Chinese trade law professors abroad can shape their 
teaching to assume more of a common-law approach to factual analysis and 
legal interpretation. As one law professor noted, “more and more professors in 
China are trained in the United States,” many of whom take a course in inter-
national trade law, and these experiences could have significant effects over 
the next ten to twenty years for teaching law in China.237 Many of these aca-
demics stress that much is at stake in the study of the WTO in China, both for 
the multilateral trading system and internally within China.238 The mandatory 
study of WTO law in Chinese law schools, in other words, has fostered trans-
national processes that affect legal training. 
B. Research 
After China’s accession to the WTO, Chinese scholars published thou-
sands of books and articles on almost all aspects of the WTO and WTO law, 
exemplifying the remarkable enthusiasm within China regarding its accession, 
promoted by the government.239  The WTO books range from introductory 
textbooks to highly specialized treatises.240 Early publications tended to be in 
Chinese, given that the primary goal was to explain the basics of WTO law to 
Chinese readers, especially to officials, businessmen, and students.241 Gradual-
ly, however, as Chinese scholars improved their English language skills and as 
they pushed deeper in their research, some of them started to publish works in 
English, including in the main English language journals in the field, such as 
the Journal of World Trade and the Journal of International Economic Law.242 
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These publications enable them to exchange ideas with non-Chinese scholars 
and bring Chinese perspectives to these journals’ broader readerships. They 
can help the Chinese government in two ways. First, these efforts help Chinese 
scholars become more proficient in WTO law in English so that they become 
useful as consultants to the government and law firms, as well as to the next 
generation of Chinese trade law specialists who they train. Second, they poten-
tially help these scholars advance juris-prudential interpretations and argu-
ments informed by a Chinese perspective and, thus, more favorable to China’s 
positions, such that this work may inform the broader WTO legal field, includ-
ing the WTO secretariat and WTO panelists.243 
To promote research on WTO issues, the government supported the crea-
tion of several WTO research associations. The oldest is the Chinese Society of 
International Economic Law (“CSIEL”), which was established in 1984 by 
Professor Yao Meizhen from Wuhan University244 and later led by Professor 
Chen An from Xiamen University.245 When China joined the WTO, the gov-
ernment established the WTO Law Research Society under the auspices of the 
China Law Society, and it appointed Sun Wanzhong, a former Director-
General of the Office for Legislative Affairs at the State Council, as its first 
President.246 Two years later, MOFCOM established the China Society for 
World Trade Organization Studies.247 China’s first ambassador to the WTO, 
Sun Zhenyu, took the helm in 2011, and the Society became quite active, or-
ganizing many training courses and research projects.248 
The annual meetings of these research associations provide a forum for 
WTO scholars and trade officials in China to exchange views. Starting with its 
2010 Annual Meeting, the Chinese Society of International Economic Law has 
organized an annual Special Symposium on WTO Law jointly with 
MOFCOM’s Department of Treaty and Law, where DTL officials, private 
lawyers involved in China’s cases, and leading WTO scholars in China review 
and discuss WTO panel and Appellate Body reports.249 Senior MOFCOM offi-
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cials deliver keynote speeches at the meeting, where they update the academic 
community on the state of play of trade negotiations and disputes and the most 
important trade law issues that China faces.250 These interactions help spur 
Chinese researchers to focus on topics of practical relevance to the govern-
ment. 
In addition to the formal research societies, entrepreneurial individuals 
have established informal networks to exchange views on WTO law. Yang 
Guohua, now a law professor at Tsinghua University, established an email list 
entitled “Academic Circle on WTO” and a WeChat group named “Rule of Law 
Utopia” when he was Deputy Director-General in DTL. Most of China’s lead-
ing WTO scholars are members of these groups, and they often engage in heat-
ed discussions on cutting-edge issues in WTO law. 
In 2010, the WTO Secretariat launched the WTO Chairs Programme, 
which aims to enhance knowledge of the WTO and the international trading 
system among academics and policy-makers in developing countries through 
curriculum development, research, and outreach by universities and research 
institutions.251 The secretariat announced a call for proposals in 2009 and se-
lected the Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade as one among fourteen centers 
worldwide.252 The Shanghai team, which has since changed its name to Shang-
hai University of International Business and Economics (“SUIBE”), includes 
three professors and around twenty researchers.253 The institute established ini-
tiatives on WTO dispute settlement and trade policy review, and it provides 
translation services for MOFCOM.254 It partners with the Geneva-based non-
governmental organization International Centre on Trade and Development 
(“ICTSD”) to publish a Chinese language version of ICTSD’s periodical on 
trade law developments, Bridges.255 These initiatives illustrate the broad trans-
national ties of WTO researchers in China, linking with the WTO secretariat 
and other Geneva-based organizations.256 
                                                                                                                                      
 250. Id. 
 251. WTO Chairs Programme, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel 
_e/train_e/chairs_prog_e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 252. School of WTO Research and Education (SWTO), SHANGHAI U. INT’L BUS. ECON., 
http://eng.suibe.edu.cn/wwwwesearchandwducationwchoolwwwwww/list.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 253. Study in China, SHANGHAI U. INT’L BUS. ECON., http://www.csc.edu.cn/studyinchina/university 
detailen.aspx?collegeId=118 (last visited Nov. 8, 2017); see also School Profile, SHANGHAI U. INT’L BUS. 
ECON., http://www.suibe.edu.cn/558/list.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2017). 
 254. The initiatives include the “China-WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Research Center” (in part-
nership with the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center), the “China-WTO Trade Policy Review Center,” 
the “WTO and the Research Center for the Internationalization of Chinese Enterprises” (in partnership with the 
City University of Hong Kong), and the “WTO Literature Translation Center.” Interview with Anonymous 
(June 12, 2014) (Interview #15) (on file with authors); see Study in China, supra note 253.  
 255. The translation programs exemplify the greater demands placed on countries that do not use a WTO 
official language (English, Spanish, and French) and want to participate meaningfully in the WTO. As one 
official quipped, “just imagine if the USTR had to defend itself in Chinese.” Interview #19, supra note 120. 
 256. Interview with Anonymous (July 20, 2016) (Interview #34) [hereinafter Interview #34] (on file with 
authors). 
SHAFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2018 9:58 AM 
150 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
C. Interactions with Government and Law Firms  
Chinese law firms and MOFCOM occasionally seek advice from Chinese 
law professors on international trade matters; they initially did so on an ad hoc 
basis where an individual official knew a law professor.257 This practice gradu-
ally became institutionalized after MOFCOM organized regular seminars on 
current WTO cases.258 The exchanges helped the government tap into academ-
ic expertise and helped the academics keep abreast of legal developments.259 
In addition to its consultations with academics, MOFCOM runs a formal 
secondment program for law professors, which it started in 2011.260 Under the 
program, MOFCOM selects young academics from elite law schools around 
the country and assigns them to the Department of Treaty and Law.261 During 
their one-year stay, the professors are treated as MOFCOM staff members and 
conduct research on legal issues and participate in all aspects of the WTO dis-
pute settlement process.262 MOFCOM invites law professors to observe WTO 
hearings in Geneva as members of the Chinese delegation.263 It also invites 
them to hear presentations at MOFCOM by foreign lawyers who handle Chi-
na’s WTO cases.264 These experiences help orient their research and pedagogy. 
The government has nominated several Chinese academics to the Indica-
tive List of Panelists maintained by the WTO secretariat.265 MOFCOM nomi-
nated three individuals in 2004, followed by two in 2006, six in 2010, and 
eight in 2011.266 By 2012, the government had nominated a total of nineteen 
individuals,267 of which eight were full-time academics, eight were sitting offi-
cials at MOFCOM at the Director or Director-General level, and the remaining 
three were former government officials who practiced as lawyers or teach part-
time as professors.268 
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VI. ENGAGING LAW FIRMS  
Litigation in the WTO is a highly specialized activity that has spurred 
governments to hire and work with legal professionals and, in particular, WTO 
law specialists in private law firms.269 Given the stakes for China’s develop-
ment policy, the government developed a policy of hiring the world’s best 
trade lawyers to defend it, who were in U.S. and European law firms.270 In par-
allel, it worked to foster the development of internal expertise within Chinese 
law firms.271 It did so by having a Chinese law firm work with a foreign law 
firm in all but one of the first twenty-eight cases that China faced before WTO 
panels. 272  As one U.S. lawyer working for China stated, China has been 
“smart” in its dual use of foreign and domestic lawyers, which facilitates 
“technology transfer.”273 Over time, lawyers in Chinese private law firms de-
veloped significant WTO law expertise.274 
The government worked along with Chinese law firms whenever China 
was a third party in a WTO case to help the government form its legal posi-
tions and, in the process, help train Chinese lawyers. For example, one Chinese 
lawyer now active in WTO cases worked with the government in about a doz-
en cases in which China was a third party between 2003 and 2008, including a 
number of subsidy cases involving the U.S., the E.U., Canada, and Korea, an 
area in which Chinese practices would subsequently be challenged before the 
WTO.275 He stressed how “being a third party was important for capacity 
building. I saw and studied how others would write submissions, develop ar-
guments; in some cases I could see how a party participated in oral hearings, 
such as before the Appellate Body.”276 As another attorney stated, “we copied, 
we learned, we pasted. As an entrepreneurial saying goes (in Chinese), creation 
starts from imitation.”277 The lawyer “loved” to see how “legal” the WTO 
work was.278 Through these processes of public-private partnership in WTO 
litigation, the government helped build expertise to defend Chinese interests, 
as well as to bring international trade law home. 
                                                                                                                                      
 269. See SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 103, at 33. 
 270. Tina Wang, China’s Coming of Age in the WTO War, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2009, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/2009/04/20/china-wto-trade-markets-economy-law.html. 
 271. See Interview #3, supra note 159. 
 272. For example, in the 2014 China—Rare Earths case, the government worked with the U.S. law firm 
Sidley Austin, together with the Chinese law firm AllBright. See, e.g., Relationships, SIDLEY: RELATIONSHIPS, 
https://www.sidley.com/en/relationships-clients (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (“We represented MOFCOM in a 
WTO dispute involving China–Rare Earths, in defense of export restraints responding to claims made by the 
U.S., the EU, and Japan”); see also AllBright Lawyer Participates in 2014 China Rare Earth Forum, 
ALLBRIGHT (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.allbrightlaw.com/info/7e3c60448c6e41a6af330be55a5a9dee (describ-
ing the lawyer’s role in the case). 
 273. Interview #6, supra note 264. 
 274. Wang, supra note 270. 
 275. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 278. Id. 
SHAFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2018 9:58 AM 
152 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
A. The Development of China’s Trade Bar 
The development of the international trade and business law fields in 
China is a phenomenon that flourished after the WTO’s creation. Between 
1997 and China’s WTO accession in late 2001, the government launched a 
dozen anti-dumping cases.279 The trade bar, however, still remained underde-
veloped. As the China Youth Daily, a major national newspaper, lamented in 
late 2001, “Chinese lawyers familiar with international law, international trade 
law and WTO rules are extremely rare.”280 For China to effectively engage 
with WTO law, including for the preparation and defense of its own regula-
tions, it needed Chinese legal professionals to enhance their competency in 
English and in trade law.281 
China’s accession to the WTO was a catalyst for developing the Chinese 
legal profession more generally, thereby facilitating transnational legal order-
ing in trade and business law. To promote such development, the Ministry of 
Justice issued an Opinion on “Accelerating the Reform and Development of 
the Legal Profession after China’s Accession to the WTO” in August 2001.282 
The ministry noted, “Chinese lawyers are weak in handling international legal 
business, and China lack talents who can excellently handle foreign-involved 
legal services, and the lawyers’ competitive capacity in the international legal 
service market are weak.”283 It stressed: 
We should improve the continuing education of the practicing lawyers, 
strengthen the education and training of the lawyers in respect of newly 
arising economic and legal knowledge, scientific and technological 
knowledge, and foreign language ability. We should open various train-
ing avenues, select excellent talents to accept trainings abroad, and 
meanwhile take corresponding measures to guarantee those lawyers se-
lected for overseas studies will come back to China to provide services. 
We should do our utmost to make the quantity and quality of China’s 
foreign-involved lawyers reach a level in line with the demand of China’s 
market economic construction and development by the year 2010.284 
In the area of trade law, MOFTEC and its Department of Treaty and Law 
took the lead in building the trade bar’s capacity. In June 2000, the DTL orga-
nized a delegation to attend a training course in Washington D.C.285 The dele-
gation included officials from the main economic ministries, officials from leg-
                                                                                                                                      
 279. Wang Qinhua, Zhongguo Duiwai Fanqingxiao de Zhuangkuang ji Anli [China’s Antidumping Expe-
rience and Cases], in WANG SHICHUN, FANQINGXIAO YINGDUI ZHIDAO [HOW TO DEAL WITH ANTIDUMPING] 
28–29 (Wang Qinhua & Zhang Hanlin eds., 2004).  
 280. Yang Lushi Qiangtan Zhongguo Zhan Bentu Lushi: Shuilai Da WTO Guansi [Foreign Lawyers En-
tering China to Compete with Local Lawyers: Who will Litigate the WTO Cases?], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO 
[CHINA YOUTH DAILY] (Dec. 10, 2001) (lamenting that “there are only about 2,000 lawyers in the whole coun-
try who can use English fluently to negotiate deals and sign contracts with foreign clients”).  
 281. Wang, supra note 270. 
 282. Ministry of Justice, Opinions of the Ministry of Justice on Accelerating the Reform and Develop-
ment of the Legal Profession after China’s Accession to the WTO, SIFATONG (Mar. 8, 2001).  
 283. Id. (translation by LawinfoChina, a legal database run by Peking University). 
 284. Id.  
 285. Chengang, Overview,supra note 155, at 15. 
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islative bodies, scholars from universities and research institutes, and practic-
ing lawyers, all selected by DTL.286 Professor John Jackson, widely referenced 
in China as the “father of the WTO,” taught the course at Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center.287 The course was a great success and many participants be-
came leading figures on WTO law issues in China, such as Dr. Yang Guohua 
who would become lead counsel in many of China’s WTO cases as Deputy 
General-Counsel at DTL.288 
Since no Chinese law firm had any experience in WTO dispute settle-
ment, MOFCOM turned to foreign law firms for representation when China 
began to fully litigate disputes before the WTO rather than settle them.289 
While the Chinese government is generally wary of involving foreign lawyers 
in other areas, and although there initially was some internal debate, the gov-
ernment continues to hire foreign law firms for WTO litigation. 290  Li 
Chengang, Director-General of DTL, justifies the decision by noting that WTO 
litigation is a highly specialized activity that requires significant legal skills 
and that this strategy has proven effective for long-time General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)/WTO Members such as Japan, India, and Bra-
zil.291 In response to concerns that foreign lawyers might be untrustworthy, his 
former colleague Yang Guohua noted, the “lawyers provide professional legal 
services. They will do their best no matter which country they work for. As a 
client, all we care about is their capabilities to provide professional ser-
vices.”292 In the process, they also facilitate legal technology transfer. 
Such transfer has particularly thrived in the area of import relief law. Alt-
hough China has been the target of trade remedy cases abroad since the 1980s, 
it only launched its first trade remedy case in 1997 when Chinese lawyers 
submitted a petition to MOFTEC to commence an anti-dumping investigation 
on behalf of a group of Chinese newsprint manufacturers.293 The case heralded 
                                                                                                                                      
 286. Id. 
 287. See, e.g., AN CHEN, THE VOICE FROM CHINA: AN CHEN ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW xli 
(2013) (Jackson as the “Father of the WTO”); Guohua, A Memoir, supra note 43, at 4 (referencing Jackson as 
famously called the “Founding Father of the GATT/WTO”).  
 288. Interview with Anonymous (June 9, 2014) (Interview #9) [hereinafter Interview #9] (on file with 
authors). 
 289. Mary E. Footer, Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country Experience, 22 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1204, 1206 (2011) (reviewing DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO, supra note 259). 
 290. Interview with Anonymous (June 9, 2014) (Interview #4) [hereinafter Interview #4] (on file with 
authors). 
 291. Chengang, Overview, supra note 155, at 27. 
 292. Yang Guohua, Zuihao de Lushi (The Best Lawyers), in WOMEN ZAI WTO DA GUANSI [LITIGATING 
IN THE WTO] 146 (Yang Guohua & Shi Xiaoli eds., 2015). 
 293. When the newsprint producers first approached lawyers Wang Xuehua, He Jinghua, and Huang Tao 
at the Huanzhong Law Firm in Beijing in 1996, there were no anti-dumping regulations in China, but only a 
vague clause in the 1994 Foreign Trade Law that allowed the state to take action against dumping. See He 
Jinghua, Fanqingxiao Shensu Xietiao Gongzuo Bibu Keshao [Coordination of Antidumping Petitions Needed], 
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY] (June 26, 2007) [hereinafter Coordination of Antidumping Petitions Needed]; 
Wang Xuehua, Shensu Lushi Yaozuo Chanye Daibiaoren [Petitioners’ Lawyer Should Represent the Industry], 
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY] (June 24, 2007) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Lawyer Should Represent the Industry]. 
As nobody in China knew how to submit an anti-dumping petition and conduct an anti-dumping investigation, 
the law firm went to officials in MOFCOM’s Department of Treaty and Law, where Wang used to work, to 
discuss the matter. Coordination of Antidumping Petitions Needed, supra; Petitioners’ Lawyer Should Repre-
sent the Industry, supra. The Department reported the case to the Minister and asked the Huanzhong Law Firm 
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the legalization of Chinese import-relief administration and the development of 
China’s import-relief bar.294 The government official, Mr. Wu Xiaochen, later 
became a leading private trade lawyer at the Hylands Law Firm and wrote a 
book, Antidumping Law and Practice of China.295 The practice has since flour-
ished in China, which has become one of the world’s largest users of anti-
dumping measures.296 China now uses anti-dumping law frequently against the 
U.S. and Europe, often in a tit-for-tat fashion in response to U.S. and E.U. in-
vestigations.297 
B. Who Are the Government’s Chinese Trade Lawyers? 
Although the government hired foreign lawyers to be best represented in 
WTO cases, it also wished to build the capacity of Chinese law firms.298 From 
its very first case, the government deliberately hired domestic law firms to 
work with the foreign firms.299 In the early years, the government selected ten 
Chinese law firms and tried to groom them for WTO work by having them 
provide support to the foreign law firms and work along with the government 
on third-party submissions.300 For example, in its first case, the US-Steel Safe-
guard case initiated in 2002, China hired the French law firm Gide Loyerette 
as its counsel, together with four domestic law firms to assist in the back-
                                                                                                                                      
to start preparing for the case after the Minister approved it in February 1997. Coordination of Antidumping 
Petitions Needed, supra; Petitioners’ Lawyer Should Represent the Industry, supra. In March, the State Coun-
cil issued The Regulation on Anti-dumping and Subsidy Countervailing Measures; in November, Huanzhong 
filed the formal petition on behalf of the domestic producers; and in December, MOFTEC formally launched 
the investigation. Coordination of Antidumping Petitions Needed, supra; Petitioners’ Lawyer Should Repre-
sent the Industry, supra. The official handling the investigation was Wu Xiaochen, a student of Wang at UIBE. 
Coordination of Antidumping Petitions Needed, supra; Petitioners’ Lawyer Should Represent the Industry, 
supra. The investigation targeted exporters from the U.S., Canada, and Korea, which hired other Chinese law 
firms such as King and Wood, Zhong Lun, and T&D Associates to prepare their defenses. See also Peng Wu 
Peng, ZHONG LUN, http://www.zhonglun.com/Content/2016/10-14/1642323112.html (last visited Nov. 11, 
2017); Ning Xuanfeng: Zhongguo “Shuangfan” Lingyu Linjun Lushi [Nin Xuanfeng: China’s Leading “Dou-
ble Reverse” Lawyer], LEGAL DAILY (July 19, 2014), http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/ 
20140719/Articel05008GN.htm; World and News, T&D, http://www.tdlawyers.com (last visited Nov. 11, 
2017). 
 294. David R. Grace et al., China’s Antidumping Regime: Worth Keeping an Eye On,  
COVINGTON & BURLING, https://www.cov.com/files/Publication/8b6e39b8-5a2d-45cd-9749-074bd978cc 
cb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8953a338-1784-45c5-ab11-0bcc7a9389e1/oid6344.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2017). 
 295. 93 Jie Xiaoyou, Sifeng Lushi Shiwusuo Hehuoren Wu Xiaochen: Yi Shisan Nian, Sishi qi Fan-
qingxiao An [Wu Xiaochen: Class of 93 Alumni and Partner at Sifeng Law Firm: Thirteen Years, Forty Anti-
dumping Cases], UIBE, http://law.uibe.edu.cn/OutListContent/index.aspx?nodeid=109&page=ContentPage 
&contentid=2300 (last visited Nov. 30, 2017); see also Mark Wu, Attacking with a Borrowed Sword: The Rise 
of Trade Remedies Law in China (Harvard Globalization Lawyering & Emerging Economies China Series 
Working Paper, 2015). 
 296. See infra notes 312–318 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 104 (2012) [here-
inafter Wu, Antidumping]; Jennifer M. Freedman, China Floods the WTO with Tit-for-Tat, BLOOMBERG (June 
7, 2012, 8:30 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-07/china-floods-the-wto-with-tit-for-
tat. 
 298. Chengang, Overview, supra note 155, at 27. 
 299. Interview #4, supra note 290. 
 300. Interview with Anonymous (Dec. 2013) (Interview #22) [hereinafter Interview #22] (on files with 
author). 
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ground.301 Most of these Chinese firms were boutique law firms with trade 
remedies practices.302 
Over the past decade, however, all but one of the original ten discontin-
ued their WTO litigation practices, although domestic trade remedies practices 
continued to grow. 303  In 2016, only King & Wood Mallesons (“KWM”), 
among the original firms, continued to handle WTO dispute settlement for the 
government, along with four other firms: Zhong Lun; Jincheng, Tongda & 
Neal (“JTN”); AllBright; and Gaopeng & Partners.304 When one compares 
these two groups of law firms, the following differences in firm size, practice 
areas, location, and lawyer profiles become salient:  
1. Firm size. While most of the firms on the initial list were boutique 
firms, among the five firms in the current group, three (KWM, Zhong 
Lun, and AllBright) are among the largest law firms in China, each 
having over 900 lawyers, while the other two are among the largest of 
the medium-sized Chinese firms, having about 200 lawyers each. 
2. Practice areas. As boutique firms, those in the initial list tended to spe-
cialize in a few related areas, such as trade remedies. In contrast, those 
in the current group are “full-service” law firms that cover almost all 
areas of business law, including corporate law, intellectual property 
law, competition law, and arbitration, in addition to international trade 
law. 
3. Location. The initial list included law firms based in Shanghai and 
Guangzhou. In contrast, all of the firms in the current group are based 
in Beijing.305 
4. Lawyers’ profiles. The lawyers in the initial list tended to be older with 
no significant overseas experiences, while the lawyers in the current 
group are younger and have significant experiences abroad, including 
practice in U.S. and European law firms. Most of the trade lawyers in 
the initial list had strong MOFCOM connections. In contrast, with the 
exception of two trade lawyers at Gaopeng, to our knowledge, no law-
yer in the current group has worked as an official in MOFCOM. 
These comparisons reflect the evolution and maturation of China’s trade 
bar. The initial decision by MOFCOM to cultivate WTO practices among bou-
tique firms with trade remedy practices made sense in 2002 since these firms 
had some expertise on trade law issues regarding dumping. After China’s first 
WTO case (US-Steel Safeguard) ended in 2003, however, China did not have 
another major WTO case litigated before a panel until 2006 when the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                      
 301. Chengang, Overview, supra note 155, at 27. 
 302. Interview with Anonymous (July 29, 2016) (Interview #33) [hereinafter Interview #33] (on file with 
authors). 
 303. See Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 304. See Interview #3, supra note 159. 
 305. Asia’s Top 50 Largest Law Firms, ASIAN LEGAL BUS. (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.legalbusiness 
online.com/features/asia%E2%80%99s-top-50-largest-law-firms/68885. 
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brought the China-Auto Parts and China-Intellectual Property Rights cases.306 
During the three-year dry spell, the boutique law firms had little incentive to 
continue investing in their WTO practice; they chose to turn to more lucrative 
practice areas. 
In contrast, larger law firms have the resources to support a WTO legal 
practice, and these practices have grown.307  Although WTO work remains 
much less lucrative than these firms’ other practice areas, maintaining a WTO 
practice can greatly enhance the prestige of a firm since it involves represent-
ing the Chinese government, which every Chinese person has been taught 
since their youth to be sacred and infallible. On the practical side, working on 
these cases helps the big law firms maintain “guanxi” (personal connections) 
with MOFCOM, which in addition to its jurisdiction on trade issues is entrust-
ed with regulatory powers over commercially important areas such as the ap-
proval of foreign investment and the enforcement of China’s competition laws. 
While different divisions within MOFCOM handle these issues, building 
“guanxi” with DTL officials through WTO cases makes it easier for the law 
firms to contact officials in other divisions. 
These Chinese law firms have also generated work related to WTO law 
that has broader implications within China, as well as for the international trad-
ing system. As the former DTL Deputy Director-General Yang Guohua wrote, 
“Chinese lawyers have grown up to provide WTO legal services not only to 
MOFCOM in [WTO disputes], but also to other government agencies and 
companies.”308 The most clearly linked area is trade remedy practices, which 
reflect a legalization of Chinese import-relief practices. Chinese law firms rep-
resent both the Chinese petitioner and the foreign companies in these cases. 
From 2003 to 2010, China implemented 122 anti-dumping measures and was 
the world’s largest user of these policies, second to India.309 Since 2010, alt-
hough the number of anti-dumping measures initiated by China dropped, the 
country still remained one of the main users of these measues, along with India 
and Brazil.310 
As Chinese law firms build expertise in this area, they increasingly repre-
sent Chinese companies and trade associations in foreign anti-dumping and 
                                                                                                                                      
 306. Although China participated as a third party in many WTO cases during this period, the legal fees 
that the government paid were too low to provide sufficient incentives for the firms. Interview with Anony-
mous (June 9, 2014) (Interview #1) [hereinafter Interview #1] (on file with authors). According to a senior 
lawyer, the legal fees for law firms to represent China in third-party cases are only two-to-three hundred thou-
sand RMB, around thirty to fifty thousand USD. Id. The only other case where China was a main party during 
this period—the 2004 China-VAT on Integrated Circuits case—failed to create significant revenue for the two 
Chinese law firms hired since China settled the case within four months and no WTO panel was formed. For a 
detailed discussion of this case, see Henry Gao, Aggressive Legalism, supra note 121, at 329–34. The govern-
ment did not even hire a foreign law firm in that case. Interview #1, supra. 
 307. Other factors include Chinese patriotism (“it’s good to help my country,” noted one interviewee) 
and the career reputational opportunities for young ambitious lawyers with English proficiency and greater 
facility with common-law reasoning. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 308. Guohua, A Memoir, supra note 43, at 11. 
 309. Wu, Antidumping, supra note 297, at 104. 
 310. See Anti-Dumping Measures: By Reporting Member 01/01/1995-31/12/2015, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_MeasuresByRepMem.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).  
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other import-relief investigations as well. 311  They often work closely with 
MOFCOM and industry associations to help overcome collective action prob-
lems.312 Often they work with foreign law firms, but sometimes they do the 
work alone.313 Most notably, one of the leading practitioners, Mr. Pu Ling-
chen of Zhong Lun law firm, returned to Beijing after over twenty years in 
Brussels, where he had received a law degree at Free University of Brussels, 
interned for the European Commission, and practiced anti-dumping work with 
law firms from the U.S. and the U.K.314 He often defends Chinese clients di-
rectly before E.U. administrative bodies in import-relief investigations.315 
In addition, these law firms have been able to expand into other areas, 
such as foreign investment law and bilateral and plurilateral trade agree-
ments.316 For example, the professionals in China that work on Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty (“BIT”) negotiations also work on trade matters, and they 
build from their trade experiences, exemplifying the interpenetration of these 
two fields in China.317 Those in MOFCOM who work on the BIT negotiations 
come from the WTO department, and they work with outside Chinese law 
firms with significant experience in WTO disputes.318 The government is har-
nessing these individuals’ knowledge to form public-private partnerships in the 
negotiation of bilateral investment agreements with the U.S., the E.U., and oth-
ers.319 If agreements are reached, these same law firms hope to work on inves-
tor-state cases under the resulting rules.320 As one lawyer noted, “these law 
firms can help with the drafting of BIT language because they understand how 
judicial interpretation works before an international tribunal.”321 
Overall, the increased number of WTO cases involving China has gener-
ated sufficient work for these five firms to create specialized WTO law prac-
tices.322 As one leading Chinese lawyer on WTO matters told us, “I spend 
                                                                                                                                      
 311. One practitioner noted that the firm had represented Chinese firms in anti-dumping proceedings in 
the U.S., E.U., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. Interview with Anonymous 
(July 26, 2016) (Interview #30) (on file with authors). 
 312. Interview #7, supra note 183. 
 313. Interview #1, supra note 306. 
 314. Interview #9, supra note 288. 
 315. Similarly, another Chinese attorney told us he was about to go to India for an optical company to 
represent it in an anti-dumping case there. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 316. Interview with Anonymous (July 27, 2016) (Interview #35) [hereinafter Interview #35] (on file with 
authors). 
 317. Interview with Anonymous (July 23, 2016) (Interview #27) [hereinafter Interview #27] (on file with 
authors). 
 318. Interview #5, supra note 224; Interview #27, supra note 317; Interview with Anonymous (July 25, 
2016) (Interview #29) [hereinafter Interview #29] (on file with authors). 
 319. Interview #29, supra note 318. 
 320. Interview #27, supra note 317. 
 321. Interview #29, supra note 318. From its international trade law experience, some Chinese trade spe-
cialists believe that China could look favorably on an appellate process for investor-state dispute settlement. 
Id. As one interviewee noted, in NAFTA investor-state dispute settlement, the U.S. has never lost before ad 
hoc panels, and in the WTO context, China has often fared better on U.S. import relief measures before the 
Appellate Body than before ad hoc panels. Interview #27, supra note 317. In short, it appears that the U.S. 
would prefer a less court-like process for investment disputes than would China. Id. 
 322. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
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eighty percent of my time on WTO cases.”323 The firms employ five to ten 
lawyers, complemented by four to five interns, to work on trade law matters.324 
C. Procedure of a Typical Case 
The WTO dispute settlement process combines lawyering and diplomacy 
at two levels: the domestic and the international. When asked what is the 
greatest challenge that Chinese officials face regarding WTO dispute settle-
ment, a high-level official responded that it is managing “Chinese national-
ism.”325 In a subsequent discussion, that same official emphasized the broader 
importance of the WTO globally to “maintain peace and prosperity.”326 In an 
economically interdependent world, these domestic and international diplomat-
ic tasks mesh, facilitating trans-national legal ordering. 
Parties use WTO law to press countries to settle disputes under the threat 
of litigation.327 Even after a formal WTO legal ruling, they also negotiate over 
what action suffices to resolve the dispute.328 The WTO dispute settlement 
process, as a result, is never purely legal, but always combines law and diplo-
macy. 
The formal process starts with consultations.329 In practice, the consulta-
tions typically involve lawyers who use them to gather information to help 
prepare a case or defense.330 MOFCOM thus involves lawyers from the very 
beginning. Once MOFCOM determines that a WTO complaint will be litigat-
ed,331 it starts the process of selecting outside law firms by asking firms to 
submit bids. In formulating their bid, the firm provides, along with its fee 
schedule, a twenty-to-fifty page memorandum analyzing the legal issues.332 In 
deciding who to select, MOFCOM considers both the quality of the memoran-
dum and the fees.333 
For WTO complaints that do not proceed to litigation before a panel, the 
government hires only Chinese law firms.334 It, likewise, hires only Chinese 
law firms when China is only a third party before a WTO panel, except in rare 
                                                                                                                                      
 323. Id. 
 324. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 325. Interview #19, supra note 120 (including both WTO and work on bilateral and plurilateral trade 
agreements). 
 326. Interview with Anonymous (June 10, 2014) (Interview #18) [hereinafter Interview #18] (on file with 
authors). 
 327. Interview with Anonymous (June 13, 2014) (Interview #14) [hereinafter Interview #14] (on file with 
authors). 
 328. Interview #18, supra note 326. 
 329. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 6.2, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Under the WTO’s “negative consensus” rule a panel will be formed unless all WTO Members (in-
cluding the complainant) agree that it not be. See id. art. 6.1. 
 332. Interview #2, supra note 160; Interview #35, supra note 316. 
 333. One participating lawyer stressed, “the government picks on the strength of the analysis, not just on 
the price.” Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 334. Interview #1, supra note 306. 
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cases involving systemic issues.335 Even in cases where it is a third party, how-
ever, the government may be quite demanding; to submit a bid to represent 
China in such cases, a Chinese law firm may again write up to thirty to fifty 
pages of legal analysis.336 The government’s actual third-party submissions, in 
turn, can fall within that range.337 The case EU-Antidumping Measures on Bio-
diesel brought by Argentina, for example, was of systemic importance because 
it involved the use of surrogate prices from third countries in anti-dumping 
calculations.338 This practice can favor the finding of dumping and, where 
dumping is found, inflate anti-dumping margins.339 It is often used against 
Chinese imports.340 China submitted a fifty-page submission in support of Ar-
gentina’s arguments.341 Because of the case’s systemic importance, the gov-
ernment hired a U.S. law firm (Sidley Austin) and a Chinese law firm (Zhong 
Lun) for the third-party submission and the WTO hearings.342 Argentina won 
the case, establishing precedent to China’s benefit.343 
In contrast, if a case is argued before a panel where China is a party, 
MOFCOM has always hired a foreign law firm together with a Chinese law 
firm, with each selected in a separate bidding process.344 The first thirteen 
WTO cases China filed were all against the U.S. (nine cases) or the E.U. (four 
cases).345 In these cases, MOFCOM used American and European law firms 
because they better understand the trade laws and practices in their home juris-
dictions.346 
When WTO members bring complaints against China,347 China also re-
lies primarily on foreign counsel for its defense because of their greater famili-
arity with WTO jurisprudence and courtroom advocacy.348 The foreign law 
firm takes primary responsibility for the legal analysis while the Chinese firm 
assists primarily with the factual presentation of the relevant Chinese 
measures.349 A Chinese lawyer quipped, “the Chinese law firm collects the in-
                                                                                                                                      
 335. Interview #21, supra note 125. 
 336. Interview #35, supra note 316. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Wu, Antidumping, supra note 297, at 12. 
 340. Id. at 25. 
 341. Interview #35, supra note 316. 
 342. Id. 
 343. The case is of systemic importance for China because Article 15 of China’s Accession Protocol 
permitted countries to use third-country cost data in place of prices in China for anti-dumping determinations 
based on China’s nonmarket economy status, but the relevant provision expired in December 2016. See infra 
note 548. The U.S. was also a third party in the case and not surprisingly supported the E.U.’s position; Argen-
tina prevailed before the panel and the Appellate Body. See Appellate Body Report, EU-Antidumping 
Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/R (Oct. 26, 2016). 
 344.  Interview #21, supra note 125. 
 345.  Interview #35, supra note 316. 
 346. As explained by a senior MOFCOM official, “we hire Washington DC lawyers in cases against the 
U.S. and Brussels lawyers in cases against the E.U.” Interview #22, supra note 300.  
 347. Only the U.S., the E.U., Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, and Japan had filed complaints against China 
as of November 2017. See Disputes by Member, supra note 65. 
 348. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 349. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
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gredients, while the foreign law firm cooks them into a dish.”350 The foreign 
law firms can (and often do) hire and pay higher salaries to employ Chinese 
lawyers to do this analysis in parallel, but the government insists that a Chinese 
law firm be included.351 In the process, the foreign law firms grant the Chinese 
lawyers access to their WTO databases and the WTO submissions that they 
used in previous cases.352 From this experience, Chinese lawyers learn signifi-
cant legal skills involved in building and defending WTO cases.353 Although 
the foreign law firms draft China’s submissions, the Chinese law firms can as-
sist and comment on them.354 For example, in the China-IPR case, the U.S. 
challenged the Chinese threshold for criminal prosecution as too high.355 The 
Chinese lawyers helped gather information about how Chinese cases operate in 
practice so that the panel could see the issue in broader context, and the panel 
found that the U.S. failed to make a prima facie case.356 
To help them understand the Chinese measures at issue, the foreign law 
firms sometimes request meetings with the relevant government agencies re-
sponsible for the measure, which MOFCOM helps to arrange and coordi-
nate.357 Initially, many ministry officials were annoyed by the meetings and 
regarded the foreign law firms as troublemakers. After MOFCOM explained to 
them that the meetings helped the law firms better understand and defend the 
Chinese measures before the WTO, however, ministry officials softened their 
attitude and became more welcoming. In the China-IPR case, for example, 
lawyers met with the Ministry of Public Security, as well as the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court because the U.S. challenge raised issues of judicial interpretation of 
Chinese law and judicial practice.358 
For the panel hearings in Geneva, MOFCOM typically sends the largest 
delegations of any WTO Member. 359  The Chinese delegation includes 
MOFCOM officials, lawyers from both foreign and domestic law firms, repre-
sentatives from the relevant ministries, and possibly also industry association 
representatives and academics.360 Unlike some WTO Members such as Japan, 
which always keep the private lawyers outside of the panel hearing room, 
MOFCOM had no reservations about bringing the foreign lawyers into the 
hearing and having them make China’s oral arguments and answer the panel’s 
questions.361 
Although foreign lawyers generally handle the oral proceedings, Chinese 
lawyers and officials inform us that, more recently, the Chinese lawyers have 
                                                                                                                                      
 350. Transcript of the High-Level Forum on Litigating in the WTO, in LITIGATING IN THE WTO, 174 
(Yang Guohua & Shi Xiaoli eds., 2015) (translated into English by the authors). 
 351. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 352. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 353. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 354. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id.; Interview #27, supra note 317.  
 357. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Interview #6, supra note 264. 
 360. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 361. Interview #1, supra note 306. 
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contributed to a greater extent.362 MOFCOM officials refer to the increased 
substantive role of Chinese lawyers in stages.363 The “first stage” was for Chi-
nese lawyers to learn about the process, while the “second” was for them to 
engage more substantively.364 In 2014, in the case China-Measures Imposing 
Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes 
(“HP-SSST”), a Chinese lawyer made the oral argument on an important fac-
tual issue in the panel hearing.365 Both the foreign lawyers and MOFCOM of-
ficials who were at the hearing praised his performance.366 
Chinese officials and lawyers talk about a potential “third stage” in which 
Chinese firms become solely responsible for China’s WTO cases.367 In the 
2012 case of US-Antidumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades 
from China, a Chinese law firm assumed the role of lead counsel, but the U.S. 
did not defend itself because the case involved Appellate Body precedent that 
the U.S. no longer challenged.368 It may be just a matter of time. In any case, 
lawyers in China have gained substantial expertise to advise the Chinese gov-
ernment and companies on trade law matters. 
VII. CHINESE COMPANIES’ AND TRADE ASSOCIATIONS’ ENGAGEMENT WITH 
TRADE LAW 
Thirty years ago, most Chinese companies were not only state owned, 
they were arms of Chinese ministries and local governments.369 Today, state-
owned enterprises have become corporatized, and many have shares listed on 
stock exchanges.370 Although private companies now represent around 54% of 
the country’s GDP, the larger ones all have Communist Party representatives 
and committees within them, designed to exercise oversight.371 Chinese com-
panies are thus generally much more deferential to state officials than their 
                                                                                                                                      
 362. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 363. Interview #1, supra note 306. 
 364. Id. One Chinese lawyer stated that, while the other party read its oral statement, he left the hearing 
along with the foreign lawyer hired by China to exchange opinions on legal issues. Li Fayin, Dui WTO Zheng-
duan Jiejue Jizhi de Yixie Suigan [Random Thoughts on the WTO Dispute Settlement System], in WOMEN ZAI 
WTO DA GUANSI [LITIGATING IN THE WTO] 75 (Yang Guohua & Shi Xiaoli eds., 2015). 
 365. Peng Jun, Zhongguo Lushi Shouci WTO Tingbian Ji [First Oral Debate by Chinese Lawyer in a 
WTO Proceeding], in WOMEN ZAI WTO DA GUANSI [LITIGATING IN THE WTO] 65–68 (Yang Guohua & Shi 
Xiaoli eds., 2015). 
 366. The lawyer noted, however, that arguing factual issues before a panel is much less challenging than 
arguing legal ones before the Appellate Body. Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 367. Interview #1, supra note 306; Interview #5, supra note 224. 
 368. The case regarded the U.S. practice of “zeroing” in anti-dumping calculations during a period in 
which the U.S. was revising its regulations to comply with earlier Appellate Body rulings. Interview #27, su-
pra note 317. 
 369. See Curtis Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Reforming China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Institutions, 
Not Ownership, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND 175, 181 (Liebman & Milhaupt eds., 2015). 
 370. Id. at 182, 205 n.3 (“[C]orporatization refers to the process of transforming SOEs from units of gov-
ernment into legally distinct corporate actors with ownership interest represented by shares, a board of direc-
tors, and other accouterments of the corporate form.”). 
 371. RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST LEADERS 72 
(2010); Mark Wu, The WTO and China’s Unique Economic Structure, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND 
313, 330–31 (Liebman & Milhaupt eds., 2015) [hereinafter Wu, The WTO and China’s Unique Economic 
Structure]. 
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U.S. and European counterparts.372 Many private Chinese companies find that 
government officials are difficult to approach.373 They, thus, have not devel-
oped a habit of hiring law firms to lobby and work with the government on 
trade disputes, and they have been further reluctant on account of the firms’ 
fees. In anti-dumping cases, many Chinese companies, in addition, face collec-
tive action problems to organize and defend themselves. 
The 2000s showed signs of change, as large Chinese companies and in-
dependent trade associations became more willing to hire trade lawyers and to 
defend their interests as partners with the government. First, larger Chinese 
companies increasingly hired in-house counsel, and many hired trade law-
yers.374 Second, some small- and medium-sized companies created industry 
associations independent of the Chinese state to work with private law firms on 
foreign and domestic anti-dumping investigations that eventually can (and did) 
lead to WTO cases.375 Both initiatives represent major changes in China and 
reflect a relative turn of Chinese companies to engage trade lawyers, thus sup-
porting transnational legal ordering. 
A. Chinese Companies and International Trade Law 
Before China’s accession to the WTO, Chinese companies also faced 
significant trade barriers abroad.376 Most of them chose to abandon the foreign 
market rather than fight in a foreign legal procedure.377 Following China’s ac-
cession, in order to help Chinese companies understand and benefit from WTO 
rules, the government launched extensive education campaigns, which were 
conducted by WTO Centers established around the country.378 It was a pater-
nalistic endeavor. For example, in July 2001, the Shanghai WTO Center 
launched the “50/100 Senior WTO Affairs Experts Training Project.”379 Under 
it, the center selected one hundred participants from fifty organizations, includ-
ing government departments, state-owned enterprises, professional service or-
ganizations, and government-formed industry associations. 380  The program 
lasted one year and was in three parts.381 Phase One provided a three-month 
                                                                                                                                      
 372. Milhaupt and Zheng contended that “state capitalism as practiced in China today is largely synony-
mous with state capture. . . . Large firms in China—whether SOEs, privately owned enterprises (POEs), or 
ambiguous mixtures of state and private ownership—survive and prosper precisely because they have fostered 
connections to state power.” Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 369, at 175, 181. 
 373. See generally SCOTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA 53 (2005). 
 374. Id. at 46. 
 375. Id. at 84. 
 376. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NTE CHINA (2013), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/2013%20NTE%20China%20Final.pdf. 
 377. See id.  
 378. See id.  
 379. Jiemi Shanghai Dazao WTO Rencai [Decoding how Shanghai Train WTO Experts], BEIJING 
QINGNIAN BAO [BEIJING YOUTH DAILY] (Sept. 10, 2001).  
 380. Gong Baihua, Shanghai’s WTO Affairs Consultation Center: Working Together to Take Advantage 
of WTO Membership, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case 
11_e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 381. Id. 
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introductory course,382 and Phase Two provided a three-month course on more 
advanced topics.383 Phase Three offered an overseas internship for participants 
to work in the U.S., the E.U., Japan, and other countries.384 The government 
launched the project with great fanfare and the response was overwhelming; 
the first morning after the announcement, the Shanghai WTO Center received 
more applications than places available.385 Hundreds of these programs mush-
roomed around the country, and the WTO centers trained thousands of Chinese 
officials and other stakeholders. 
Larger Chinese companies independently saw the need to develop WTO 
knowledge from their experience with foreign anti-dumping and other 
measures, and built in-house expertise.386 Since import-relief investigations of-
ten target Chinese companies, the companies hire specialized employees to re-
spond to them.387 Baosteel, one of the largest steel manufacturers in China, has 
an anti-dumping task force that coordinates over 110 people from twenty-two 
internal departments.388 Combining internal expertise with assistance from ex-
ternal legal counsel, Baosteel learned to defend itself successfully in anti-
dumping investigations.389 In the WTO case China-Certain Measures Affecting 
Electronic Payment Services, the banking association China UnionPay directly 
hired a Chinese law firm that MOFCOM included in its WTO delegation, to-
gether with the Chinese law firm that MOFCOM hired separately.390 
Larger Chinese companies have built internal legal expertise on many 
trade-related issues, including intellectual property, import relief, customs, 
trade facilitation, and investment law.391 For example, the Chinese technology 
giant Huawei has over one hundred in-house counsel.392 In 2013, Huawei hired 
international trade lawyer James Lockett as its Vice-President and Head of 
Trade Facilitation and Market Access.393 Before he joined Huawei, Lockett 
                                                                                                                                      
 382. The subjects included: the WTO and China in economic globalization; WTO and regional economic 
cooperation; WTO and special and differential treatment for developing countries; the basic principles, legal 
framework, and organizational structure of the WTO; the transparency principle and the shifting of govern-
ment functions; the non-discrimination principle and the establishment of fair market practices; the WTO dis-
pute settlement system; and the WTO trade policy review mechanism. Id. 
 383. The topics included: the GATT and specialized agreements; the GATS and specialized agreements; 
the TRIPS Agreement; and the Doha Round Agenda. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Luo Xinyu, Shanghai wei Rushi Zaozuo Zhunbei, Jiajin Peiyang WTO Gaoji Rencai [Shanghai Pre-
pares Early for the WTO Accession by Training WTO Senior Experts], XIN LANG [SINA], (Oct. 6, 2001), 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2001-10-06/371065.html.  
 386. Interview #9, supra note 288; Wendy Zeldin, World Trade Organization: Panel Rules in China’s 
Favor on Anti-Dumping Complaint Involving Fasteners, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Dec.  
16, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/world-trade-organization-panel-rules-in-chinas-favor-
on-anti-dumping-complaint-involving-fasteners/. 
 387. Interview #32, supra note 111. 
 388. Shanghai Baogang de Gushi–Jiaru WTO Zhihou Zhongguo Qiye Yingdui Fanqingxiao de Celu [The 
Story of Shanghai Baosteel: Strategies for Chinese Firms in Dealing with Antidumping Cases Post WTO Ac-
cession], ZHONGGUO JINJI SHIBAO [CHINA ECON. TIMES] (Mar. 1, 2002), http://news.mysteel. 
com/02/0301/00/2E7D37E77673E1CD.html. 
 389. Id.  
 390. Interview #5, supra note 224; Interview #6, supra note 264; Interview #29, supra note 318. 
 391. Interview #9, supra note 288. 
 392. Id. 
 393. See LOCKETT INT’L, http://www.lockett-intl.com/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
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had worked for the U.S. Department of Commerce, served as the Chairman of 
the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, and had been a lawyer for 
U.S. law firms in Brussels and Vietnam.394 He was thus highly familiar with 
U.S. and E.U. regulatory systems. His hiring indicates that leading Chinese 
companies like Huawei are looking beyond their defensive interests in foreign 
trade remedies cases and increasingly lobby proactively to open foreign mar-
kets. 
During our discussion, Lockett maintained that Huawei plays an im-
portant role in developing international standards on telecommunication 
equipment and reducing tariffs in information technology product.395 For ex-
ample, Huawei lobbied for the expansion of the WTO Information Technology 
Agreement (“ITA”) to include Latin American countries such as Brazil and 
Mexico,396 and its position on the ITA publicly differed from that of the Chi-
nese government.397 Hauwei’s taking such a public position exhibits a growth 
in confidence of a large firm to advance its views before state officials.398 
Building in-house trade law expertise takes time and resources that most 
Chinese small- and medium-sized enterprises cannot afford. To encourage 
more Chinese companies to bring their problems to the government, 
MOFCOM introduced a Foreign Trade Barrier Investigation mechanism in 
2002, which was modeled after U.S. Section 301 legislation and the E.U.’s 
Trade Barrier Regulation.399 The mechanism allows private companies to peti-
tion MOFCOM to launch an investigation and take necessary action when the 
companies encounter foreign trade barriers, whether through bilateral consulta-
tion or WTO litigation.400 The government introduced the mechanism with 
great fanfare.401 Companies, however, only formally invoked it in two cases in 
the first twelve years—the first involving a 2004 investigation regarding Japa-
nese import quotas on laver (seaweed) that was successfully settled, and the 
second regarding U.S. subsidies in the renewable-energy sector initiated in 
2012.402 As Gao argues, a main reason Chinese private companies do not use it 
is that, traditionally, they have lacked access to the government.403 Thus, when 
                                                                                                                                      
 394. About James, LOCKETT INT’L, http://www.lockett-intl.com/about_james (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 395. Interview #14, supra note 327. 
 396. Huawei Urges Brazil, Mexico to Sign IT Trade Agreement, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB., 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=1903450&CategoryId=13936 (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). The ITA 
was concluded at the WTO’s Tenth Ministerial Conference on December 16, 2015. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Cf. Shannon Tiezzi, China, US Clash Kills IT Trade Agreement: The Collapse of the ITA Signifies 
Why One Shouldn’t Be Optimistic About Broader US-China Cooperation on Trade Issues, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 
26, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/china-u-s-clash-kills-it-trade-agreement/; William 
Mauldin & Natalia Drozdiak, WTO Countries Clinch Deal to End Tariffs on Many High-Tech Goods, WALL 
STREET J. (July 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wto-countries-clinch-deal-to-end-tariffs-on-many-
high-tech-goods-1437710461.  
 399. For a detailed discussion of the mechanism, see Henry S. Gao, Taking Justice into Your Own Hand: 
The Trade Barrier Investigation Mechanism in China, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 633, 651 (2010). 
 400. Id. at 638–42. 
 401. Henry S. Gao, Public-Private Partnership: The Chinese Dilemma, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 983, 985 
(2014). 
 402. Id. 
 403. Gao, Taking Justice, supra note 399, at 649. 
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they encountered trade barriers, they preferred to resolve the problem by shift-
ing their exports elsewhere or by switching to other products.404 
Because the formal Foreign Trade Barrier Investigation mechanism was 
rarely used, MOFCOM introduced an informal alternative around 2005.405 This 
new approach—nicknamed the “Quadrilateral Coordination” mechanism—
involves the cooperation of four parties: the central government, local govern-
ment, industry association, and individual companies.406 Under it, industry as-
sociations play a key role as the bridge between private companies and the 
government, thus resolving private companies’ concerns about access.407 But 
to act effectively, industry associations would have to enhance their trade law 
capacity and their independence. 
B. Chinese Industry Associations and International Trade Law 
Historically, industry associations have not been independent of the gov-
ernment in China. Rather, they were established by and affiliated with func-
tional Ministries in particular domains, which were separate from MOFTEC 
(MOFCOM’s predecessor). These associations more-over had no expertise on 
foreign trade issues. To address this problem, MOFTEC, in the late 1980s, cre-
ated seven trade associations for importers and exporters of products, divided 
into broadly defined sectors.408 
Although these trade associations have closer links with MOFCOM, they 
still are ineffective in assisting most Chinese companies for multiple reasons. 
First, their scope of coverage is extremely broad, so that companies within the 
trade associations do not share the same concerns. To address a problem in-
volving a specific product, a company must work through many levels of bu-
reaucracy within the trade association.409 Second, these associations are typi-
cally based in Beijing and do not have branch offices in the provinces. 
Companies facing trade remedies cases are often located in distant provinces 
like Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang, and they are not engaged with these 
trade associations.410 
                                                                                                                                      
 404. Id. at 649–50.  
 405. Gao, Public-Private Partnership, supra note 401, at 986–87. 
 406. For a detailed discussion of the mechanism, see id. at 986–89. 
 407. Id. at 986–88. 
 408. Id. (“They are: China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Textiles and Apparel 
(CCCT), China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Light Industrial Products and Arts-Crafts 
(CCCLA), China Chamber of Commerce of Metals Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC), 
China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME), China 
Chamber of Commerce of Foodstuffs and Native Produce (CFNA), China Chamber of Commerce for Import 
& Export of Medicines & Health Products (CCCMHPIE), and China International Contractors Association 
(CHINCA).”). 
 409. To give an example, steel fasteners, along with many other products such as ball bearings and 
chains, are under the jurisdiction of the Machinery Components Branch, which is one of twelve different 
branches under the Department of Machinery Industry, which, in turn, is one of three departments in the China 
Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (“CCCME”). Id. at 997–
98. 
 410. Id. at 998. 
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Third, since the associations target trading firms, their memberships are 
typically limited to companies granted foreign trading rights by the govern-
ment. Until the revision of the Foreign Trade Law in 2004, MOFCOM granted 
trading rights only after careful examination and subject to particular criteria. 
The high procedural threshold effectively limited trading rights as a privilege 
for state-owned enterprises and large companies. Because most small- and me-
dium-sized companies did not enjoy trading rights, they could not join the as-
sociations. 
Fourth, these trade associations are established by the government, and 
not by the companies themselves. They tend to be rather bureaucratic and irre-
sponsive to the companies’ needs and demands. Many companies rarely turn to 
the trade associations for help since the companies view them as associations 
that govern them, rather than serve them.411 As one lawyer told us, “the trade 
association is a second government. . . . This is central planning.”412 The law-
yer suggested that the formation of independent trade associations will finally 
signal that China has become a market economy.413 
In the last decade, more independent industry associations have emerged, 
which represents a significant development in China resulting from its integra-
tion in the global economy.414 These private associations respond better to 
company interests.415 First, their scope of coverage is very narrow and tends to 
cover just a single product or several closely related products. For example, 
there are associations for fasteners, for parasols, and for cigarette lighters. Such 
a high degree of product specialization facilitates their ability to identify spe-
cific trade measures affecting the industry, such as anti-dumping investiga-
tions. Second, the new industry associations are located in the cities and coun-
ties where the industry operates, as in provinces such as Zhejiang and 
Guangdong. Third, these local associations accept both exporters and manufac-
turers as members and are more representative of the interests of the industry 
as a whole. Fourth, because these industry associations are formed on the com-
panies’ own initiatives, they are more responsive to the companies’ needs and 
demands, and the companies are more comfortable approaching them when the 
companies encounter trade barriers.416 
To help their members address trade barriers, the private industry asso-
ciations hire personnel with trade law expertise, train existing staff, and work 
with government trade departments and private law firms in individual cases. 
The E.U.’s 2007 anti-dumping investigation of Chinese iron and steel fastener 
imports illustrates the proactive role that local industry associations can play. 
In that case, the Jiaxing Fasteners Export and Import Industry Association 
                                                                                                                                      
 411. Id. at 986. 
 412. Interview #3, supra note 159; see also Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 369, at 196 (“The industrial 
associations actively supervise the operations of firms in their respective industries and have retained much, if 
not all, of the power exercised by their state predecessors.”). 
 413. Interview #3, supra note 159.  
 414. PETER NOLAN, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 54 (2001). 
 415. Gao, Public-Private Partnership, supra note 401, at 993–1003. 
 416. Id. 
SHAFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2018 9:58 AM 
No. 1] CHINA’S RISE 167 
helped fight the E.U. investigation at every step of the process. It helped com-
plete the E.U. questionnaires and worked with lawyers to challenge the E.U. 
measures before E.U. courts, a WTO panel, and the Appellate Body.417 
The association engaged in extensive lobbying efforts. Its representatives 
went to Brussels to meet with Commission officials and work with other 
stakeholders, such as European importers, distributors, and downstream indus-
tries, to lobby against the E.U. investigation. After the Commission imposed 
anti-dumping duties, the association pressed MOFCOM to initiate an anti-
dumping investigation against E.U. producers as retaliation and to file a WTO 
complaint that led to the Appellate Body ruling against the European Union. It 
also convinced the government to challenge the E.U’s compliance with the 
Appellate Body’s findings.418 
This arrangement involved public-private coordination comprised of the 
central government, local government, industry association, individual compa-
nies, and private lawyers.419 As one Chinese lawyer told us, he learned how 
U.S. trade associations operate when he worked in Washington D.C. with a 
U.S. law firm. 420  Now, in China, he advises his clients to form industry-
developed coalitions with a secretariat to defend themselves against foreign 
anti-dumping proceedings.421 Such arrangements once more represent learning 
from U.S. practice. 
In addition to assisting companies in individual cases, new industry asso-
ciations provide other trade-related services, such as the creation of Foreign 
Trade Pre-Warning Centers.422 These Centers monitor trade data in a particular 
sector and alert companies when they identify risks of impending trade barri-
ers. First pioneered in Zhejiang Province, more than 100 pre-warning centers 
sprouted around the province by late 2011. “Linking more than 6,000 [compa-
nies] in sectors ranging from textiles and clothing, to steel, consumer electron-
ics, and agricultural products, the centers cover every major regional economic 
block in the province.”423 “On average, every center has two full-time staff.”424 
“They distribute pre-warning information to [companies] through newsletters, 
websites, bulk text message broadcasts, and instant messaging programs.”425 In 
2010, the centers in Zhejiang sent more than half a million pre-warning mes-
sages through websites and text messages. Based on the experience in 
Zhejiang, associations in other provinces established similar pre-warning cen-
ters.426 
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 418. Id. at 995–96. 
 419. Id. at 986–87. 
 420. Interview #7, supra note 183. 
 421. Id. (stating that Taiwanese and Chinese associations often are small and medium-sized companies 
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 422. Gao, Public-Private Partnership, supra note 401, at 1002–03. 
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It remains a much greater challenge to form independent industry asso-
ciations in China than in the U.S. or Europe. A Chinese lawyer who earlier 
worked for a law firm in the U.S. noted three particular challenges.427 First, he 
found that “the mentality in China” differs because the firms are so focused on 
competing against each other in foreign markets they have trouble cooperating 
in foreign anti-dumping investigations. Second, the firms now lack faith that 
WTO law can help them gain real market access following a WTO case. Third, 
creating ad hoc coalitions is much more difficult in China because they invite 
closer scrutiny by the Chinese government. There is thus less of a bottom-up 
push from Chinese industries to organize collectively, hire lawyers, bring mat-
ters to MOFCOM, and challenge foreign measures.428 Nonetheless, the devel-
opment of independent industry associations for trade matters represents a sig-
nificant development in China, constituting both an offshoot of, and further 
conduit for, transnational legal ordering. 
VII. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGAL 
ORDER 
A. The Implications within China 
Bringing China into the WTO was more than just about opening China’s 
markets and foreign markets to Chinese goods. It involved processes of trans-
national legal ordering that have broader implications for government institu-
tions, the role of markets, the development of professions, and normative 
frames in which government accountability is assessed.429 It involved internal 
Chinese contests over the direction of China’s economic policy conducted 
within the context of an international legal regime.430 Some even view the 
WTO in quasi-constitutional terms regarding its impact on Chinese public law. 
As Tom Ginsburg noted: “The WTO became, in essence, an amendment to the 
Chinese constitution. Internal forces wished to ‘lock in’ commitments before 
they could be whittled away at the local level, and third-party monitoring, 
locked in by international agreements, provided the mechanism.”431 The WTO, 
                                                                                                                                      
 427. Interview #7, supra note 183. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Shaffer, WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, supra note 24, at 5. 
 430. As Mark Wu wrote, “[e]conomic reformers, led by Premier Zhu, utilized the WTO accession pro-
cess to push their agendas. WTO commitments served as a means to lock in desired reforms of China’s eco-
nomic structure.” Wu, The WTO and China’s Unique Economic Structure, supra note 371, at 313, 344–45; see 
also STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME, supra note 2, at 29 (explaining that, ultimately, Zhu Ronji “used the 
WTO accession agreement as a lever to downsize the state bureaucracy and drive out ministerial resistance to 
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ical needs of a reformist premier”); ZEMIN, supra note 144, at 454 (“The accession to the WTO demands major 
changes in the ways the economy is managed by our governments at all levels. We shall further adjust and 
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ance with the general rules of the market economy.”) (quoting from President Jiang Zemin’s speech he gave at 
the WTO Seminar for Provincial-level Officials on Feb. 25, 2002). 
 431. Tom Ginsburg, The Judicialization of Administrative Governance: Causes, Consequences and Lim-
its, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 10 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2009). 
One Chinese academic went so far as to affirm 
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in other words, was more than just about international law and compliance 
with it; it was about transnational legal ordering. 
The Chinese government significantly invested in developing trade law 
expertise at the central and provincial levels.432 It took complementary initia-
tives to foster the development of trade-related legal capacity in academia, pri-
vate law firms, companies, and trade associations.433 What started as top-down 
government paternalism, over time, turned organically toward partnerships, as 
the government increasingly relied on these actors to defend its view of Chi-
na’s interests.434 In the process, these actors pursued their own career and busi-
ness interests and worked with the government where their interests coincid-
ed.435 As in the U.S., many government officials were tempted to leave for 
more lucrative careers in the private sector and developed trade law practices 
within companies and law firms.436 These professionals were transnationally 
connected and their social capital depended on such transnational knowledge 
and connections.437 
As with any country, there are divisions within China about how to ap-
proach WTO law and litigation.438 There are those who see the WTO as a force 
for liberalization and the rule of law in China’s domestic governance, and oth-
ers who see WTO law and litigation as a force that must be contained for Chi-
na to pursue its development goals through state planning.439 These divisions 
are reflected in struggles “between pro-trade departments such as MOFCOM 
and more conservative ministries . . . .” 440  The divisions explain why 
MOFCOM has those ministries’ officials involved in WTO hearings—because 
it believes their participation will help facilitate eventual acceptance and com-
                                                                                                                                      
I was optimistic about China’s joining the WTO . . . and the impact of legal reasoning [from engaging 
with the WTO]—that once the skill was mastered it would teach people to be rational, and once rational, 
they would manage their rights and obligations, . . . and this is the beginning of the rule of law. 
Interview #28, supra note 192. 
 432. Hsieh, supra note 102, at 1000–14. 
 433. Id. at 1005. 
 434. Id. at 1028. 
 435. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME, supra note 2, at 31. 
 436. Interview #19, supra note 120; cf. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 103; Interview with 
Anonymous (July 24, 2016) (Interview #38) (on file with authors). The government’s WTO and international 
trade departments face continuity challenges since officials often rotate out of WTO work into different gov-
ernment positions after they develop WTO expertise—a challenge common to many countries.  
 437. As Steinfeld wrote:  
In a pattern that would spread across government, academia, and industry, the senior management team, 
so to speak, would increasingly be drawn from people who had been trained abroad, often in the United 
States. These individuals not only spoke English, but they spoke and fully absorbed the language of mod-
ern market systems. They valued such systems, realized professional status from prior experience in those 
systems, and saw as their personal mission the fostering of China’s modernization through adoption of 
those systems. 
STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME, supra note 2, at 31. 
 438. As an E.U. official stated, “There is no one China. It’s not one country,” noting that central agencies 
vary, as do provincial and local governments. Interview with Anonymous (July 30, 2017) (Interview #36) 
[hereinafter Interview #36] (on file with authors). 
 439. Interview #29, supra note 318. 
 440. Zhang & Li, supra note 68, at 158. One practitioner stated, “MOFCOM always stands on the liberal 
side.” Interview #29, supra note 318. 
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pliance with WTO rulings. 441  In engaging in capacity-building efforts, 
MOFCOM simultaneously engages in constituency building.442 
MOFCOM is the key intermediary between the WTO and national minis-
tries engaged in domestic policy.443 Its WTO departments are the “watch dogs” 
for China’s compliance.444 A routine part of MOFCOM’s work, in the words 
of a former Deputy Director-General of its Treaty and Law Department, is “to 
check the WTO consistencies of the draft documents from both the other de-
partments of MOFCOM and different ministries . . . . Normally my colleagues 
and I would send back our feedbacks to the drafters and meetings would be 
held when necessary.”445 MOFCOM’s authority is thus critical for China’s im-
plementation of WTO law and, more deeply, for the permeation of WTO legal 
norms in the mentalities and practices of Chinese government officials and pri-
vate actors. 
MOFCOM’s handling of WTO cases helped it build a professional repu-
tation among China’s ministries and thus enhanced its relative authority in in-
ter-ministerial discussions.446 As one senior official noted, “during their meet-
ing with other ministries, they [MOFCOM officials] will explain why a 
measure is inconsistent with WTO rules. When their view is affirmed by the 
WTO, the MOFCOM gains more respect from the other ministries.”447 As a 
leading private lawyer confirmed, MOFCOM involves affected ministries from 
the start of a WTO case so that, when China loses a WTO case, “the affected 
ministry will understand the fact that the measure is not WTO consistent.”448 
Especially in the early days, “China brought huge delegations to Geneva be-
cause it brought in the agencies to show the process is fair and that China is 
going to lose, which would make acceptance of the rule of law and compliance 
easier.”449 Chinese lawyers see a positive effect in that ministry officials “start 
to care about WTO rules because once they [are] being sued in the WTO they 
start to think that ‘this is for real!’”450 As one lawyer stated, “my observation is 
that through the experiences gained from these years, people become more and 
                                                                                                                                      
 441. Interview with Anonymous (July 21, 2016) (Interview #24) (on file with authors). When asked 
about the most difficult challenge that the Chinese mission faces, one Chinese diplomat in Geneva responded, 
“We don’t wish to arouse anxieties at home; we thus prepare information for the media; we give a view of the 
positive side of dispute outcomes; we try to mitigate so it does not become a difficult political issue.” Inter-
view #18, supra note 326. 
 442. We thank Jacques de Lisle for this point. 
 443. Interview #25, supra note 154; see Shaffer, WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, supra note 24, at 
4. 
 444. Yang Guohua, WTO and Rule of Law in China: A View Based on Personal Experience, 11 GLOBAL 
TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 252, 252–54 (2016). 
 445. Id. 
 446. As a Chinese lawyer noted, “MOFCOM has built up a reputation as a professional in this area.” In-
terview #2, supra note 160. 
 447. Interview #22, supra note 300. 
 448. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 449. Interview #6, supra note 264. 
 450. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
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more serious about WTO law when they formulate the measures or poli-
cies.”451 
This experience spans across government ministries. For example, the 
China-Raw Materials case involved the Ministry of Land and Resources, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, and the powerful National Development 
and Reform Commission (“NDRC”).452 A lawyer noted that MOFCOM also 
works with local governments regarding their subsidy policies. If local subsi-
dies are found to be WTO-inconsistent and the local government does not 
comply, the policies “can escalate to the State Council.”453 Different ministries 
now call the lawyer “periodically to ask random questions to see if an initiative 
is ok under WTO rules.”454 The value of WTO litigation, in other words, is not 
just winning a case, but also socializing a ministry to take account of WTO 
law.455 
The use and acceptance of WTO law and litigation has become somewhat 
normalized within China, as reflected in the 195 cases in which China has par-
ticipated.456 China has changed laws and regulations to comply with WTO de-
cisions, although the required changes have generally not been fundamental.457 
For example, following the China-Intellectual Property Rights decision, China 
amended its copyright laws.458 An official told us that MOFCOM simply pre-
pared the amendment, and the State Council passed it without question.459 The 
former Deputy Director-General of MOFCOM’s Treaty & Law Department 
underscored how this “was unprecedented in [China’s] legislative history in 
the sense of amending its laws according to international rules” following an 
international court ruling.460 Similarly, China complied with the China-Raw 
Materials and China-Rare Earths decisions because, in a Chinese official’s 
words, “the Ministries see the WTO as a just process.”461 The official contend-
ed, “that is such an important progress”; it helps one “envisage[] the rule of 
law in China.”462 Another MOFCOM official thus contended that the WTO has 
                                                                                                                                      
 451. Id. Another practitioner spoke of being consulted by a Chinese ministry as to whether its proposed 
new regulations were valid under WTO law, which constitutes “a different language” in China. Interview #29, 
supra note 318. 
 452. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. 
 455. Interview #29, supra note 318. 
 456. Disputes by Member, supra note 65. 
 457. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (June 2014), https://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/228504.pdf. 
 458. Interview #1, supra note 306. 
 459. Id. 
 460. Guohua, A Memoir, supra note 43, at 11–12. The U.S., however, lost on its key enforcement claims, 
which made it much easier for China to comply. See Cui Huang & Wenhua Ji, Understanding China’s Recent 
Active Moves on WTO Litigation: Rising Legalism and/or Reluctant Response?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 1281, 
1303 (2012); cf. Webster, Paper Compliance, supra note 27, at 557–62 (noting that the changes China made 
had no significant impact on copyright protection in China). Even though the case arguably did not significant-
ly affect China’s enforcement of copyright protection, China did comply with the legal rulings. Webster, Pa-
per Compliance, supra note 27, at 557–62. 
 461. Interview #1, supra note 306. 
 462. Id. Other interviewees noted how the WTO has helped to discipline the government’s application of 
anti-dumping law in China. See, e.g., Interview #5, supra note 224. 
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been a “pioneering area in China for the rule of law.”463 Similarly, one legal 
academic speculated that among the reasons MOFCOM created secondment 
programs for Chinese law professors to assist it on WTO matters is that the 
professors can become supporters of MOFCOM’s efforts on WTO-related mat-
ters in China, thereby helping China’s compliance with its WTO commit-
ments.464 
Many of the Chinese practitioners we met said that they are trade liberals 
and believers in the WTO.465 They thus have clear predilections. Their hope is 
that WTO law can seep into the practices of local governments and firms. They 
stress how far China has come in relation to its past. One told us that he “can’t 
believe how much freer is China today, where one can be sarcastic, ironic, and 
criticize the government on trade law issues, at least privately.” China still has 
much to learn regarding the WTO, he said, but things are getting better. Re-
garding trade law and policy, he emphasized: 
I am a person who lived through the time of the Cultural Revolution. I 
was in China from the worst time and now, and I can say that it’s not 
easy progress to become what China is today. . . . We went through lots 
of ups and downs, suffered a lot. And now I see the people, news, criti-
cism, comments, journalists. It’s unbelievable. From your perspective it 
might be normal, but for me it’s really unbelievable. . . . Now we can 
criticize the government, comment on the policies, talk about WTO law. 
It really changed a lot.466 
As time passed, nonetheless, more Chinese officials and stakeholders 
have become skeptical and disillusioned.467 Regarding the rule of WTO law in 
international trade relations, some disenchantment stems from China learning 
how to play the system and limit the impact of losses in WTO cases. Thus, 
when scholars such as Timothy Webster write of China’s “paper compliance” 
with WTO rulings in ways that do not increase actual market access, he, as 
well as others, suggests that China has followed U.S. examples of how to play 
the legal game.468 As MOFCOM official Ji Wenhua noted after watching the 
tactics of others at the WTO, “we should try to employ some [such] strategies, 
including resorting to sophistry and delay tactics.”469 
                                                                                                                                      
 463. The official pointed to the Decision of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Com-
mittee of the CCP in 2014, the first plenary session to focus on the rule of law in China. Interview #25, supra 
note 154; see CCP News, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Zhiguo Ruogan Zhongda 
Wenti de Jueding [Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Important Issues concerning Comprehensive 
Advancement towards Ruling the Country According to Law] (Oct. 29, 2014), http://news.xinhua 
net.com/politics/2014-10/28/c_1113015330.htm (stressing “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics” 
grounded in many traditional rule-of-law goals while noting the preeminence of the Chinese Communist Par-
ty); Cai, supra note 204, at 272. 
 464. Interview #12, supra note 233. 
 465. Interview #9, supra note 288. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Interview #17, supra note 177. 
 468. See Freedman, supra note 297 (“[T]he mainland’s negotiators are simply learning how to play the 
game.”); cf. Webster, Paper Compliance, supra note 27, at 534; Webster, China’s Implementation, supra note 
27, at 100.  
 469. See Gao, China’s Ascent, supra note 15, at 169. 
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For example, after the Appellate Body’s 2011 ruling in US-Definitive An-
tidumping Duties and Countervailing Duties Against Certain Products from 
China (DS379), China was hopeful that many of the findings could rein in U.S. 
countervailing duty practices against China.470 A key issue in the case was 
whether Chinese state-owned enterprises should be deemed “public bodies,” in 
which case they would be subject to subsidy rules under the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”).471 The U.S. 
maintained that the state-owned enterprises were “public bodies” because they 
were owned and controlled by the state.472 On this ground, the U.S. imposed 
countervailing duties on Chinese products that included inputs from Chinese 
state-owned enterprises allegedly sold at less than market value.473 A WTO 
panel found in favor of the U.S. position and declared that, “on its own, ma-
jority government ownership is clear and highly indicative evidence of gov-
ernment control, and thus whether an entity is a public body for purposes of the 
SCM Agreement.”474 
Before the Appellate Body, China countered that ownership alone is not 
determinative, and that the key criterion should be whether the entity exercises 
governmental authority.475 The Appellate Body largely sided with China and 
ruled against the United States.476 It maintained that in order to find that a 
state-owned enterprise is a “public body” under the SCM Agreement, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce must show that such enterprise exercises “govern-
ment functions.”477  This threshold requirement creates legal constraints on 
U.S. countervailing duty practice against Chinese imports.478 The Office of the 
United States Trade Representative bitterly protested the ruling.479 
The U.S. Commerce Department nonetheless responded by almost im-
mediately writing a memorandum to find that the Chinese state-owned enter-
prises indeed “possess, exercise, or are vested with governmental authority” so 
that they are public bodies under the new criteria.480 It accordingly maintained 
                                                                                                                                      
 470. Id. at 171. 
 471. Appellate Body Report, United States–Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Cer-
tain Products from China, ¶ 207(a), WTO Doc. WT/DS471/AB/R (adopted July 28, 2011) [hereinafter Appel-
late Body Report DS471]. 
 472. Id. at ¶ 150; see Gao, China’s Ascent, supra note 15, at 169. 
 473. Appellate Body Report DS471, supra note 471, ¶ 209; see Gao, China’s Ascent, supra note 15, at 
169. 
 474. Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Prod-
ucts from China, ¶ 8.135, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010). 
 475. Appellate Body Report DS379, supra note 136, ¶ 137. 
 476. Id. at ¶ 611. 
 477. Id. at ¶ 318. 
 478. Id. at ¶ 543. 
 479. See Melissa Lipman, WTO Rejects US Duty Double-Counting in China Fight, LAW360  
(Mar. 11, 2011, 3:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/231712/wto-rejects-us-duty-double-
counting-in-china-fight.  
 480. Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervail-
ing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance (June 22, 2015), 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2015-15891-1.pdf, (“The GOC [government of China] exercises 
meaningful control over these entities and uses them to effectuate its goals of upholding the socialist market 
economy, allocating resources, and maintaining the predominant role of the state sector.”); see also Memoran-
dum for Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance, Section 129 Determination of the 
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the duties. One U.S. trade lawyer concluded, “it is the U.S. that teaches China 
how to do facial implementation without concrete results. . . . If the U.S. is do-
ing this, it is losing its credibility and it will hurt itself when China implements 
WTO decisions. . . . At the end of the day, if everyone is gaming the system, 
then why play at all.”481 
These experiences lead to legal cynicism. A U.S. trade lawyer represent-
ing China thus contended, “[t]he U.S. is doing a disservice to the rule of law in 
China. It is sending a message to China that this is just a game. It is so short 
sighted. Instead of taking the high road so that we fully comply, the U.S. turns 
it into a game.”482 He gave the example of another U.S. action—this one in-
volving U.S. retroactive legislation against Chinese products. Following a U.S. 
Federal Circuit ruling which held that existing U.S. countervailing duty law 
does not apply to nonmarket economies like China, the U.S. Congress passed 
new legislation that U.S. countervailing duty law indeed applies to China, and 
does so with retroactive effect going back six years.483 The lawyer shrugged, 
“This business about retroactive legislation. Can you imagine if it involved 
China and the National People’s Congress retroactively changed law and 
forced courts to go back six years to enforce it!”484 He lamented, “early on 
China was very focused on WTO compliance,” but now one gets a sense of le-
gal cynicism.485 The U.S., in particular, has turned to “mutually agreed solu-
tions” (“MAS”) to resolve disputes against it, which led a former Chinese offi-
cial to question the utility of WTO dispute settlement.486 In his words, “MAS is 
a big basket. You can put anything into it. Or you could see it as a black 
hole.”487 
Similarly, in the early years, China knew nothing about internal WTO 
processes and took the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (“TPRM”) quite seri-
ously.488 But, over time, the government saw that other WTO Members took 
little heed of the TPRM process. For reformers in China, this realization ad-
versely affects attitudes and decision-making within China’s ministries.489 For 
example, China has export restrictions on around 200 products. When it lost 
the China-Raw Materials case regarding export restrictions on ten raw materi-
als,490 the U.S. asked China to remove all of China’s restrictions.491 Instead, the 
                                                                                                                                      
Countervailing Duty Investigations of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe; Light-Walled Rectangular 
Pipe and Tube; Laminated Woven Sacks; and Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China: An 
Analysis of Public Bodies in the People’s Republic of China in Accordance with the WTO Appellate Body’s 
Findings in WTO DS379 (May 18, 2012). 
 481. Interview #2, supra note 160. 
 482. Interview #6, supra note 264. 
 483. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(f)(1) (2012); see Interview #6, supra note 264. 
 484. Interview #6, supra note 264. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Interview #4, supra note 290. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Interview #32, supra note 111. 
 489. Id. 
 490. See generally Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012) The raw materials were bauxite, coke, fluor-
spar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus and zinc. Id.  
 491. Interview #32, supra note 111. 
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Chinese government removed only those restrictions that the WTO decision 
specifically enumerated, and it waited to be sued, possibly after full WTO liti-
gation, before removing others.492 In other words, it engaged in second-order 
compliance with the specific Appellate Body ruling, and not first-order com-
pliance with the rules as applied to Chinese measures. 
WTO law is perceived as less important in China today,493 whether be-
cause the dispute settlement system is gamed and viewed as less constraining, 
because trade negotiations turn to other venues, or because foreign political 
leaders espouse economic nationalism and target China. A leading Chinese 
WTO law academic noted that, as a result, “fewer students are interested in the 
WTO than in earlier years.”494 This attitudinal change poses a challenge for re-
form advocates using WTO law to foster domestic change in China. Since 
“each national and local agency must know WTO law” in order to “know if a 
violation might occur,” if WTO law is deemed less important to study, such 
knowledge will diminish within functional ministries and local administrative 
bureaucracies in adopting and implementing new regulations.495 Even though 
the WTO somewhat empowered MOFCOM in inter-ministerial relations, 
MOFCOM is a much less powerful ministry than others, such as the Ministry 
of Finance and the NDRC, and WTO divisions within MOFCOM are now 
viewed as lower in the MOFCOM hierarchy.496  With the consolidation of 
power of President Xi, most commentators view China as moving backwards, 
retaining or even enhancing state-owned enterprises as central pillars for Chi-
na’s economic strategy while cracking down on and imprisoning rights-
oriented lawyers.497  Surveys of U.S. and European businesses operating in 
China find that they feel less welcome in China in recent years.498  
                                                                                                                                      
 492. This led the U.S. and others to file complaints in 2012, Appellate Body Report, China–Measures 
Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, ¶ 1.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS432/AB/R 
(Aug. 7, 2014) (regarding tungsten and molybdenum), and in 2016, China–Export Duties on Certain Raw Ma-
terials, WTO Doc. WT/DS508/1 (July 13, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ 
ds508_e.htm (regarding various forms of antimony, cobalt, copper, graphite, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum, 
and tin). 
 493. See Interview #4, supra note 290 (asserting that few agencies within China “care about WTO”); 
Interview #11, supra note 208 (explaining that learning about the WTO is not widely required in undergradu-
ate education). 
 494. Interview #11, supra note 208. 
 495. Interview #4, supra note 290. 
 496. Interview #32, supra note 111. 
 497. As a Chinese lawyer euphemistically concluded, “the atmosphere in China on the WTO is not as 
good as when China joined.” Interview #4, supra note 290. Another said, “[I]t has been a difficult time.” Inter-
view #33, supra note 302. In a similar vein, another stated, “I think it is a really hard and dark moment.” Id.; 
see also Mahboubi et al., supra note 58; Minzner, supra note 6, at 936–40; Youwei, The End of Reform in 
China, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2015, at 2, 4 (“[R]eform in China has now stagnated and may even be moving 
backward.”). See generally DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S FUTURE (2016). But cf. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, 
MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESS IN CHINA 1 (2014) (for a more optimistic view, alt-
hough written before President Xi took power). 
 498. Simon Denyer, No Longer Welcome? American Companies Fear China’s Turning Its Back on 
Them, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/no-longer-welcome-
american-companies-fear-china-is-turning-its-back-on-them/2017/01/17/bd0e16e6-dcc7-11e6-b2cf-b67fe32 
85cbc_story.html?utm_term=.85a707755832 (citing surveys of the American Chamber of Commerce China 
and European sources). 
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At the same time, the WTO has served as a catalyst for reformers within 
China in the development of legal institutions and the disciplining of central, 
regional, and local decision-makers to be more responsive to the WTO’s legal 
constraints, including WTO requirements for transparency, judicial review, and 
nondiscrimination.499 Efforts continue. In 2014, the State Council again passed 
a notice calling on all Chinese ministries to ensure that new Chinese trade-
related laws and regulations, including those passed at the sub-central level, 
comply with WTO requirements through adherence to a procedure adminis-
tered by MOFCOM’s Department of WTO Affairs.500 Differing views and re-
sponses to the WTO continue to compete in China, and it is too early to tell 
which will prevail—a continued turn toward the rule of law for trade matters, a 
turn to legal cynicism, or both. In any case, lawyers are needed. And those 
lawyers have worked with the Chinese government and Chinese enterprises, 
facilitating transnational legal ordering and China’s ability to take on the U.S. 
and the E.U. before the WTO. 
B. Implications for the International Trade Legal Order  
As a result of its investments in developing trade law expertise, China has 
become a formidable opponent of the U.S. and the E.U. in WTO litigation and 
a critical player in the WTO system. By 2006, China started asserting its status 
by not only using WTO rules vigorously to defend its trade policies as a re-
spondent, but also by bringing cases against the U.S. and the E.U. as a com-
plainant. 501  As an E.U. official stated, “China now knows how the WTO 
works. It does not hesitate to threaten bringing a WTO case. For the Commis-
sion, it creates more challenges in the relationship. They know, and they know 
we know they know.”502 
China has started to shape WTO jurisprudence to constrain U.S. and E.U. 
discretion in imposing protection against Chinese imports. U.S. and European 
perceptions of the WTO legal order have correspondingly changed. Within a 
decade of its accession, China established itself as a “repeat player” in WTO 
litigation.503 As a repeat player, it can strategize to “play for rules,” shaping the 
                                                                                                                                      
 499. See Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 
B.C. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 319, 345 (2004). 
 500. The rules provide:  
Any regulations and documents related to trade in goods, trade in services and trade-related intellectual 
property, either by ministries under the State Council or by local governments . . . must be in compliance 
with the WTO Agreement, its Annexes and subsequent agreements, and China Accession Protocol and 
Working Party Report. 
See State Council, Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Maoyi Zhengce Hegui Gongzuo de 
Tongzhi [State Council Rules on Further Strengthening Trade Policy Compliance Practice], June 17, 2014. A 
Chinese official claimed that this shows China’s commitment to WTO compliance through transforming deci-
sion-making by central and sub-central government units in China so as to conform with WTO law. Interview 
#25, supra note 154; see Guohua, WTO and Rule of Law in China, supra note 475. 
 501. See Huang & Ji, supra note 460, at 1283–88. 
 502. Interview #36, supra note 438. The official also noted that “the level of discussions” has improved 
and that the rules can be a framework for the discussions.” Id. 
 503. See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 
LAW & SOC. REV. 95, 98 (1974). 
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international trade legal order.504 Chinese engagement in WTO litigation, in 
particular, pushed back on the U.S. and the E.U.’s practice of protecting 
against imports by using anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations. 
The litigation resulted in tightened legal constraints on these practices, affect-
ing U.S. and European import-competing industries.505 Notably, China twice 
successfully challenged the U.S. practice of double-counting injuries to U.S. 
industries by combining relief from anti-dumping and subsidy investigations to 
increase duties.506 Similarly, China successfully challenged the U.S. definition 
of a public body that the U.S. Commerce Department had used to find that 
Chinese state-owned enterprises subsidized other Chinese producers, thereby 
increasing duties against Chinese products.507 China also successfully chal-
lenged E.U. and U.S. practices of using surrogate third-country data in import 
relief cases to inflate anti-dumping duties.508 
These cases are relevant to a major issue affecting the U.S. and Europe: 
China’s “market economy” status for purposes of their anti-dumping calcula-
tions. The U.S. and the E.U. apply the nonmarket economy label to justify us-
ing third-country prices in assessing whether China dumps products in their 
markets so that they can then raise tariffs to counter China’s alleged dump-
ing.509 If the U.S. and the E.U. use prices from Singapore,510 for example, they 
can more easily find lower-priced or below-cost sales in the U.S. and Europe. 
The U.S. and the E.U. use these methodologies to raise anti-dumping duties to 
prohibitive levels (such as over 500%) and effectively block market access to 
Chinese products. 511  In December 2016, China launched systemic claims 
                                                                                                                                      
 504. On the benefits of a “repeat player” in adjudication processes, see id. at 95–100. As applied to WTO 
litigation, see Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Coun-
tries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM IN THE WTO 2003, at 15–18 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., ICTSD Resource 
Paper No. 5, 2003). 
 505. See Huang & Ji, supra note 460, at 1292–301. 
 506. Appellate Body Report DS379, supra note 136, at ¶¶ 611–12; Appellate Body Report DS449, supra 
note 136, at 91; Interview #27, supra note 317 (referencing these challenges as Chinese contributions to WTO 
jurisprudence). 
 507. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. This decision was of great importance for China since 
Chinese SOEs monopolize key utilities such as electricity, oil, and water, and control key sectors such as bank-
ing, telecommunications, and steel. See Gabriel Wildau, China’s State-Owned Enterprise Reform Plans Face 
Compromise, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/5eeeb84a-5aaa-11e5-97e9-7f0bf5e71 
77b. 
 508. Appellate Body Report DS397, supra note 136; Panel Report, United States—Certain Methodolo-
gies and their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China, WTO Doc. WT/DS471/R (rendered 
Oct. 19, 2016, under appeal). 
 509. Shannon Donnan et al., China Challenges EU and US Over Market Economy Status, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6af8da62-bf5d-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354. 
 510. For example, the E.U. used Singapore prices in an anti-dumping case involving television sets from 
China, and the U.S. used Portuguese prices in an anti-dumping case involving crayfish. See Le Thi Thuy Van 
& Sarah Y. Tong, China and Anti-Dumping: Regulations, Practices, and Responses, 22 n.55 (EAI Working 
Paper No. 149), http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/EWP149.pdf (on E.U. use of Singapore); see also 
Notice of Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty New Shipper Administrative Reviews: Freshwater Craw-
fish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic of China, 66 Fed. Reg. 18604 (Apr. 10, 2001), http:// 
enforcement.trade.gov/frn/2001/0104frn/01-8819.txt.  
 511. For examples of exorbitant U.S. anti-dumping duties imposed against Chinese products through 
using third country prices, see Len Bracken, U.S. Hits Chinese Melamine With 500 Percent Tariffs, 33 
BLOOMBERG INT’L TRADE REP. 1, 24 (Jan. 7, 2016) (“The U.S. is imposing antidumping duties and counter-
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against the U.S. and the E.U. concerning provisions of their laws “pertaining to 
the determination of normal value for ‘non-market economy’ countries in anti-
dumping proceedings involving products from China.”512 This litigation will 
take years and will place considerable strain on the WTO dispute settlement 
system, potentially undercutting perceptions of its legitimacy within the side 
that loses. Yet already, through the above WTO cases, China has built a base to 
successfully challenge U.S. and E.U. administrative practices that increase pro-
tection against Chinese imports.513 
While some argue that China simply follows U.S. practices in responding 
to Appellate Body rulings, many in the U.S. now view China’s joining the 
WTO as a bad bargain.514 As a result, the U.S. appears less committed to up-
holding the international trade legal order. China’s successful adaptation to 
WTO law, in other words, paradoxically has called into question U.S. com-
mitments to the trade legal order itself. 
Complaints center on how WTO rules asymmetrically help China.515 On 
the one hand, China has learned to use the WTO legal regime to effectively 
challenge U.S. trade remedy measures.516 On the other hand, the U.S. has 
found it increasingly difficult to use WTO rules to address trade barriers within 
                                                                                                                                      
vailing duties on melamine exports from China that add up to at least 507.65 percent.”); Brian Flood, Chinese 
Roadbuilding Products to Face Stiff Duties, 34 BLOOMBERG INT’L TRADE REP. 243, 252 (Feb. 9, 2017) (“The 
decision means that the imports will face antidumping duties of up to 372.81 percent and anti-subsidy duties of 
up to 152.50 percent, based on a previous Commerce Department ruling.”); Brian Flood, Chinese Fertilizer 
Will Face Massive Duties, 34 BLOOMBERG INT’L TRADE REP. 275, 282 (Feb. 16, 2017) (“[T]he imports will 
face antidumping duties of 493.46 percent, and anti-subsidy duties of 206.72 percent, in line with rates previ-
ously calculated by the Commerce Department.”); Brian Flood & Rossella Brevetti, Commerce Assigns Duties 
on Cold-Rolled Steel, BLOOMBERG INT’L TRADE REP. (May 19, 2016) (“Commerce found dumping margins of 
71.35 percent for Japan and 265.79 percent for China. It found a subsidy rate of 256.44 percent for China.”). 
 512. See United States—Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS515/1 (request for consultations received Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds515_e.htm; European Union—Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS516/2 (request for consultations received Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm. These cases involve Article 15(a)(ii) of China’s Protocol of Accession, 
which permits WTO Members to treat China as a “non-market economy” and thus use prices from surrogate 
third countries for the determination of normal value for a fifteen-year period. That provision expired on De-
cember 11, 2016 pursuant to Article 15(d) of the Accession Protocol. Article 15(a)(ii) provides: “The import-
ing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or 
costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail 
in the industry producing the like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product.” 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001). The second sentence of 
Article 15(d) provides: “In any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date 
of accession.” Id. Some commentators contend that WTO Members may continue to treat China after the expi-
ration of this provision on the basis of a de facto finding of its status, whether on a case-by-case basis or oth-
erwise. Id. 
 513. Mark Magnier, China Challenges U.S., EU Over WTO Antidumping Duties, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 
12, 2016, 8:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-challenges-u-s-eu-over-wto-antidumping-duties-
1481548883. 
 514. See, e.g., Wu, The WTO and China’s Unique Economic Structure, supra note 371, at 350 (“The Par-
ty-state’s desire to preserve its unique political economy is threatening to shatter the liberal [WTO] project of 
building a strong multilateral trading regime. In the end, both cannot stand.”); Wu, The End of an Era for 
Global Trade, supra note 25.  
 515. Keith Bradsher & Paul Mozur, As Washinton Tries to Protect Tech, China Could Fight Back, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/business/china-trade-trump-technology.html? 
mcubz=3. 
 516. Id. 
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China because of the lack of transparency in China regarding the state’s role in 
the economy.517 The WTO rules, Mark Wu argued, are designed mainly for 
countries with market economies, but in China, the government intervenes sig-
nificantly through formal and informal state command.518  Thus, he found, 
WTO rules are inadequate.519 Consider, for example, the question of whether 
state-owned enterprises shall be deemed “public bodies” under the SCM 
Agreement. In a country like China, even SOEs without explicit governmental 
authority are often required to exercise various state functions such as provid-
ing loans and promoting the development of particular economic sectors.520 In-
deed, the 2015 Guiding Opinions on Deepening SOE Reform provided that 
SOEs shall “serve the national strategy and implement national industrial poli-
cy.”521 In many cases, however, the lack of government transparency could 
make it difficult to prove SOEs are acting as public bodies.522 
In addition, the U.S. contends that China violates basic rule-of-law norms 
by filing tit-for-tat anti-dumping investigations against U.S. firms whenever 
the U.S. brings a WTO complaint against China.523 Going further, officials 
contend that China punishes firms that cooperate with the U.S. or the E.U. in 
bringing WTO cases.524 The Chinese government’s aim, they contend, is to 
undermine enforcement of WTO rules against it. 525  By retaliating directly 
against innocent individual companies, China undermines rule-of-law norms. 
The Chinese government denies such practices, but others, such as Stephen 
Kho, a former United States Trade Representative attorney for China enforce-
ment, have claimed that China’s actions violate the spirit of WTO law and risk 
sparking a trade war.526 
Finally, many find that WTO rules do not adequately address new tech-
nologies important for U.S. trade. For example, when China introduced regula-
tions requiring Internet companies to use local servers527 and hand over the 
                                                                                                                                      
 517. David Barboza & Chris Buckley, China Plans to Reduce the State’s Role in the Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/25/business/global/beijing-signals-a-shift-on-
economic-policy.html. 
 518. Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge, supra note 3, at 265. 
 519. Id. 
 520. Id. at 274. 
 521. Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Guoyu Qiye Gaige de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding 
Opinions on the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening State-owned Enterprises Re-
form], CHINESE GOV’T NETWORK (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content 
_2930440.htm.  
 522. Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge, supra note 3, at 302. 
 523. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2016 ANNUAL 
REPORT 96 (2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Chapter%20II%20-%20The%20World%20Trade%20 
Organization.pdf (decrying China’s retaliatory use of trade remedies); see also Freedman, supra note 297; 
Mark Wu, Antidumping, supra note 297, at 141. 
 524. Shaffer Informal Discussions with U.S. and European Officials and Practicing Lawyers (on file with 
authors). 
 525. Freedman, supra note 297. 
 526. Id. at 305. 
 527. China’s Control over Internet Map Services, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (June 11, 2010), 
http://www.internetgovernance.org/2010/06/11/chinas-control-over-internet-map-service/. 
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source code528 to provide services, the U.S. found that existing WTO rules 
were unhelpful to deal with these restrictions.529 The U.S. thus would like to 
modify existing WTO rules or introduce new rules to constrain China, includ-
ing in response to Appellate Body rulings.530 The U.S. has been unable to 
make headway in the WTO, however, and it thus turned to fora where China 
and other rival emerging economies do not participate in the negotiations.531 
The United States’ turn to these bilateral and plurilateral negotiating ven-
ues has called into question the WTO’s relevance and fragmented the interna-
tional trade legal order.532 The Obama administration, in particular, tried to 
ratchet up rules through two regional initiatives, the Transpacific Partnership 
(“TPP”) with Asia and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(“TTIP”) with Europe.533 Many of the negotiated rules were tailor-made for 
China and directly responded to existing WTO jurisprudence favoring Chi-
na.534 For example, the TPP chapter on SOEs defined SOEs according to their 
ownership, rather than in terms of the “exercise of government functions.”535 
The TPP chapter explicitly prohibited SOEs from providing or receiving sub-
sidies in relation to their commercial activities.536 The rules aimed to update 
trade rules regarding e-commerce.537 In particular, the TPP included provisions 
prohibiting forced localization requirements and transfers of source code.538 
The Obama administration hoped that the TPP would create a competi-
tive negotiating environment that would draw other countries to join the TPP 
on the U.S.’s terms so that their products would receive nondiscriminatory 
U.S. market access.539 Because Vietnam would benefit through the TPP, the 
Philippines would feel pressure from Philippine enterprises to join, so as to 
                                                                                                                                      
 528. Armstrong Chen, Who Will Be Affected by the New Regulation of Banking Security?,  
KWM (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.kwm.com/en/us/knowledge/insights/the-influence-of-new-rules-on-
financial-security-20150831.  
 529. Members Debate Cyber Security and Chemicals at Technical Barriers to Trade Committee, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (June 15, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/tbt_20jun17_e.htm.  
 530. See Tim Worstall, Trump to Revert to Pre-WTO Rules to Deal with China Trade, Bad Idea, FORBES 
(Aug. 2, 2017, 5:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/08/02/trump-to-revert-to-pre-wto-
rules-to-deal-with-china-trade-bad-idea/#18be4a4836dc. 
 531. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2013 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2012 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2013), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Chapter%20II%20-%20The%20World%20Trade%20 
Organization.pdf. 
 532. WORLD TRADE ORG., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 8 (2013), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Chapter%20II%20-%20The%20 
World%20Trade%20Organization.pdf. 
 533. See Daniel C.K. Chow, How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to Contain China 
in International Trade, CHI. J. INT’L L. (2016). For an overview of the TPP, see TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: 
AN ASSESSMENT (Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs & Jeffrey J. Schott eds., 2016). 
 534. China’s WTO Updates, CHINA.ORG.CN (July 11, 2002), http://www.china.org.cn/english/ 
36714.htm. 
 535. Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 17.1, Jan. 26, 2016 [hereinafter TPP]. 
 536. Id. art. 17.6. 
 537. Id. art. 14.2. 
 538. Id. art. 14.13 & 14.17.  
 539. ADVISORY COMM. FOR TRADE POLICY & NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE 
CONGRESS, AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 6 (2015), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Advisory-Committee-on-Trade-Policy-and-Negotiations.pdf. 
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level the playing field for their products.540 Similarly, if Malaysia and other 
Southeast Asian countries would benefit, Thailand would feel pressure from 
Thai constituencies to accede.541 And if the Philippines and Thailand joined, 
the Indonesian government would feel constrained.542 In each case, these coun-
tries would have to agree to TPP rules they did not participate in negotiating. 
Over time, to the extent that the TPP created significant benefits for members 
in discriminating against China, China would feel pressure to join. 
Most dramatically, were the U.S. able to complete both the TPP and 
TTIP, then it could merge the two agreements and withdraw from the WTO. It 
would thereby force China and the rest of the world to join the new organiza-
tion if they wished to avoid discrimination against their products. It is through 
such processes that the Obama administration hoped to shape the global legal 
order for trade.543 In President Obama’s words, “America should write the 
rules.”544 Once more, as with its accession to the WTO, China would have to 
accept rules that the U.S. made and negotiate an accession protocol, possibly 
on discriminatory terms, to benefit from them.545 
It was a risky strategy since it was not clear that China would join the 
TPP, and China, in parallel, responded by leading negotiations for a rival 
mega-regional agreement called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (“RCEP”) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s ten mem-
bers and five other Asian countries.546 China also led parallel economic initia-
tives that do not include the U.S., such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
                                                                                                                                      
 540. Babe G. Romualdez, The Philippines Should Join the TPP, PHIL. STAR (Oct. 8, 2015 12:00am), 
http://www.philstar.com/business/2015/10/08/1508233/philippines-should-join-tpp. 
 541. Mounting Pressure for Thailand to Join TPP, THAILAWFORUM (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www. 
thailawforum.com/mounting-pressure-for-thailand-to-join-tpp/. 
 542. Joe Cochrane, Indonesia to Decide on Joining Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Y. TIMES  
(Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/asia/joko-widodo-indonesia-washington-trans-
pacific-partnership.html. 
 543. Rem Korteweg, Unfreezing TTIP: Why a Transatlantic Trade Pact Still Makes Strategic Sense, CTR. 
EUR. REFORM (May 2017), http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pb_ttip_rk_10.5.17.pdf.  
544 Barack Obama, President Obama: The TPP Would Let American, Not China, Lead the Way on Global 
Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-
would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-509217211 
65d_story.html?utm_term=.7736c5a35356 (“America should write the rules. America should call the shots. 
Other countries should play by the rules that America and our partners set, and not the other way around. 
That’s what the TPP gives us the power to do. . . . The world has changed. The rules are changing with it. The 
United States, not countries like China, should write them.”); see also Michael Froman, The Strategic Logic of 
Trade: New Rules of the Road for the Global Market, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 111, 111 (Nov./Dec. 2014). 
 545. The aim was to press for change in the role of the Chinese state and state industrial policy. As for-
mer Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson wrote, “China is more likely to make the reforms necessary to join 
the TPP when it recognizes the danger of being excluded from it.” PAULSON, supra note 110, at 399. 
 546. The five other countries are Japan, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. See Factsheet: What 
You Need to Know About Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), MINISTRY TRADE & 
INDUS.: SING. (June 18, 2014), https://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/SiteAssets/Pages/FACTSHEET-WHAT-
YOU-NEED-TO-KNOW-ABOUT/Factsheet%20on%20RCEP%20(June%202014).pdf. If the RCEP is signed 
and ratified, it could create pressure on the U.S. Congress to ratify the TPP so that U.S. companies do not face 
discriminatory trade barriers in relation to Chinese exports. In this sense, the RCEP and TPP could have a 
symbiotic relationship such that the U.S. could subsequently return to the TPP. 
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Bank (“AIIB”) and the Belt and Road Initiative with Eurasian economies.547 
The result could be rival trading blocs. Now that the Trump administration has 
abandoned the TPP, however, China is positioned to take the lead in negotiat-
ing trade agreements governing Asian economic integration, ironically by ex-
cluding the United States.548 While some have criticized China’s initiatives for 
their lack of imagination regarding new rules, these rules create fewer con-
straints on China’s internal practices while guaranteeing market access.549 Chi-
na has attracted many followers through these initiatives because of its promis-
es of access to its huge market and its grant of other benefits to countries that 
sign.550 So far, there is little evidence that China has aimed to be revisionist to 
change the existing international trade legal order.551 Rather, China, through its 
investment in trade law could become the new upholder of the international 
trade legal order initially created by the U.S. and Europe.552 Without U.S. sup-
port and engagement, however, the existing legal order for the global economy 
could erode from within, even if the Trump administration does not formally 
withdraw from the WTO as it has threatened.553 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article illustrates the enmeshment of international and national trade 
law in a major emerging economic power, China, and the implications of de-
velopments in China for the international trade legal order itself. International 
trade law and Chinese law and policy mutually implicate each other in com-
plex processes of transnational legal ordering and disordering. Developments 
in one cannot be understood without attending to the other. 
Internally, China’s engagement with the WTO started as a top-down ini-
tiative of the Chinese government to boost its trade-related legal capacity both 
internally (for compliance) and externally (to defend its legal rights) through 
                                                                                                                                      
 547. For the AIIB, see Who We Are, AIIB, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2017). For Belt and Road, see Full Text: Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road, 
CHINA.ORG (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2015-09/15/content_36591064_3.htm.  
 548. Jason Scott & David Rowman, Trump Trade Snub Set to Boost China’s Bid for its Own Asian Pact, 
33 INT’L TRADE REP. 1638 (Nov. 17, 2016) (noting that RCEP would give China “greater prestige in a region 
where it is seeking to displace U.S. influence”). 
 549. Id. at 1637. 
 550. Id. at 1615. 
 551. Jacques de Lisle, China and International Economic-Legal Institutions: A Revisionist Option (draft 
on file with authors); Ian Clark, International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of Pow-
er, CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 315, 315 (2014). 
 552. See Stephen Fidler et al., China’s Xi Jinping Seizes Role as Leader on Globalization (UNE), WALL 
STREET J. (Jan. 17, 2017, 12:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-jinping-defends-globalization-
1484654899. China already has become the second largest contributor to the WTO’s budget after the U.S. and 
contributes over three times as much as the U.S. in terms of per capita GDP. See Hongying Wang & Erik 
French, China in Global Economic Governance, 9 ASIAN ECON. POL’Y REV. 254, 254 (2014). 
 553. As a candidate, President Trump threatened to pull the U.S. out of the WTO if the WTO ruled 
against his plan to massively increase tariffs on Chinese products. Geoff Dyer, Donald Trump Threatens to 
Pull US Out of WTO, FIN. TIMES (July 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d97b97ba-51d8-11e6-9664-
e0bdc13c3bef; see also John Brinkley, Trump May Withdraw U.S. from WTO, Outside Advisor Says, FORBES 
(Feb. 13, 2017, 2:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2017/02/13/trump-may-withdraw-u-s-
from-wto-outside-advisor-says/#286938c933bb. 
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engaging with nongovernmental actors. With time, government officials and 
private actors began working in public-private partnerships, involving academ-
ia, law firms, companies, and trade associations, thereby conveying WTO legal 
norms more broadly within China and enabling deeper transnational legal or-
dering. What started as a strategic, top-down initiative became a more organic 
process. As a result, China developed significant legal capacity in terms of 
breadth and depth. In terms of depth, China still does not have the internal ex-
pertise of the U.S. and Europe. Yet, China readily taps into U.S. and European 
expertise by hiring the world’s leading professionals in Washington, Brussels, 
and Geneva to work with Chinese counterparts. 
Through these processes, the WTO helped advance the position of trade 
legal norms in China’s economic governance, increasing the role of law and 
lawyers. Compared to the baseline where China started, the country has opened 
its economy, integrated in the global economy, and invested in the diffusion of 
trade law norms. In our view, these developments should give pause to bold 
claims that China is undermining the global trade legal order. 
Externally, at the time of China’s accession to the WTO, the U.S. and the 
E.U. remained economically dominant and pressed China to adopt require-
ments that would transform its economy and its governance of trade. Over 
time, by investing in human capital to build legal capacity, China became a ri-
val to the U.S. and Europe in WTO dispute settlement and other trade fora. As 
a result, the U.S. and the E.U. would have to work with China if the WTO 
were to remain a meaningful multilateral institution for fostering global legal 
order and prosperity. With China’s rise, the WTO helped China, the U.S., and 
the E.U. resolve their trade disputes through law and the use of a third-party 
dispute settlement mechanism. Political disputes were turned over to law-
yers.554 There is no other area of international relations where one can speak of 
such a turn to law and legal proceedings to resolve disputes between China, the 
U.S., and the E.U.555 
Yet, pessimism now builds regarding the multilateral trade legal order 
and China, especially with the rise of economic nationalism in the U.S. and 
Europe punctuated by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Europe-
an Union and the election of U.S. President Trump. That pessimism feeds off 
of, and back into, domestic policy choices. It undercuts those advancing rule of 
                                                                                                                                      
 554. As a government official maintained, “the WTO dispute settlement system helps to solve problems 
politically. The Chinese president talked with [U.S. President] Obama about trade disputes. But once a WTO 
case was filed, all the talk about this disappeared. It became a legal issue instead of a political one.” Interview 
#1, supra note 306; see also Interview #26, supra note 154 (referring to the U.S.-tire special safeguards case 
and contrasting it to the South China Sea dispute—the interviewee noted that in the tires case, “China lost the 
case and that settled it.”).  
 555. Similarly, in the four years after the Russian Federation joined the WTO on August 22, 2012, it was 
a complainant in four cases, a respondent in seven cases, and a third party in twenty-eight cases. See Chrono-
logical List of Disputes Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
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law reforms in China. It reflects and supports the rise of populism, nationalism, 
demagogy, and xenophobia in politics around the world.556 
Ironically, China could become the upholder of a multilateral trade legal 
order that the U.S. and Europe created. Yet, if the U.S. indeed withdraws its 
support, the WTO would hollow out as an authoritative organization for trade 
governance and dispute settlement. The trans-national legal order for trade, 
erected through U.S. and European initiative following World War II and 
deepened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would decline and fall.557 
To maintain the WTO as a multilateral organization to foster economic 
order, stabilize growth, and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes 
through law, the U.S., Europe, and China would need to join efforts. Prospects 
are dimming. The WTO is no nirvana (no institution is), but the alternative of 
unchecked economic nationalism could be dire. The world has experienced the 
implications of U.S. abandonment of an international institution, the League of 
Nations, especially when economic crises break.558 Will post-Cold War institu-
tions show resilience? Are current trends so strong that they will catalyze in-
ternational regime change? Will the world fall into darker times? Time will 
tell. To paraphrase Peng from this Article’s epigraph, we are in the history and 
make the history with the choices we make today. 
                                                                                                                                      
 556. See Sewell Chan, A Future Haunted by Ghosts of the Past, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/world/europe/a-future-haunted-by-ghosts-of-the-past.html (quoting for-
mer Greek foreign minister on the “rise of nationalism, populism, demagogy and xenophobia”); David E. 
Sanger, Hopes for Democracy’s Spread Meet with Harsh Facts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/hopes-for-democracys-spread-meet-with-harsh-facts.html (rise of 
nativism). In the U.S., for example, the Republican candidate Donald Trump successfully attacked “bad trade 
deals” and trade with China to build support at the same time that he vowed to put the Democratic candidate 
Hillary Clinton in jail once elected. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley, How the Politics of Trade Changed So Fast, 
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